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ABSTRACT 
 
The emerging technology of mobile devices and cloud computing has brought a new and 
efficient way for data to be collected, processed and stored by mobile users. With 
improved specifications of mobile devices and various mobile applications provided by 
cloud servers, mobile users can enjoy tremendous advantages to manage their daily life 
through those applications instantaneously, conveniently and productively. However, 
using such applications may lead to the exposure of user data to unauthorised access when 
the data is outsourced for processing and storing purposes. Furthermore, such a setting 
raises the privacy breach and security issue to mobile users. As a result, mobile users 
would be reluctant to accept those applications without any guarantee on the safety of 
their data.  
The recent breakthrough of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) has brought a new 
solution for data processing in a secure motion. Several variants and improvements on 
the existing methods have been developed due to efficiency problems. Experience of such 
problems has led us to explore two areas of studies, Mobile Sensing Systems (MSS) and 
Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC). In MSS, the functionality of smartphones has been 
extended to sense and aggregate surrounding data for processing by an Aggregation 
Server (AS) that may be operated by a Cloud Service Provider (CSP). On the other hand, 
MCC allows resource-constraint devices like smartphones to fully leverage services 
provided by powerful and massive servers of CSPs for data processing.  
To support the above two application scenarios, this thesis proposes two novel schemes: 
an Accountable Privacy-preserving Data Aggregation (APDA) scheme and a Lightweight 
Homomorphic Encryption (LHE) scheme.  
MSS is a kind of WSNs, which implements a data aggregation approach for saving the 
battery lifetime of mobile devices. Furthermore, such an approach could improve the 
security of the outsourced data by mixing the data prior to be transmitted to an AS, so as 
to prevent the collusion between mobile users and the AS (or its CSP). The exposure of 
users’ data to other mobile users leads to a privacy breach and existing methods on 
preserving users’ privacy only provide an integrity check on the aggregated data without 
being able to identify any misbehaved nodes once the integrity check has failed. Thus, to 
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overcome such problems, our first scheme APDA is proposed to efficiently preserve 
privacy and support accountability of mobile users during the data aggregation. 
Furthermore, APDA is designed with three versions to provide balanced solutions in 
terms of misbehaved node detection and data aggregation efficiency for different 
application scenarios. 
In addition, the successfully aggregated data also needs to be accompanied by some 
summary information based on necessary additive and non-additive functions. To 
preserve the privacy of mobile users, such summary could be executed by implementing 
existing privacy-preserving data aggregation techniques. Nevertheless, those techniques 
have limitations in terms of applicability, efficiency and functionality. Thus, our APDA 
has been extended to allow maximal value finding to be computed on the ciphertext data 
so as to preserve user privacy with good efficiency. Furthermore, such a solution could 
also be developed for other comparative operations like Average, Percentile and 
Histogram. Three versions of Maximal value finding (Max) are introduced and analysed 
in order to differentiate their efficiency and capability to determine the maximum value 
in a privacy-preserving manner. Moreover, the formal security proof and extensive 
performance evaluation of our proposed schemes demonstrate that APDA and its 
extended version can achieve stronger security with an optimised efficiency advantage 
over the state-of-the-art in terms of both computational and communication overheads.  
In the MCC environment, the new LHE scheme is proposed with a significant difference 
so as to allow arbitrary functions to be executed on ciphertext data. Such a scheme will 
enable rich-mobile applications provided by CSPs to be leveraged by resource-constraint 
devices in a privacy-preserving manner. The scheme works well as long as noise (a 
random number attached to the plaintext for security reasons) is less than the encryption 
key, which makes it flexible. The flexibility of the key size enables the scheme to 
incorporate with any computation functions in order to produce an accurate result. In 
addition, this scheme encrypts integers rather than individual bits so as to improve the 
scheme’s efficiency. With a proposed process that allows three or more parties to 
communicate securely, this scheme is suited to the MCC environment due to its 
lightweight property and strong security. Furthermore, the efficacy and efficiency of this 
scheme are thoroughly evaluated and compared with other schemes. The result shows 
that this scheme can achieve stronger security under a reasonable cost.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 FOREWORD 
The role of society has emerged to depend on a number of key sensing systems due to 
rapid technology advance over recent decades. In sensing systems, mobile users are 
becoming the main contributors to the data creation as they are actively contributing to 
data generating and processing via the use of mobile devices such as smartphones and 
tablets. With the emerging technology of mobile devices, more sensors can be embedded 
in the devices to collect, process and distribute data among people. As data is shared and 
distributed among people and processed by arbitrary applications, there is a serious risk 
of unattended leakage of personal sensitive information such as personal health 
information, user locations and sensitive personal images and videos. Such a scenario has 
led to the rise of concerns about user privacy and data security in mobile applications [1], 
[2].  
To overcome such concerns, secure communication is required to protect user privacy 
and data security. One solution to this concern is to use an encryption scheme that enables 
data to be protected against unauthorised users and also allows the encrypted data to be 
processed by arbitrary applications without any need for decryption. Thus, in this chapter, 
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MSS and MCC are introduced, along with a discussion on the motivation behind the 
research in this thesis. The contributions to knowledge are also presented, in addition to 
the aims and objectives of the work, the methodology taken and the thesis structure.   
1.2 MOBILE COMPUTING 
Nowadays, mobile devices like smartphones and tablets are the most effective and 
convenient communication tools that are not bounded by time and place. Mobile devices 
are quickly gaining popularity due to the support for a wide range of applications like 
gaming, image processing, video processing and online social network services. 
According to International Data Corporation (IDC)’s statistics, the worldwide 
smartphones market grew 13% year over year in 2015, with totalling encompassing 341.5 
million shipments of these devices. Furthermore, the revenue of mobile app stores was 
near $40 billion in 2015 and expected to reach $100 billion in 2020 [2]–[6]. 
Mobile users can enjoy various services from mobile applications like iPhone and Google 
apps. Such rapid progress of the mobile computing is achieved via the great advance of 
the smartphones in terms of computing resources in the past few years. The latest 
smartphones are equipped with high performance processors, RAM, sensors and data 
storage. According to [7], Sony Xperia S comes with a 1.5GHz Dual Core processor, 1GB 
RAM, 32GB data storage support and 1750mAh battery. Similarly, HTC One X has a 
1.5GHz Quad-core processor, 1GB RAM, 32GB data storage support and 1800mAh 
battery.  
However, according to [8], though mobile devices have significantly increased their 
capabilities, those devices still have serious limitations to execute complicated 
computations. This limitation can be shown by comparing mobile devices to desktop 
machines. Devices like iPhones, Android Series and Mobile Window Series have slightly 
lower processing capabilities and significantly reduced memory capacities. Furthermore, 
their storage capacities are at 5 to 10 times smaller as well as their network bandwidth. In 
some cases, mobile services or applications require extensive computing power and 
massive storage spaces to run on mobile devices [9].  Thus, the mobile devices with low 
resources compared to desktop machines will suffer from a negative effect on the service 
operation and quality [5].  
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1.2.1 MOBILE SENSING SYSTEMS 
MSS has received a great deal of attention due to the rapid development in mobile phones 
via extending their capabilities to sense and process urban information. MSS may be 
composed of thousands of mobile nodes like smartphones and an aggregator like a CSP 
that are connected through the wireless medium. In MSS, mobile devices are embedded 
with sensors to sense surrounding data like health information in a distributed manner. 
The sensing data is collected and transmitted using a technique called data aggregation to 
increase the battery lifetime of mobile devices. Such an aggregation technique also 
increases the network lifetime by reducing the bandwidth size of data to be transmitted 
and battery energy usage [1], [10]–[12]. The collected data is transmitted to the aggregator 
for further process in order to generate some useful information, which benefits to the 
mobile users.  
1.2.2 MOBILE CLOUD COMPUTING 
The emerging technology in mobile devices mainly in terms of computing resources and 
storage spaces has led MCC to receive a great deal of attention for further exploration and 
enhancement. On the one hand, such enhancements allow initial processing on the data 
such as encryption and decryption by mobile devices before outsourcing the data to the 
CSPs. Those processing are essential to protect the data and preserve the privacy of 
mobile users against the CSPs. On the other hand, as cloud computing services have 
emerged to suit the mobile devices implementation, rich-mobile applications have been 
developed to attract billions mobile users to leverage those services in a very convenient 
way with very minimal efforts through wireless connections and mobile devices [13]. The 
widespread Internet infrastructure like Wi-Fi and high-speed mobile Internet access like 
4G allow those applications provided by the CSPs (e.g. Amazon, Google and Microsoft 
Azure) to be widely available and reliable to be accessed and leveraged by mobile users 
[14] .  
In the next section, we describe data outsourcing techniques that allow data to be gathered 
and processed by the AS like a CSP. Those techniques allow mobile devices, which have 
limited capabilities mainly in term of battery lifetime, to reduce their battery consumption 
by outsourcing the data and their related processing to the AS.        
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1.3 DATA OUTSOURCING 
Data outsourcing is one of the best solutions, which allows data to be processed remotely 
in an efficient and secure manner. This data outsourcing is crucial particularly for 
resource-constrained devices like smartphones and tablets, by leveraging tremendous 
benefits provided by powerful and massive servers of CSPs. Furthermore, such a 
technique could improve the battery lifetime of mobile devices as they can avoid intensive 
data processing by themselves. In this thesis, two techniques of data outsourcing will be 
exploited, namely, data offloading and data aggregation. 
1.3.1 DATA AGGREGATION TECHNIQUE 
In MSS, data aggregation is a good technique for allowing useful data, which has been 
generated or sensed by mobile devices, to be gathered and processed efficiently by an AS 
for statistical analysis purposes. Such a technique is proposed to increase the battery 
lifetime of mobile nodes as the aggregated data reduces the number of bits transmitted, 
so as to reduce the bandwidth usage in the data transmission [15]–[17]. Reducing the 
bandwidth in the data transmission increases the battery lifetime of mobile devices [18]. 
Furthermore, this technique could improve users or data contributors’ privacy and 
security against a malicious AS due to this technique mixing the collected data prior to 
the transmission to the AS so that it is difficult for the AS to identify the data from any 
particular individual contributor [11], [19], [20]. However, the technique does not 
preserve privacy among the data contributors as the data could be distributed from one 
distributor to another in a plaintext form [21]. Such an issue has received a great attention 
from researchers to propose privacy-preserving data aggregation techniques based on 
homomorphic properties [18], [22]–[25]. Such properties allow data to be processed in 
its ciphertext form without the need for decryption, so as to hide personal information of 
the data owner from the processor. Having a scheme with lightweight properties (i.e. 
demanding less resources from mobile devices for the encryption) would enable the 
concern to be addressed efficiently and securely. 
1.3.2 OFFLOADING TECHNIQUE 
In MCC, the battery lifetime of mobile devices can be extended by offloading their large 
tasks like complex mathematical calculations, search functions, image processing, 
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gaming applications, downloading files and security applications to powerful and massive 
servers [26]. The work in [5] shows that portable computers that execute their large tasks 
remotely can save significant amounts of battery power by up to 51%. Furthermore, a 
computation offloading technique avoids taking a long application execution time on 
mobile devices, which requires a large amount of power consumption [5], [27]. To apply 
this offloading technique, some previous works have been carried out to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the technique through experiments. The results demonstrate that the 
remote application execution can save energy significantly [28]. However, offloading 
may not be always the best option as some factors like the network connectivity, 
communication bandwidth, utilisation cost and mobile device energy have to be 
considered. Furthermore, security is one of the most prominent bottlenecks in the 
adoption of the offloading technique [7].  
1.4 MOTIVATIONS 
1.4.1 USER PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY 
The data shifted to other parties for storing and processing purposes can have implications 
on its privacy and security [29], [30]. Since the data is processed by the other parties, all 
the information about the data is disclosed to them. Such a factor makes it evident that all 
the data cannot be outsourced without considering the privacy and security implications 
[31]–[34]. One possible solution to outsourcing data is to transform it into an encrypted 
form. This solution can prevent unauthorized access to the data. However, if the data is 
encrypted, then it normally needs to be decrypted by a third party in order to perform 
operations on the data [34]–[40]. Such decryption allows the third party to gain some or 
all of the information about the data [41]–[43]. To overcome this problem, Fully 
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) that supports arbitrary functions on ciphertext data 
seems to be one of the best solutions because of its properties for encrypted data to be 
processed without decryption [44], [45], [46]–[49]. Thus, a new lightweight HE scheme 
needs to be proposed to allow ciphertext data to be processed securely and efficiently by 
CSPs. 
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1.4.2 PROBLEM ON HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION  
A lot of FHE schemes have been proposed and improved upon but efficiency is still a big 
obstacle for their implementation. This efficiency is due to the fact that the complexity of 
the FHE schemes is normally high, which makes them not suitable to be implemented 
especially on small devices like smartphones, tablets, etc. [36], [37], [46], [48], [49]. 
Furthermore, performing data encryption before outsourcing the data requires additional 
processing by the mobile device and hence consumes extra energy [50]. Also the resource 
limitation of mobile devises means that security algorithms proposed for desktop machine 
environments may not directly work on the mobile devices. Therefore, a scheme with 
lower complexity is really needed to execute the encryption process on small devices 
without much resource degradation [51]. 
1.4.3 LIMITATION ON MOBILE DEVICES 
Mobile devices nowadays have evolved in their specifications and technology. However, 
they still have a limited amount of processing power compared to desktop machines. To 
encrypt using a FHE scheme, the devices require a large amount of processing power 
[25], [52]. Furthermore, mobile devices need to be charged regularly as higher 
computation in generating the ciphertext can quickly decrease the lifetime of the battery. 
Moreover, a large ciphertext size produced by the encryption scheme requires a large 
bandwidth for transmitting the data that leads to decreasing the battery lifetime even 
further [1], [4], [7], [12], [50], [53]. Therefore, a lightweight scheme is demanded to allow 
ciphertext data to be generated by mobile devices resource-efficiently and can be 
processed by other parties without sacrificing the privacy of user data and disclosing its 
information [52], [53]. 
1.4.4 ACCOUNTABILITY 
As the privacy of mobile users is becoming a major concern in data outsourcing, 
preserving their privacy is really crucial. However, this privacy-preserving leads to 
another difficulty of supporting the accountability of the users’ behaviour in order to deter 
some users from misbehaving, who could misuse the privacy preservation property to 
hide users’ identities for malicious purposes. The accountability here is referring to 
holding mobile users involved in collecting and processing the data in a network 
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responsible for their behaviour. This accountability is important because the data 
collected must be genuine and processed correctly to ensure the integrity of the final 
result.  
In mobile networks, participating users could consist of both well-behaved and 
misbehaved users [54]. The misbehaved users are those who have a specific interest 
outside their responsibility [55] for providing the requested data to an AS. They might 
want to discover other users’ sensor data and use it for their own purposes. Furthermore, 
the misbehaved users may contribute fake data [56] that leads to a wrong result at the end 
of the process [57]. Identifying such users in the data aggregation process is very 
challenging. An appropriate technique needs to be proposed to detect and hold the 
misbehaved users accountable for their misbehaviour, while minimising device 
performance degradation. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The motivations stated above have led us to list some research questions that need 
appropriate solutions to be figured out from this research work. Those questions are listed 
as below: 
1.5.1  In MSS, the integrity of aggregated data received from mobile users could be 
verified if the data is in a plaintext form. However, such a form of data reveals the 
data content as well as the privacy of the data contributors to the aggregator. Thus, 
how can a scheme be provided to verify the integrity of the aggregated data 
without revealing the content and the privacy of the data contributors as well as 
reducing energy consumption of mobile devices? 
1.5.2  In MSS, data contributors may consist of both well-behaved and misbehaved 
nodes. Tracking such misbehaved nodes in a privacy-preserving environment is 
crucial and challenging due to the inherent limitations of mobile devices. Thus, 
how can we track down those misbehaved nodes in such an environment without 
increasing the energy consumption of mobile devices?  
1.5.3 In MSS, the aggregated data needs further processing to produce some meaningful 
results to the data users. Thus, how can a scheme be provided to support additive 
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and non-additive functions without revealing the data content and increasing the 
energy consumption of mobile devices? 
1.5.4 In MCC, the generated data is transmitted directly by mobile users to a Cloud 
Server (CS) for data processing. As MCC uses a different structure and 
computational functions compared to MSS, a different encryption scheme needs 
to be implemented. Thus, how can we provide a scheme that allows a CS to 
process the data arbitrarily without revealing the data content, compromising the 
privacy of mobile users and increasing the energy consumption of mobile devices? 
1.5.5 All the aforementioned schemes must be secured against potential threats and 
attacks in both MSS and MCC environments. Thus, how can it be proved that the 
proposed schemes are secured against those threats and attacks?  
1.6 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The research questions stated above have led us to propose the development of two novel 
schemes for the MSS and MCC application scenarios. The key aim of the schemes is to 
enable data to be collected, stored and processed in its ciphertext form efficiently and 
securely by mobile devices. This needs to provide strong data security and preserve user 
privacy while holding the users accountable for their behaviour.  
This research aim is achieved through the completion of multiple research objectives, 
including: 
1.6.1 To develop a novel scheme, which can verify the integrity of aggregated data in 
MSS while preserving mobile users’ privacy. This objective has been achieved by 
using an extensive literature survey on privacy-preserving data aggregation 
techniques to provide the proposed novel APDA, which is able to verify the 
integrity of aggregated data without disclosing any information related to mobile 
users to the CSPs as to be described in Chapter 2 and 4.  
1.6.2 To propose an innovative scheme that can detect any misbehaved nodes in a data 
aggregation process in MSS without compromising individual nodes’ data 
privacy. Such an objective has been achieved by using the proposed APDA with 
various versions to detect any misbehaved nodes in the aggregation process 
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certainly and efficiently as to be described in Chapter 4. In addition, we have 
evaluated those versions to fulfil this objective as to be described in Chapter 5.   
1.6.3 To extend the functionality of the above proposed scheme to support additive and 
non-additive statistical functions over encrypted data certainly and efficiently. We 
have developed an extended APDA by introducing three versions of a maximal 
value function in Chapter 4 and evaluated those versions in Chapter 5 to fulfil this 
objective. 
1.6.4 To design a new FHE scheme, which has a lightweight property applicable to 
resource-constrained devices in MCC. This objective has been achieved by the 
proposed new LHE scheme that supports both addition and multiplication in an 
encrypted form as to be described in Chapter 6. Furthermore, we have evaluated 
this scheme to fulfil this objective and described it at end of this chapter. 
1.6.5 To design secure schemes without scarifying the privacy of mobile users during 
data outsourcing. This objective has been fulfilled by the extensive security 
analyses provided on the proposed schemes against several attacks launched by a 
curious AS or malicious devices as well as attacks on the schemes themselves 
such as key recovery attacks and a many time pad attack. We have shown in 
Chapter 5 and 6 that our schemes are secured against those attacks. 
1.7 NOVEL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis offers two kinds of homomorphic encryption schemes, which have some 
essential characteristics that are desired by many applications on processing data in an 
encrypted form. The main novel contributions of our research work are as follows: 
1.7.1 In MSS, mobile users or their devices may consist of both well-behaved and 
misbehaved ones [21], [54], [58]–[65]. Holding a device accountable for its 
behaviour in such an environment is a very challenging task as the data is 
encrypted to preserve the users’ privacy. Therefore, our first contribution is to 
propose a novel privacy-preserving data aggregation technique called APDA. 
This scheme allows data to be aggregated in a privacy-preserving manner with an 
improved functionality that enables misbehaved nodes to be detected by an AS. 
Three approaches are introduced with varying capabilities. APDAW is proposed 
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to efficiently determine misbehaved nodes with less certainty. It offers lower 
computation and communication as there is no digital signature included in the 
ciphertext data. Conversely, APDAS is proposed to certainly pinpoint which nodes 
have misbehaved, but its efficiency is lower. It requires high computation and 
communication as signatures are involved to detect misbehaved nodes with 
certainty. To take advantage of the strengths of these two methods and rectify their 
weaknesses, APDAH is proposed by mixing both versions to certainly pinpoint the 
misbehaved nodes with better efficiency. 
1.7.2 In data aggregation, the purpose of having aggregated data is to generate additive 
and non-additive statistical results like Count, Sum, Average, Min/Max and 
Percentile. A number of researchers have proposed schemes to allow such 
functions to be executed on ciphertext data. Nevertheless, their limitations on 
efficiency and functionality are still the major challenges for their implementation 
[19], [21], [23], [66]–[73]. Thus, our second contribution is to propose an 
extended version of ADPA to support maximal value finding with better security 
and efficiency. Such an extended version could be developed for other 
comparative operations but is excluded from this thesis. Three modes of the 
scheme for determining a maximum value with different capabilities are proposed. 
MaxC is designed to accurately determine the maximum value, but its efficiency 
is lower. Conversely, MaxB is developed to efficiently determine the maximum 
value with less certainty. To take advantage of both methods, MaxH is proposed 
as a mixed version of the methods to more efficiently determine the maximum 
value with certainty.  
1.7.3 The existing FHE schemes cannot be directly implemented by resource-
constrained devices as complexity and efficiency are the big obstacles for their 
implementation [34], [37], [44], [47], [48], [58], [74], [75]. The main reason of 
such complexity and inefficiency is that those schemes encrypt every individual 
bit and require a large public key size for each encryption [35], [76]. These 
conditions rapidly reduce the battery lifetime of mobile devices during encrypting 
the data. Thus, implementing such schemes requires extra computing resources to 
encrypt and decrypt the data, more bandwidth for transmitting the data and more 
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storage spaces for storing the data [1], [11], [38], [46], [59]. Therefore, our third 
contribution is to propose a new LHE scheme with less complexity but remains 
strong security to be implemented in MCC, so as to extend the battery lifetime of 
mobile devices. This scheme supports arbitrary functions on ciphertext data and 
it works well as long as the size of noise is less than that of the encryption key. 
This flexibility of the key size selection enables the scheme to incorporate any 
computation functions with better efficiency. As a result, such a scheme allows 
mobile devices, which have limited computing resources and storage spaces, to 
leverage rich mobile applications provided by CSPs in an efficient and secure 
manner.  
1.8 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The research detailed in this thesis is divided into six (6) chapters. An overview for each 
of the remaining chapters is provided as below. 
Chapter 2 – Mobile Sensing Systems and Mobile Cloud Computing: This chapter 
investigates associated research into processing data in an encrypted form. Furthermore, 
we define what MSS are, how they function, what weaknesses they tend to have and how 
they are currently protected against threats using data aggregation and partially HE 
schemes. Moreover, MCC is also explored to give an overview of how mobile 
applications could benefit from the emerging technology of cloud computing. 
Chapter 3 – Mathematical Foundation: This chapter will draw some of the mathematical 
concepts that have been used and utilised throughout this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter 
will give an overview into the fundamental concepts and the development of FHE 
schemes. In addition, research methodology will be presented at the end of this chapter. 
 Chapter 4 – Accountable Privacy-preserving Data Aggregation: In this chapter, the 
design of APDA and its extended version to support maximal value finding on aggregated 
data will be presented. It will entail an outline of its specification, a detailed discussion 
on its architecture and an explanation of its operation.  
Chapter 5 – Security Analysis and Performance Evaluation of APDA and Max Methods. 
This chapter provides security analysis and performance evaluation on the proposed 
schemes. This chapter also describes a detailed analysis of the data aggregation results. 
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A visual interpretation of the data aggregation process and a justification of the results 
obtained will also be put forward in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 – A New Lightweight Homomorphic Encryption Scheme: In this chapter, we 
propose a new LHE scheme that allows mobile users to leverage rich mobile applications 
provided by CSPs. The scheme will be compared with other schemes to demonstrate its 
efficiency. Furthermore, an in-depth security analysis will be provided to show that 
although the scheme has lightweight features, it can still provide stronger security to 
protect the encrypted data. 
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Future Work: In the final chapter of this thesis, the research 
presented here will be concluded by discussing the accomplishments of this research 
work. This chapter will also highlight how future work can be built on for research 
purposes. 
1.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an overview of the thesis related to MSS and MCC. The issues 
of user privacy and accountability as well as data security and integrity, which are 
becoming major concerns in both MSS and MCC, have motivated us to conduct the 
research presented in this thesis for better solutions. To achieve this, five project 
objectives have been set out and the accomplishment of these objectives has resulted in 
three novel research contributions, which are the APDA scheme, its extended version and 
the LHE scheme. APDA is proposed to support the accountability of users’ behaviours, 
while its extended version is devised to allow some statistical calculations to be executed 
efficiently in a privacy-preserving manner. Furthermore, the new LHE scheme is 
developed to suit MCC needs on lightweight and strong security properties. Also the 
thesis structure is provided at the end of this chapter to briefly describe the following 
chapters in this thesis. The next chapter will thoroughly describe how both MSS and MCC 
are implemented and figure out all benefits and limitations inherent in both paradigms.    
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOBILE SENSING SYSTEMS AND MOBILE 
CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The emerging technology of computing paradigms has opened up a new way for data to 
be shared and benefited among mobile users. Support from cloud computing has also 
signified the rise of MSS and MCC to mobile users as all burdens of heavy computations 
are taken and managed by the cloud server. In addition, the wide spread of network 
communication links such as Wi-Fi access and high-speed technology like 3G/4G have 
contributed to this achievement. Nevertheless, as data is user-generated content, it may 
consist of sensitive information related to mobile users. Sharing and disclosing such data 
to other parties like other mobile users or a cloud server can lead to a disaster for the data 
contributors as such parties are assumed to be untrusted. They may misuse the data for 
their own benefits. Experiencing security issues such as privacy, confidentiality, 
accountability and integrity of the shared data has prevented mobile users from 
contributing their data into such systems as there is no guarantee how their data will be 
protected. Thus, this chapter introduces and explores two areas of studies, which are MSS 
and MCC.  
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MSS is gaining more popularity as more sensors can be embedded in the mobile devices 
so that the devices can provide better sensing functionality than wireless sensor nodes [1], 
[23], [67], [71]. Sensors that are built into mobile phones on the one hand, are more 
powerful than traditional sensor nodes as they can be conveniently recharged. 
Furthermore, such sensing systems can not only sense a surrounding environment like 
road congestion and crowd in an event but also information related to mobile users like 
health information and locations. In an urban area, the sensed data can be collected on a 
massive scale by leveraging thousands of individual mobile phones and a near-pervasive 
wireless-network infrastructure like Wi-Fi access [56].  
On the other hand, some mobile applications like gaming and complex mathematical 
algorithms require extensive computing resources and massive storage spaces to be 
executed by mobile devices. Running such applications on mobile devices is not practical 
as it reduces the battery lifetime rapidly. Thus, MCC is introduced to mobile devices in 
order to leverage the tremendous advantages provided by cloud computing to resolve such 
limitations. MCC is one of the interesting research areas in cloud computing. This is due 
to the main objectives of cloud computing, which are to facilitate access to ample 
computing resources by small and resource-constrained devices like smartphones and 
tablets. Furthermore, mobile users can experience with rich mobile applications through 
the widespread third/fourth generation (3G/4G) mobile networks and Wi-Fi access. 
According to [53], MCC can be defined as “a rich mobile computing technology that 
leverages unified elastic resources of varied clouds and network technologies toward 
unrestricted functionality, storage and mobility to serve a multitude of mobile devices 
anywhere, anytime through the channel of Ethernet or Internet regardless of 
heterogeneous environments and platforms based on the pay-as-you-use principle”.   
In the following sub-sections, service models, benefits and limitations inherent within 
both MSS and MCC will be explained. Such explanations are essential to understand the 
issues in both areas of studies in order to provide solutions to their existing problems.  
2.2 MOBILE SENSING SYSTEMS 
MSSs differ significantly from traditional WSNs that focus on urban environments for 
sensing and collecting data. In MSSs, sensing devices belong to individuals with diverse 
  
 
15 
 
interests, while in WSNs, the sensor nodes are owned and managed by a single authority. 
Furthermore, mobile devices have better computing resources and storage spaces than 
sensor nodes and can be recharged regularly. Moreover, MSSs feature dynamic node 
mobility, while WSNs mostly consist of static sensing elements, which are either 
physically placed or randomly distributed across a target area of interest [77].  
On the other hand, mobile sensing data is more related to personal information rather than 
environmental, agricultural or industrial monitoring data in WSNs. In MSSs, humans act 
as data contributors, while in WSNs, sensor nodes are responsible for sensing and 
generating data to be collected and processed by an AS [78]. Though both MSSs and 
WSNs have significant differences, both types of application may gather sensed data 
using the same approach called data aggregation as it can increase the overall lifetime of 
the applications. The reason is that, such an approach requires less bandwidth for 
transmitting the aggregated data and uses less battery energy. 
2.2.1 SYSTEM APPROACH 
A MSS leverages a data aggregation approach in order to increase its overall network 
lifetime. For example, in hierarchical networks, special nodes are used to aggregate the 
sensed data in order to decrease the number of data packets transmitted to the root node 
like a CSP. As a result, the energy efficiency of the whole network can be improved as 
less bandwidth requires for data transmission. Such networks consist of several categories 
like cluster-based, chain-based and tree-based networks. In brief, each category of 
hierarchical networks can be described as follows.  
Cluster-based networks consist of a cluster head, gateway nodes and ordinary sensor 
nodes as shown in Figure 1. In this network, sensor nodes are divided into clusters and 
the data that is sensed by sensor nodes is sent to a high end sensor called a cluster head 
in each cluster. A cluster head aggregates all the data and transmits the aggregated data 
via a tree structure to the base station. In addition, the gateway nodes link adjacent 
clusters. On the other hand, chain-based networks comprise of sensor nodes, leader heads 
and a sink node as illustrated in Figure 2. In such networks, each sensor node 
communicates and transmits the sensed data only to the closer neighbour to form a chain 
using an algorithm like a greedy algorithm [79]. This formed chain will lead to the leader 
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node, which collects and submits the data to the sink node [80]. Such a setting reduces 
the distance of data transmission so as to decrease the energy dissipation per round [81].  
 
 
 
 
 
In tree-based networks, all nodes are organized into a tree or in a hierarchical form as 
shown in Figure 3. The intermediary nodes help to perform data aggregation and transmit 
the aggregated data upwards towards the root node [21].  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Cluster-based Networks 
Figure 2: Chain-based Networks 
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- Leaf nodes (children): resource-limited sensor nodes/data collecting 
sensors.  
- Intermediary nodes (parent/grandparent): act as intermediary data 
aggregators, aggregating the data received from their child nodes and 
forwarding the aggregated results to their parents. 
 - Tree root: a resource-enhanced server. 
2.2.2 BENEFITS 
A MSS implements data aggregation to gather useful data and expresses the result in a 
summary form such as additive and non-additive statistical calculations. It has become 
one of the fundamental processing procedures for saving the energy in WSNs. The main 
goal of data aggregation algorithms is to gather and aggregate data in an energy efficient 
manner so that the network lifetime will be prolonged and reduce the latency of receiving 
data by the sink. The overall network lifetime is increased because the data aggregation 
implementation reduces redundancy in the transmitted data. Furthermore, such a 
technique can solve the implosion and overlap problems in data centric routing.  
Data aggregation also reduces the number of data transmissions and retransmissions. As 
a result, this technique will directly decrease energy consumption and hence increase the 
overall network lifetime [131]. Moreover, this technique reduces the number of bits 
Figure 3: Tree-based Networks 
AS 
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transmitted, thereby decreasing the bandwidth usage. In addition to reducing the number 
of data transmissions and retransmissions, data aggregation will directly reduce the 
number of collisions and the wastage of time. Finally, the data aggregation increases 
robustness and accuracy of information obtained from the network [16]. Nevertheless, 
such an approach still has some major issues related to the aspects of data security and 
integrity as well as user privacy and accountability. 
2.2.3 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
Data aggregation offers great advantages to prolong a network lifetime especially in 
WSNs and MSS. Nevertheless, this technique also presents significant challenges to the 
data and mobile users. One of the major challenges is the security of the sensed data itself 
as the data is tied to specific individuals. For instance, an adversary wishes to discover 
the data in order to reveal some information that can be used to identify a user’s location. 
Furthermore, the integrity of the sensed data is also important. The data that has been 
aggregated must be genuine to ensure that some statistical results could be correctly 
generated. CarTel [8] and VTrack [3] are the examples of data integrity breaches that use 
traffic statistics such as an average speed as an indicator of congestion to help system 
users to do route planning. A malicious driver may manipulate the aggregate result to 
prevent other users from choosing its current road.  
Moreover, in a MSS, mobile data is shared among users to allow data to be aggregated 
and processed by an AS (or a CSP). Nevertheless, users are reluctant to share their data 
as their privacy like personal and location information could be disclosed to the system. 
In [77], a study of the relationship between air quality and public health is one of the 
examples, where the study required some information related to personal health data such 
as heart rates, blood pressure levels and weights at different sections of an urban area. 
Mobile users were reluctant to reveal their personal data if their data would be used to 
invade their privacy. In addition, as such data is very crucial to determine the health 
condition of the data owner, the data should be genuine and reliable. Such examples 
highlight the necessity for verifiable privacy-preserving data aggregation techniques that 
can ensure strong user privacy and also aggregation integrity [23], [56]. 
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Finally, the system may consist of well-behaved and misbehaved users with an easy 
access to wireless networks that may have a weak security control.  A node could 
misbehave by refusing to forward necessary data packets in order to save its energy 
(selfishness) or simply degrade network performance (maliciousness). Furthermore, this 
node may modify their devices in terms of software or hardware to increase their 
individual network benefit while expending less resources. To prevent such concerns, 
every network device can be equipped with a tamper-proof hardware.  However, this 
accessory requires extra costs as such a hardware is not cheap [8]. Hence, the network 
must be able to detect instances of misbehaviour, identify the misbehaving nodes and 
revoke them from the aggregation process [55]. Such challenges provide a new research 
area of study to propose solutions to the stated problems. 
2.2.4 EXISTING SOLUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Some contributions have been made through several projects like MetroTrack [82] and 
SensorPlanet [12] to accelerate the rise of MSSs. For example, SensorPlanet is a Nokia 
initiated global research framework for mobile device-centric WSNs [12]. These projects 
have attracted several universities and companies to work together to facilitate research 
on data analysis and mining, visualization and machine learning.  
The UCLA Urban Sensing initiative is proposed to compose a sensor-based recording of 
users’ experiences and environments [12]. Furthermore, the Intel-sponsored Urban 
Atmospheres project is proposed to explore the human condition by using embedded 
sensors in mobile devices. Also the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cartel project 
provides a mobile communications infrastructure based on car-mounted communication 
platforms exploiting open Wi-Fi access points in a city, and it provides urban-sensing 
information such as traffic conditions [23]. Moreover, the CitySense project involving 
Harvard University, the city of Cambridge (Massachusetts, USA) and BBN Technologies 
provides a static sensor mesh offering similar types of urban sensing data feeds [31]. 
Though such projects have facilitated the rise of MSSs, the key issue of how to preserve 
the privacy of mobile users is still a big challenge on the urban sensing implementation. 
Thus, a number of solutions have been proposed to deal with the issue as described in 
Sub-section 2.2.3. AnonySense is a privacy-aware architecture for realising pervasive 
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applications that is based on collaborative and opportunistic sensing by personal devices. 
This solution has focused on protecting the privacy of participants of sensing data while 
allowing their devices to reliably contribute high-quality data to the large-scale 
applications. This scheme incorporates new privacy-aware techniques into secure tasking 
and reporting, and demonstrates that their solution consumes minimum device resources. 
The scheme can also protect privacy against outside eavesdroppers and other mobile 
nodes [59]. However, according to Ziling, E., et al., such a solution does not protect 
privacy against other ASs. The scheme also does not support additive and non-additive 
aggregation functions on ciphertext data. Furthermore, the scheme does not support node 
failure and data loss resilience, which refers to whether the AS can compute a correct 
aggregate result when a few mobile nodes become offline or a few messages get lost [67].  
To overcome the disadvantages of AnonySense, PriSense has been proposed to provide 
a novel solution to privacy-preserving data aggregation in People-Centric Urban Sensing 
Systems (PC-USSs) [77]. This scheme is based on the concept of data slicing and mixing 
to preserve the privacy of mobile users against any curious ASs. It also supports a wide 
range of statistical additive and non-additive aggregation functions on ciphertext data. 
Furthermore, the scheme protects privacy against outside eavesdroppers, other mobile 
nodes or the ASs. Nevertheless, according to Ziling, E., et al., this scheme does not 
support node failure and data loss resilience [67]. 
To improve the weaknesses of PriSense, PDA has been proposed in [77]. It is a novel 
privacy-preserving robust data aggregation scheme in PC-USSs. The scheme is designed 
based on 𝐾-anonymity, homomorphic encryption and secret sharing. This scheme also 
supports a wide range of statistical additive functions without leaking individual sensed 
data. Furthermore, PDA is robust to node failure and data loss. Moreover, the scheme 
protects privacy against outside eavesdroppers, other mobile nodes or the ASs [67]. 
However, such a scheme does not support non-additive functions and provides an 
integrity check to the aggregated data, thus preventing the non-genuine data to be 
aggregated.  
In another work, VPA has been proposed to provide a novel peer-to-peer based solution 
to verifiable privacy-preserving data aggregation in PC-USSs [23]. It achieves strong user 
privacy by letting each user exchange random shares of its data with other peers, while 
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ensuring data integrity through a combination of Trusted Platform Module and 
homomorphic encryption Message Authentication Code (MAC). VPA leverages the same 
technique as in PDA, which is the slicing technique to provide data privacy in the 
aggregation process. Furthermore, VPA can support a wide range of statistical additives 
using VPA+ and non-additive aggregation results by implementing VPA⊕.  
However, VPA has to accept that the Max/Min aggregation functions naturally disclose 
some information about a user’s data: any user’s data will be smaller than or equal to the 
maximum value 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 and larger than or equal to the minimum value 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛. The reason 
why the VPA cannot prevent this kind of privacy breach is due to the aggregate functions 
themselves. As a result, VPA ignores such a natural privacy breach and focuses on the 
loss of privacy occurring in the query process [23]. On the other hand, VPA implements 
a signature for each data encryption and thus requires more computing resources to 
compute the signature, i.e. hash values. Furthermore, VPA also provides an integrity 
check on the aggregated data as in PDA. However, if the integrity check has failed, the 
scheme is not able to detect which nodes have misbehaved, and this limitation does not 
allow the scheme to revoke such misbehaved nodes from a further aggregation process.  
As a conclusion, though all the aforementioned schemes guarantee mobile users’ privacy 
while some can securely support statistical analyses on the aggregated data, their scheme 
efficiency still can be improved to prolong the network lifetime of MSS. Furthermore, 
the most essential flaw of the proposed schemes is that, they cannot support the 
accountability of the participating users for their behaviour. Such a limitation prevents 
the system from detecting the misbehaviour instantly, identifying the misbehaving nodes 
and revoking them from a further aggregation procedure. These reasons have led us to 
propose a novel technique that can support participating users’ accountability in a 
privacy-preserving manner.  
On the one hand, the emerging technology of mobile devices has allowed rich-mobile 
applications provided by CSPs to be accessed and leveraged by mobile users via wireless 
links. On the other hand, such improvements allow security elements like encryption and 
decryption processes to be executed by mobile devices to improve the security of the 
outsourcing data. Thus, the next section describes the implementation of mobile devices 
in MCC and how such devices could be benefited by cloud technology to facilitate mobile 
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users to utilise all services provided by CSPs in a privacy-prserving manner with less 
resources degradation.  
2.3 MOBILE CLOUD COMPUTING 
Mobile devices are becoming the major computing component nowadays thanks to their 
prevalence of ubiquitous connection via the high-speed network technology such as 
3G/4G and Wi-Fi access. Nevertheless, limitations on computing resources, storage 
spaces and battery lifetime lead to the need for external support architecture like cloud 
computing as it can provide elastic resources to applications on those devices. The 
implementation of cloud computing by mobile devices has led to the emergence of several 
computing paradigms such as Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) [26], Fog Computing 
[83]–[88] and Mobile-edge Computing (MEC) [89]–[93]. Such paradigms share the same 
concepts and promise better solutions to mobile devices by alleviating all the burdens of 
heavy computations and complex tasks to the cloud servers. Nevertheless, those 
paradigms have specific structures that may only suitable for particular services requested 
by mobile users. Moreover, such paradigms may face other limitations such as security 
issues that need further improvements. 
For instance, Fog computing and MEC provide some advantages mainly in providing low 
latency and improving Quality-of-Service (QoS) for streaming and real-time applications 
as they provide processing and storage resources to lower layers of the computing 
architecture [84], [88], [92]. However, such paradigms introduce other drawbacks in term 
of reliability, as the lower layer devices are not reliable compared to a cloud server [83], 
[93]. In addition, those devices’ connectivity cannot be guaranteed, which implies the 
requested service cannot be fulfilled even its computational hardware is working [83], 
[92]. Furthermore, the edge nodes usually consist of end devices, which are smaller and 
less powerful than a massive and powerful cloud server [85], [94], [95]. Thus, 
applications demanding heavy computations need to be processed by cloud servers. Such 
requirements lead to the need for MCC implementation and its detail is provided in the 
sub-sequent sub-section. 
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2.3.1 ARCHITECTURE 
MCC is designed on a standard cloud service model. Gartner [33] has defined cloud 
computing as a style of computing where massively scalable IT-enabled capabilities are 
delivered ‘as a service’ to external customers using Internet technologies. According to 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) USA, cloud computing is a model 
for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources like networks, servers, storage, applications and 
services that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction [53].  
 
Figure 4: Mobile Cloud Computing Architecture 
In MCC, mobile devices obtain services from a centralized cloud like Amazon Web 
Services (AWS) and Google [72]. The cloud is located in a remote centralized cloud 
infrastructure as illustrated in Figure 4. Mobile devices can access the data centre 
resources through a near-pervasive network infrastructure such as Wi-Fi Access Points 
(APs) or 3G/4G cellular networks. In this setting, the cloud represents a third party to 
provide services to the original content providers and mobile devices. By using the cloud, 
a mobile device can offload part or all of its workload to the cloud in order to process its 
data by utilising the massive cloud resources [14].  
2.3.2 BENEFITS  
(i) An Improvement on computing power and battery resources 
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Even though the capability of mobile devices has been improved, certain facilities like 
wireless communication appear to be highly power-consumptive. Several techniques in 
[96] have been introduced to reduce the power consumption and save energy during 
communication. Furthermore, the battery lifetime can be extended by offloading large 
tasks for remote processing. The work in [96] shows that the portable computers 
executing their large tasks remotely can save up to 51% of battery power. Dinh, H., T., et 
al. [27] proposed a computation offloading technique to outsource large computations 
and complex processing from resource-limited devices to massive resource machines like 
servers in clouds. Such a technique prevents taking long application execution time on 
mobile devices that requires a considerable amount of power consumption on the devices.  
(ii) An improvement on a capacity of data storage 
Mobile devices suffer from limitations on storage capacity. Thus, MCC is developed to 
enable mobile users to store or access a large amount of data on the cloud through wireless 
networks. The Amazon Simple Storage is one of the services provided to facilitate the 
data storage of mobile users. Another example is the Image Exchange which utilizes the 
large storage space in clouds to serve mobile users. By using the cloud storage as a 
service, the users can save significantly their mobile devices’ energy and storage space 
due to all data being stored and processed in the clouds [27]. 
(iii) Cost saving 
In MCC, the costs like time, energy and fees need to be considered carefully prior to 
offloading mobile data to the clouds. This silent commitment can ensure that mobile users 
enjoy all services provided by the clouds under a reasonable cost without degrading their 
mobile device performance. Furthermore, Walker et al. [4] have proposed a model that 
highlights the advantages of leveraging storage from the cloud rather than to buy extra 
computing resources and spend more on the software [9]. 
2.3.3 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
In MCC, mobile users leverage all services provided by the clouds through web 
applications. The data that has been outsourced to the cloud can have implications on 
privacy and security as the data is going out of users’ control into the public domain. 
Furthermore, as the data is stored and managed in the cloud, security and privacy settings 
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depend on the IT management provided by the cloud. On the other hand, the CSP typically 
works with many third party vendors, so there is no guarantee how these vendors may 
safeguard the data. Moreover, data on the cloud may be stored at multiple locations across 
different states and countries. Thus, the security of the data depends on its location, and 
regulations for accessing the data might differ from one country to another [50]. As a 
result, the implications on security and privacy of the data need to be considered prior to 
the data being outsourced to the cloud.  
To remedy such concerns, an encryption technique is one of the possible solutions to 
protect data in the cloud.  This technique prevents unauthorized users from access to 
meaningful data even when the storage is breached at the cloud end. However, if the data 
is encrypted, then it has to be decrypted at the CSP because of the need to perform 
operations on the data. On the other hand, performing the encryption before sending the 
data to the cloud requires some additional processing on the mobile device and consumes 
extra energy [50]. Furthermore, as MCC is a cloud-based environment, all security 
weaknesses of mobile systems are inherited in MCC. Such weaknesses require a different 
approach to be implemented due to resource limitations on the mobile devices. [52].  
2.3.4 EXISTING SOLUTIONS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
Normally, providing strong security and high privacy means requiring more computing 
resources and energy consumption. Furthermore, increasing data security decreases the 
functionality that can be executed on the data [97], [98]. Due to those reasons, a lot of 
research has been conducted to provide security and improve the privacy of outsourced 
data with the consideration of energy consumption and solution efficiency. To ensure the 
integrity of users’ data stored in cloud servers with improved energy efficiency, Itani et 
al. [99] have proposed an energy efficient framework for mobile devices using the 
concept of incremental cryptography and trusted computing. Furthermore, Jia et al. [43] 
have introduced a secure data service that outsources data and security management 
overhead to a cloud in a trusted mode. Also proxy re-encryption and identity-based 
encryption have been implemented to provide data privacy and fine-grained access 
control with small cost and communication overheads. Moreover, Shukla et al. [100] have 
proposed a scheme for smartphones to ensure the security and integrity of mobile users’ 
files stored in cloud servers with low energy consumption.  
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Even though the aforementioned schemes have some advantages to enhance the battery 
lifetime of mobile devices, such schemes are based on trust, which is contrary to our MCC 
setting, where we assume that CSPs are not trusted. Thus, those schemes are not suitable 
for implementation in our setting or environment. To overcome such a problem, privacy-
preserving encryption schemes [60], [101], [102] have been proposed and are summarised 
below. 
(i) Data encryption and related problems 
To ensure data integrity in cloud-based applications, data needs to be protected using 
strong encryption algorithms like RSA. This security measure can also be done through 
any common Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This form of encrypted data is good for 
storage in cloud but rather costly to process [33]. This argument is also supported by other 
researchers who attempt to avoid the use of primitive encryption schemes to protect data 
[33], [102]–[106].  
According to Gentry [107], encrypting one’s data seems to nullify the benefits of such 
data storage servers like clouds. Data encrypted with ordinary encryption schemes makes 
it virtually impossible for someone to manipulate the underlying data in any useful way 
without being able to decrypt them. Furthermore, from the clouds’ point of view, 
encrypting data in the cloud storage prevents the data itself from being processed by SaaS 
or PaaS applications such as Salesforce.com or Google Apps. Moreover, encryption may 
not be suitable since this technique prevents indexing or searching on the data [33], [103]. 
Though such problems have received serious attentions from [108]–[116] to work on 
searchable encryption, the proposed solutions still have limitations and need further 
improvements in order to be implemented in clouds [116]–[118].  
(ii) Alternative methods and related problems 
The difficulty of processing data in its encrypted form has led reseachers to come out with 
other techniques like a technique based on interaction [32], [119]–[123], programme 
obfuscation [124], [125], data and file fragmentation [126], [127] and data concealment 
[105]. Sahai [124] proposed a solution based on how interaction and secure hardware can 
help to compute encrypted data. Indeed, in his joint work with Barak, Goldreich, 
Impaggliazzo, Rudich, Vadhan, and Yang, they show that encrypted programs (program 
obfuscation) are in general impossible [124].  
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Mahmood [103] has proposed a method for data fragmentation and suggested limiting the 
amount of data that should be decrypted for processing in clouds. Similarly, Tian et al. 
[126] have conducted research to improve the assurance and scalability of a 
heterogeneous distributed system by dividing storage servers into different server groups 
and developing a file fragmentation and allocation approach. However, this approach has 
significant drawbacks in terms of the time cost to reconstruct a file from its fragments, 
which is obviously greater than non-fragmentation storage methods. In addition, through 
this approach, performance degradation becomes inevitable. In another research work, 
Delettre et al. [105] have proposed a data concealment component to solve the issue of 
the confidentiality of data stored in cloud databases. Although the poposed solution is 
efficient, it is necessary to improve the data marking method to avoid concatenation of 
the mark with the data. As alternative methods have such significant drawbacks, other 
techniques are required to efficiently protect data and their related processing in clouds. 
(iii) Homomorphic Encryption and related problems 
A significant amount of current research has been conducted by utilizing homomorphism 
[18], [34], [39], [45], [46], [73], [128], [129]. Homomorphism based schemes hold a great 
promise that allows data to be processed in its ciphertext form without decryption. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter 2, efficiency is still the major challenge to 
implementing those existing schemes in practical applications. Thus, further 
improvements on such schemes are needed to ensure that they can be implemented 
efficiently without degrading the performance of the processor, especially for mobile 
devices. Futhermore, there is a need for a lightweight secure framework that provides 
security with minimum communication and processing overheads on mobile devices [24]. 
2.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has overviewed two major areas, MSS and MCC. They demand heavy 
computation in an encrypted form. Both types of system have been investigated in detail 
to understand their architectures, benefits and limitations in order to propose appropriate 
solutions to their problems. Furthermore, the relevant existing solutions have been studied 
and compared to see how they work and identify their weaknesses in terms of 
implementation, particularly their functionality and efficiency. Based on the weaknesses 
identified, further research work will be conducted and described in the next few chapters 
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to propose better solutions that are more applicable to the MSS and MCC settings. In the 
next chapter, some basics mathematical materials are introduced and exploited to develop 
our new schemes, which utilise homomorphic properties to preserve mobile users’ 
privacy in both MSS and MCC environments. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses some basic mathematical materials including number theory and 
abstract algebra as well as some fundamental statements on computational theory, 
homomorphism and its application in cryptography. Here, we will provide definitions and 
theorems on the fundamental mathematics that will be used throughout this thesis. Such 
definitions and theorems are essential for deeply understanding the concept of FHE 
schemes that will be exploited to allow data to be processed in its ciphertext form without 
sacrificing the privacy of the data users or contributors. At the end of this chapter, we will 
describe our research methodology for this research work. We will also provide a brief 
explanation and necessary validation techniques of our proposed methods.      
3.2 ALGEBRAIC NUMBER THEORY 
A scheme that is based on homomorphism utilises fundamental concepts in algebraic 
number theory such as fields. Thus, in this section, we describe some related number 
theory concepts and algorithms like groups, modulo arithmetic, prime numbers, and 
Euclidean algorithm.  
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3.2.1 GROUPS 
Definition 3.1. A group (𝐺,∗) is a nonempty set 𝐺 together with a binary operation ∗: 𝐺 ×
𝐺 → 𝐺  and (𝑎, 𝑏) → 𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 such that the following conditions hold: 
(i) Associativity: 
∀𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐺: 𝑎 ∗ (𝑏 ∗ 𝑐) = (𝑎 ∗ 𝑏) ∗ 𝑐 
(ii) Existence of an identity element 𝑒: 
∃𝑒 ∈ 𝐺 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐺: 𝑎 ∗ 𝑒 = 𝑒 ∗ 𝑎 = 𝑎 
(iii) Existence of an inverse element 𝑎′: 
∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐺 ∃𝑎′ ∈ 𝐺: 𝑎 ∗ 𝑎′ = 𝑎′ ∗ 𝑎 = 𝑒 
 Furthermore, there are some basic concepts in groups can be described as below: 
(i) A group (𝐺,∗) is said to be an abelian group if the operation 𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 is commutative, 
that is 𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 = 𝑏 ∗ 𝑎. 
(ii) A finite group 𝐺 is a group which (as a set) is finite. The order of a finite group 
(denoted as |𝐺|) is the number of elements in it.  
(iii) Let 𝑎 ∈ 𝐺. If there exists a positive integer 𝑛 such that 𝑎𝑛 = 𝑒, then 𝑎 is said to 
have a finite order and the smallest such positive integer 𝑛 is called the order of 𝑎, 
denoted |𝑎| = 𝑛. 
(iv) A subset 𝐻 of a group 𝐺 is said to be a subgroup if with the same operation (∗) and 
identity element (𝑒), (𝐻,∗) is a group [130]. 
Moreover, a group 𝐺 is said to be a cyclic group if there exists an element 𝑎 ∈ 𝐺 such 
that 𝑎 generates 𝐺, i.e. 𝐺 = 〈𝑎〉 or 𝑎 is the generator of 𝐺, then 𝐺 is called a cyclic group 
[130]. A group 𝐺 is said to be a finite group, if its elements is finite. In addition, a group 
(𝑮,∗, +) is called a ring if the following properties are satisfied: 
(i) It is an additive finite abelian group with its multiplication being associative. 
(ii) It has an identity element on each of the addition and multiplication operations.  
(iii) The addition and multiplication operations are linked via the distributive law: 
𝑎 ∙ (𝑏 + 𝑐) = 𝑎 ∙ 𝑏 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑐 = (𝑏 + 𝑐) ∙ 𝑎                                     (3.1) 
Furthermore, a ring is called a commutative ring if its multiplication operation is 
commutative [131]. Next, the definition of modulo arithmetic is given prior to providing 
the definition of a field. 
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3.2.2 MODULO ARITHMETIC 
Informally, modulo arithmetic can be defined as two integers having the same remainder 
when they are divided by a positive integer 𝑚. The formal definition is given as below. 
Definition 3.2. If 𝑎 and 𝑏 are integers and 𝑚 is a positive integer, then 𝑎 is congruent to 
𝑏 modulo 𝑚 if 𝑚 divides 𝑎 − 𝑏. The notation 𝑎 ≡ 𝑏 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚) is used to indicate that 𝑎 
congruent to 𝑏 modulo 𝑚. If 𝑎 and 𝑏 are not congruent modulo 𝑚, then the notation 𝑎 ≢
𝑏 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚) is used [132]. 
A field that is generated by modulo a prime number plays an important role in 
cryptography due to its finite elements. Such a field is called a prime field. This finite 
field is used to represent each byte of data as a vector, so that encryption and decryption 
can be manipulated easily. In the next sub-section, a formal description of a field is given.  
3.2.3 PRIME FIELDS 
For a given prime 𝑝, the finite field of order 𝑝, 𝐹𝑝, is defined as the set of integers 
{0,1, . . . , 𝑝 − 1}, together with the arithmetic operations modulo 𝑝. Furthermore, the set 
𝐹𝑝 = {0,1, . . . , 𝑝 − 1} together with the arithmetic operations modulo 𝑝 is said to be a 
commutative ring. Moreover, any positive integer in 𝐹𝑝 has a multiplicative inverse if and 
only if that integer is relatively prime to 𝑝. Therefore, if 𝑝 is prime, then every integer in 
𝐹𝑝 has a multiplicative inverse [133]. 
The arithmetic operations in a finite field are addition, multiplication and inversion. These 
operations can be described as follows: 
(i) Addition: If 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐹𝑝, then 𝑎 + 𝑏 = 𝑟, where 𝑟 is the remainder when 𝑎 + 𝑏 is 
divided by 𝑝 and 𝑟 < 𝑝 − 1. This is known as addition modulo 𝑝. 
(ii) Multiplication: If 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐹𝑝, then 𝑎 ∙ 𝑏 = 𝑠, where 𝑠 is the remainder when 𝑎 ∙ 𝑏 is 
divided by 𝑝 and 𝑠 < 𝑝 − 1. This is known as multiplication modulo 𝑝. 
(iii) Inversion: If 𝑎 is a non-zero element in 𝐹𝑝, the inverse of 𝑎 modulo 𝑝, denoted 𝑎
−1, 
is the unique integer 𝑐 ∈, 𝐹𝑝 for which 𝑎 ∙ 𝑐 = 1 
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3.2.4 PRIMES 
In the field of cryptography, prime numbers play an important role to provide stronger 
security to the data. For instance, in the RSA encryption scheme, its security is depending 
on the prime factorization of a public key, which is a multiplication of two distinct primes. 
Thus, this sub-section provides a formal definition of prime numbers and other several 
definitions associated with them.  
Definition 3.3. (Prime Numbers) A prime is a positive integer greater than 1, which is 
divisible by no positive integers other than 1 and itself [134]. 
Prime numbers can be determined by using a primality test such as Fermat’s little theorem 
and Euler’s theorem tests. Such tests are used to determine whether a given integer greater 
than 1 is a probable prime or a composite number [130].  
Definition 3.4. (Relatively Prime) 
If 𝑎 and 𝑏 are integers, i.e. 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℤ and the Greatest Common Divisor, GCD(𝑎, 𝑏) = 1, 
then 𝑎 and 𝑏 are said to be relatively prime or coprime. Sometimes the phrase ‘𝑎 is prime 
to 𝑏’ is also used [134]. A formal definition of GCD is given as below. 
Definition 3.5. (Greatest Common Divisors) The GCD of two integers 𝑎 and 𝑏, that are 
not both zero, is the largest integer, which divides both 𝑎 and 𝑏 without a remainder. The 
GCD of 𝑎 and 𝑏 is written as GCD(𝑎, 𝑏) [134], [135]. 
In addition, GCD can be determined by using an algorithm called the Euclidean 
Algorithm. This algorithm can be described as below. 
3.2.5 EUCLIDEAN ALGORITHM 
The GCD can be computed using the division algorithm. The systematic use of the division 
algorithm will produce a successive algorithm called the Euclidean algorithm.  This 
algorithm can efficiently be used to determine the GCD. 
Theorem 3.1. Let 𝑎 and 𝑏 be integers (𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℤ) such that 𝑎 ≥ 𝑏 > 0, and set 𝑎 =
𝑟−1 and 𝑏 = 𝑟0. By repeatedly applying the Division Algorithm, we get  𝑟𝑗−1 = 𝑟𝑗𝑞𝑗+1 +
𝑟𝑗+1 such that 𝑞𝑗+1 and 𝑟𝑗+1 are the quotient and the remainder at 𝑗 + 1 respectively, with 
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0 < 𝑟𝑗+1 < 𝑟𝑗 for all 0 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑛, where 𝑛 is the least nonnegative number such that 𝑟𝑛+1 =
0 in which case GCD(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑟𝑛 [134]. 
Several elements like a one-way function and Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) are 
used to provide various tools in cryptography. For instance, a hash function is a kind of 
one way functions, while the ElGamal algorithm is one of the schemes that the security 
is based on DLP [136]. On the other hand, a scheme that utilises homomorphism is also 
implementing such elements and can be described as below. 
3.2.6 ONE-WAY FUNCTION 
In brief, a one-way function 𝑓 can be explained as a function that is “easy to compute” 
(i.e. 𝑓 can be computed by a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm) but “difficult 
to invert” (i.e. attempting to invert will succeed with low probability using a PPT 
algorithm) on the average. A hash function is one of the examples of the one-way 
function. In brief, a hash function can be described as a function that compresses an input 
of arbitrary length to an output of a fixed-size. Both one-way function and a hash function 
are given in the Definition 3.6 and the definition 3.7 respectively.  
Definition 3.6. A function 𝑓 ∶  {0,1}∗   →  {0,1}∗ is a one-way function if 𝑓 is: 
1. Easy to compute: There is a deterministic PPT 𝑓 such that for all sufficiently large 𝑘 ∈
ℤ+ in the input function  and all 𝑥 ∈ {0,1}𝑘, 𝑓 can be computed in polynomial time.  
2. Difficult to invert: For any PPT algorithm 𝐴, there is a negligible function 𝑣𝐴:  
Pr[ 𝑥 ←  {0,1}𝑘 ; 𝑦 ←  𝑓(𝑥); 𝑧 ←  𝐴(1𝑘 , 𝑦): 𝑓(𝑧) =  𝑦 ] ≤ 𝑣𝐴(𝑘) 
The PPT algorithm can be defined as follows. An algorithm A has PPT if it uses 
randomness and its running time is bounded by some polynomial in the input size [69], 
[138].  
Definition 3.7. A hash function is a computationally efficient function mapping binary 
strings of arbitrary length to binary strings of some fixed length, called hash-values [139]. 
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3.2.7 DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM 
Definition 3.8. Let ℤ𝑝
∗  be a multiplicative group modulo 𝑝 such that 𝑝 is a large prime, 
and 𝑔 ∈ ℤ𝑝
∗  be a generator. According to [140], the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) 
for the group ℤ𝑝
∗  can be stated as follows: 
Given prime 𝑝, generator 𝑔 of ℤ𝑝
∗ , and an element 𝑐 ∈ ℤ𝑝
∗ , find the unique integer 
exponent 𝑒 with 0 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 𝑝 − 2 such that 
𝑐 ≡ 𝑔𝑒(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)                                                   (3.2) 
3.2.8 HOMOMORPHISM 
A group homomorphism has been widely used in the field of cryptography as its 
properties provide a great promise to allow data to be processed in its ciphertext form 
without the need for decryption [38], [141], [142]. A formal definition of a group 
homomorphism is given as below [135].   
Definition 3.9. Let ∗𝐺  and ∗𝐻 be arbitrary operations in groups 𝐺 and 𝐻 respectively. A 
function 𝑓: 𝐺 → 𝐻 from group 𝐺 to group 𝐻 is a (group) homomorphism if the group 
operation is preserved in the sense that: 
𝑓(𝑔1 ∗𝐺 𝑔2) = 𝑓(𝑔1) ∗𝐻 𝑓(𝑔2)                                        (3.3) 
For all 𝑔1, 𝑔2 ∈ 𝐺, let 𝑒𝐺 be the identity in 𝐺 and 𝑒𝐻 the identity in 𝐻. A group 
homomorphism 𝑓 maps 𝑒𝐺 to 𝑒𝐻: 𝑓(𝑒𝐺) = 𝑓(𝑒𝐻). 
Note that 𝑓 must preserve the inverse map due to: 
𝑓(𝑔)𝑓(𝑔−1) = 𝑓(𝑔𝑔−1) = 𝑓(𝑒𝐺), therefore: 𝑓(𝑔
−1) = 𝑓(𝑔)−1. 
3.3 HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 
In this section, we review the state-of-the-art of the work in the area of HE schemes, its 
implementation issues related to its complexity and the improvement that has been made 
to enable such schemes to be implemented efficiently.  
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3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
An encryption scheme is called a partially HE scheme if it supports either addition or 
multiplication operations on encrypted data but not both operations at the same time [39].  
For example, the unpadded RSA is multiplicatively homomorphic due to such a reason; 
given 𝐸(𝑚1) = 𝑚1
𝑒 mod 𝑛 and 𝐸(𝑚2) = 𝑚2
𝑒 mod 𝑛 (i.e. the ciphertexts of plaintexts 
𝑚1 and 𝑚2 respectively).  The product of 𝐸(𝑚1) and 𝐸(𝑚2) is given below: 
𝐸(𝑚1)  ∙ 𝐸(𝑚2) 
= (𝑚1
𝑒 mod 𝑛 ∙ 𝑚2
𝑒 mod 𝑛) mod 𝑛 
= (𝑚1
𝑒 ∙ 𝑚2
𝑒) mod 𝑛 
= (𝑚1 ∙ 𝑚2)
𝑒 mod 𝑛 
= 𝐸(𝑚1 ∙ 𝑚2)  
As (𝐸(𝑚1)  ∙ 𝐸(𝑚2))  = 𝐸(𝑚1 ∙ 𝑚2), then the unpadded RSA is multiplicatively 
homomorphic [143].  Furthermore, the Paillier cryptosystem is additively homomorphic 
due to such a reason; given 𝐸(𝑚1, 𝑟1) = 𝑔
𝑚1𝑟1
𝑛 mod 𝑛2 and 𝐸(𝑚2, 𝑟2) =
𝑔𝑚2𝑟2
𝑛 mod 𝑛2 as the ciphertexts of 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 respectively. The product of the 
ciphertexts is given below: 
𝐸(𝑚1, 𝑟1) ∙ 𝐸(𝑚2, 𝑟2) 
= (𝑔𝑚1𝑟1
𝑛 mod 𝑛2 ∙ 𝑔𝑚2𝑟2
𝑛 mod 𝑛2 )mod 𝑛2 
= (𝑔𝑚1𝑟1
𝑛 ∙ 𝑔𝑚2𝑟2
𝑛) mod 𝑛2 
= 𝑔𝑚1+𝑚2 ?̃?𝑛 mod 𝑛2 
= 𝐸(𝑚1 +𝑚2).  
As 𝐸(𝑚1, 𝑟1) ∙ 𝐸(𝑚2, 𝑟2) = 𝐸(𝑚1 +𝑚2), then  the Paillier cryptosystem is additively 
homomorphic [144].   In addition, if an encryption scheme can support both addition and 
multiplication at the same time on ciphertext data for any degree of polynomial, it is 
turned to be a FHE scheme [145]. 
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3.3.2 LATTICE BASED SCHEMES AND RELATED PROBLEMS 
The idea of FHE was first posed by Rivest et. al. almost 30 years ago. Even though a lot 
of work has been proposed to achieve double homomoprhism, all of them still have 
limitations. For example, the ElGamal and Pallier schemes only support a single 
homomorphic operation [39], while Boneh, Goh and Nissim support arbitrary additions 
but only one multiplication [146]. Nevertheless, in 2009, Gentry has constructed the first 
FHE scheme based on an ideal lattice. Since then, a significant amount of current research 
work has been conducted by utilizing homomorphic properties [44], [45], [48], [49], [75], 
[128], [147]–[149] due to its special class of encryption functions which allow encrypted 
data to be operated on directly without the need for any knowledge about the decryption 
function [150].  
This salient feature has made an enormous contribution to the solution of the problems 
identified earlier. Gentry [107] has defined ‘fully’ as having no limitation on what 
manipulations can be performed on ciphertext. The scheme should enable data to be kept 
secret but allow users with no decryption keys to compute any result of the data, although 
the function is very complex. In a cloud setting, for example, a CSP never sees any 
unencrypted data or details about what users are searching for [107]. Started with 
Gentry’s original construction scheme, there are now a number of such schemes in the 
literature [45], [48], [74], [128], [147], [149], [151]–[153], which are all based on lattices. 
In this sub-section, we provide an overview of the initial developments on Lattice-based 
FHE schemes starting with the Gentry’s scheme.  
Lattices have been widely used in cryptography. They hold a great promise for post-
quantum cryptography while enjoying very strong security proofs based on worst-case 
hardness. Post-quantum cryptography is cryptographic algorithms that secure against 
threats by quantum computing. Quantum computing becomes a threat to the existing 
algorithms such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
(ECDH)  key exchange, which are designed respectively based on integer factorisation, 
discrete logarithm and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems. Quantum computing is 
able to break the security of those algorithms much more quickly than any classical 
computers as it provides massive computing power [154]. Lattice-based cryptography 
provides relatively efficient implementations as well as great simplicity. Informally, a 
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lattice can be defined as a set of points in an 𝑛-dimensional space with a periodic 
structure, such as the one illustrated in Figure 5. This figure shows a lattice with two 
possible bases of basis vectors (𝑏1, 𝑏2) and (𝑐1, 𝑐2). The figure also shows that a lattice 
has many bases.  
 
Figure 5: A two-dimensional lattice and two possible bases 
A lattice is defined as the set of all integer combinations: 
ℒ(𝒃1, … 𝒃𝑛) = {∑ 𝑥𝑖𝒃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 : 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℤ for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛}                       (3.4) 
of a 𝑛 linearly independent vectors 𝒃1, … 𝒃𝑛 in a real number set, ℝ
𝑛. The set of vectors 
𝒃1, … 𝒃𝑛is called a basis for the lattice. A basis can be represented by the matrix 𝘉 =
[𝒃1, … 𝒃𝑛] ∈ ℝ
𝑛×𝑛 having the basis vectors as columns. Using the matrix notation, the 
lattice generated by the matrix 𝘉 ∈ ℝ𝑛×𝑛 can be defined as ℒ(𝐵) = {𝐵𝑥: 𝑥 ∈ ℤ𝑛}, where 
𝐵𝑥 is the usual matrix multiplication [155]. 
In the earlier works on FHE, there were three proposed FHE schemes based on lattices as 
outlined below. Those schemes are designed with bootstrapping, without bootstrapping 
and without modulus switching. 
(i) Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Bootstrapping 
Gentry [145] has proposed a FHE scheme based on lattices that enable the encryption 
scheme to have a decryption algorithm with low circuit complexity. Furthermore, ideal 
lattices have been used in order to make the scheme bootstrappable. This can be achieved 
as lattices offer an additive structure while an ideal lattice algorithm has a multiplicative 
structure that enables the evaluation of deep arithmetic circuits. The security of the 
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scheme is based on the hardness of the lattice problem which is Boundary Distance 
Decoding (BDD). BDD is a variant of the Closest Vector Problem (CVP) in which the 
target is guaranteed to be close to the lattice, relative to minimum distance 𝜆 of the Lattice. 
CVP can be explained as, given a lattice 𝐿 represented by some basis and a target point 𝑦, 
find the lattice point closest to 𝑦. 
From this breakthrough, all existing schemes have common traits as of Gentry’s work 
and they add a small “noise” component during encryption. Such encryption techniques 
made the scheme not really practical as efficiency is a big challenge for their 
implementation. There have been several attempts [148], [156]–[159] at implementing 
most of the schemes mentioned, but none of them comes even close to being practical. 
For instance, the work in [157] manages to execute one AES encryption 
homomorphically in eight days using a massive amount (tens of GBs) of RAM memory. 
Therefore, a lot of further work on the scheme has been made in order to achieve 
simplicity and improve the efficiency while securing the data.  
(ii) Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Bootstrapping 
The schemes proposed in [128] and [160] are based on Leaning With Error (LWE), where 
a vector in 𝑍𝑞 is used to represent the ciphertext. LWE is a problem to recover a secret 
𝑠 ∈ ℤ𝑞
𝑛 given a sequence of ‘approximate’ random linear equations on 𝑠 [161]. Moreover, 
the security of the schemes is based on lattice problems with quasi-polynomial 
approximation factors.  In such schemes, noise is introduced for every ciphertext 
generated for security reason. Noise magnitude 𝐵is doubled during homomorphic 
addition, while nearly squared during homomorphic multiplication. By using the scheme 
in [128], the noise increases from an initial magnitude of 𝐵 to 𝐵2
𝐿
after 𝐿 levels of 
multiplication. Thus, this requires a very large 𝑞, i.e. 𝑞 ≈ 𝐵2
𝐿
, to be used in order to allow 
for a correct result to be computed from such levels of homomorphic operation on 
ciphertext data. As a result, such a setting has affected the efficiency of the scheme due 
to a large size of ciphertext to be transmitted so as to hire more bandwidth to be leveraged 
for transmitting the data. Furthermore, such a setting also reduces the security of the 
scheme as the scheme security is proportional to the ratio 𝐵 𝑞⁄ .  
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On the other hand, the scheme in [128] allows such a limitation to be remedied by 
proposing a noise management technique without any bootstrapping approach. By using 
such a technique, the ciphertext vector will be reduced by a factor of 𝑤 using a scale down 
approach called a “modulus switching” technique. This approach also reduces 𝑞 to 𝑞/𝑤 
as well as reduces the noise 𝐵 to 𝐵/𝑤. Thus, computing 𝐿 levels of homomorphic 
multiplication will reduce the value to 
𝑞
𝐵𝐿⁄  while the noise 𝐵 will remain the same. Such 
an approach reduces the value of 𝑞 ≈ 𝐵𝐿+1 to be used, so as to improve the scheme’s 
efficiency compared to the previous one. However, according to [149] such an approach 
requires a complicated process on the ciphertext data to be evaluated homomorphically.  
(iii) Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Modulus Switching 
Brakerski had presented a scale invariant scheme [149], where the ciphertext is scaled 
down by a factor of 𝑞 so that the noise magnitude turns to 𝐵/𝑞. This setting leads to the 
homomorphic multiplication only requiring the noise magnitude multiplied by a 
polynomial factor 𝑝(𝑛). Thus, to compute 𝐿 levels of homomorphic multiplication, it only 
requires 𝑞 = 𝐵 ∙ 𝑝(𝑛)𝐿 due to the noise growth from 𝐵/𝑞 to 𝐵/𝑞 ∙ 𝑝(𝑛)𝐿. This choice of 
𝑞 improves the scheme’s efficiency compared to the previous two schemes.    
The advantages of the scheme are that it only uses the same modulus throughout the 
evaluation process with no need for “modulus switching”, and this modulus can take an 
arbitrary form. Furthermore, in all previous work, the ciphertext noise grows 
quadratically (𝐵 → 𝐵2 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦(𝑛)) with every multiplication (before “refreshing”), while 
the noise in this scheme only grows linearly (𝐵 → 𝐵 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦(𝑛)) [149], [162]. However, 
according to Lauter et al., [156] even though such constructions of FHE schemes have 
been proposed and improved upon, they are still far from practical as they are suffering 
from poor efficiency. Thus, all known FHE schemes seem to have a long way to go before 
they can be used in practice.  
For easy reference, the main weaknesses of the existing FHE schemes together with 
potential solutions to the problems are summarised below:  
 Existing FHE schemes are designed with high complexity to provide strong 
security [22], [49], [159], [163]. Such complexity prevents resource-constrained 
devices like smartphones to efficiently execute those schemes in order to protect 
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mobile data [25], [52]. Thus, a scheme with less complexity but strong security is 
needed to allow the aforementioned devices to leverage rich-mobile applications 
provided by the clouds [34], [51], [156], [164]. 
 Existing FHE schemes are encrypting individual bits so as to make them easier to 
achieve fully homomorphic properties. Nevertheless, such an encrypting 
technique requires a huge bandwidth and storage spaces that prevent their 
applicability to resource-constrained devices. Especially they would shorten these 
devices’ battery lifetime due to the need to continuously transmit huge amounts 
of data [44], [47], [48], [74], [163], [165]. Thus, a scheme, which encrypts integers 
rather than individual bits, could help to achieve a lower bandwidth in transmitting 
the data and require less storage space. 
3.3.3 INTEGER BASED SCHEMES AND RELATED PROBLEMS 
A scheme that is based on simplicity such as over the integers is demanded to reduce the 
complexity so as to improve efficiency. Several works that have proposed schemes based 
on the integers can be found in [44], [48], [147]. Such works have provided encryption 
schemes with bigger message spaces as all operations on ciphertext data are executed 
over the integers. For instance, the scheme proposed by M. Djik et al. is based on simple 
integer arithmetic like addition and multiplication. The scheme achieves fully 
homomorphic properties by leveraging the bootstrappable approach that was proposed by 
Gentry. However, the scheme also suffers from efficiency issues due to its use of a large 
public key size 𝑂(𝜆10), where 𝜆 represents the scheme’s security parameter [35]. Several 
attempts [44], [48], [166] have successfully improved the size of public keys. For 
example, the work in [167] has further reduced the size of the public keys to 𝑂(𝜆3.5). 
Nevertheless, such an improved key size is still considered to be high for being 
implemented in resources-constrained devices like smartphones and tablets [35], [44], 
[46].  
In the works [99] and [102], an efficient symmetric FHE scheme has been proposed to 
allow cloud-based applications to process data in its ciphertext form. Both schemes are 
believed to be simple and can achieve fully homomorphic properties as they are based on 
matrix operations. Both schemes have supported homomorphic addition and 
multiplication with linear complexity and nearly linear complexity respectively. 
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However, such schemes require more bandwidth for transmitting data due to the 
ciphertext data being in the form of matrices. Therefore, some enhancements to the 
scheme are needed prior to be implemented by resources-constraint mobile devices like 
smartphones and tablets. In chapter four, we will further describe the schemes’ efficiency 
based on several experimental results.  
3.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this research work, we have selected two computing paradigms, which are MSS and 
MCC, to be investigated in order to propose our new methods. The reason is that both 
computing paradigms provide a very promising solution to data sharing and processing 
effectively and efficiently. Nevertheless, experiencing security issues such as data 
confidentiality and user’s privacy as well as inherent limitations on mobile devices in 
both computing paradigms has led us to leverage some existing methods described in 
Chapter 2 and mathematical foundation concepts with new enhancements to reflect to our 
research questions listed in Chapter 1. Those methods will be described in the sub-sequent 
section, while the new enhancements will be explained in Sub-section 3.4.2. Finally, we 
provide a validation process to our proposed schemes prior to summarising this chapter.  
3.4.1 THE RATIONALE OF SELECTED METHODS 
(i) Privacy-preserving Data Aggregation (DA) and Data Offloading (DO) 
techniques 
In the MSS setting, we assume all parties are untrusted. Thus, a technique such as privacy-
preserving data aggregation is good for implementation in MSS [1], [11], [23], [71], [98]. 
This is because, such a technique can protect user privacy by mixing the data prior to 
submitting it to a cloud server. In addition, this technique improves the battery lifetime 
of mobile devices by reducing the data to be transmitted. To implement this technique, 
we adapt a hierarchical network structure proposed in [23] to locate the nodes in a way 
that the lowest level of this structure consists of leaf nodes without child or children. The 
upper layer of this structure will consists of parent, grandparent and root nodes before 
reaching the cloud server, which are all assumed as untrusted nodes. On the other hand, 
data offloading is good for implementation in MCC as such a technique allows data to be 
transmitted directly to the cloud server [4], [5], [13], [26], [168], [169]. This technique 
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also reduces battery consumption as all computation burdens are taken by the cloud 
server. The aim of both techniques is to allow the outsourced data to be processed without 
disclosing the content of the data and scarifying the privacy of mobile users. To fulfil this 
aim, homomorphic properties are the best options as such properties allow the transmitted 
data to be processed in its ciphertext form without decryption [22], [39], [49], [163], 
[170].  
(ii) Homomorphic Encryption Schemes 
The concept of homomorphism was introduced almost 40 years ago by Rivest et. al [171]. 
Since then, many encryption schemes have been designed based on homomorphic 
properties. A partially homomorphic encryption scheme is a scheme which supports 
ciphertext computation either addition or multiplication at a time. Conversely, an FHE is 
a scheme that allows ciphertext data to be computed arbitrarily without any limitations. 
In MSS, a partial homomorphic scheme is good for implementation as data is aggregated 
using the addition operation via the hierarchical structure. In the meanwhile, a scheme 
that supports fully homomorphic properties is demanded in MCC to process arbitrary 
functions on ciphertext data. Both partially and fully homomorphic properties require a 
broad understanding of mathematical foundations as it covers fundamental mathematical 
concepts in number and group theory. For instance, the recent FHE schemes have been 
proposed based on Lattices and integers [35]. There are distinct advantages of such 
schemes as described in the previous section. For our setting, we have designed our 
homomorphic encryption schemes based on integers as such a selection could achieve 
simplicity, improve efficiency and reduce the communication costs. 
(iii) Homomorphic MAC 
In MSS, the aggregated data must be genuine in order to further process such data. 
Otherwise, the aggregated data will be wasted as it will not provide a correct result to 
benefit other mobile users and the system. Thus, a homomorphic MAC is good to be 
implemented as such a technique could verify the aggregated data [23]. Such a technique 
is important to validate the aggregated data in order to allow a correct result to be obtained 
from the aggregated result.  
All the aforementioned methods are good to be implemented in both computing 
paradigms. The reason is that, such methods with further enhancements could provide 
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solutions to the research questions mentioned in Section 1.5. A direct mapping of those 
methods and the research questions is provided in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Research Methodology versus Research Questions 
Research 
Methodology 
Research 
Question 1 
Research 
Question 2 
Research 
Question 3 
Research 
Question 4 
Research 
Question 5 
Privacy-preserving 
DA and DO 
techniques 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Homomorphic 
Encryption Scheme 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Homomorphic MAC √    √ 
3.4.2 THE PROPOSED METHODS 
In MSS, we propose APDA schemes that consist of weak, strong and hybrid versions. 
Those versions are signified as APDAW, APDAS and APDAH, respectively. APDA allows 
data to be aggregated in its ciphertext form so as to protect data confidentiality and 
preserve the privacy of mobile users. This is because APDA leverages homomorphic 
properties with better efficiency. In addition, APDA allows nodes, which misbehaved in 
the aggregation process to be detected certainly and efficiently. Briefly, APDAW is 
designed without involving a signature so that it can achieve high efficiency but lower 
misbehaviour detection accuracy. In contrast, APDAS is designed with signature involved 
so that it can achieve high misbehaviour detection accuracy but lower efficiency. To 
balance both schemes, APDAH is proposed by combining the two schemes so as to 
achieve high detection accuracy with better efficiency.  
Generally, each version of APDA consists of research processes as shown in Figure 6. 
Those processes begin with the commitments collection process. This process determines 
the willingness of mobile users to contribute their data in the aggregation process. In 
addition, each mobile user will leverage this commitment as an encryption key to encrypt 
their data as this value is unique and only known by them and the AS. The next process 
involves aggregated data encryption from the lowest layer of children nodes to the highest 
layer of root node prior to submitting the final aggregated data to an AS. In this process, 
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APDAW is implemented. This weak version will consists of no signature to accelerate 
misbehaved node tracking. If the integrity checking has failed, APDAW can only detect 
the misbehaved nodes with certainty if the node has the leaf or child node status. 
Otherwise, APDAW can only assume the nodes as suspicious. In contrast, By using 
APDAS, the AS generates and assigns appropriate keys to each participating mobile user 
for generating the signature of each piece of generated data. This signature will be used 
by the aggregator to track down any misbehaved nodes if the integrity checking has failed. 
In contrast, if the integrity checking is positive, then the AS will recover the result of the 
aggregated data. Embedding a signature to each piece of generated data guarantees any 
misbehaved nodes to be detected with certainty. Nonetheless, such a setting lowers the 
scheme efficiency. Thus, to certainly detect the misbehaved nodes with better efficiency, 
APDAW and APDAS are combined in such a way that, APDAW is executed first to 
determine the suspicious nodes. When the suspicious nodes are detected, then only those 
nodes need to execute APDAS. This can improve the efficiency of the misbehaved nodes 
tracking process while able to determine the misbehaved nodes certainly. This approach 
is called as APDAH.    
Aggregated Data 
Encryption
Aggregated Data 
Recovery
Misbehaved 
Nodes 
Tracking
Commitment 
Generation
Integrity Checking
  
Aggregated Data 
Encryption
Aggregated Data 
Recovery
Misbehaved 
Nodes 
Tracking
Integrity 
Checking
Commitment 
Collection
Key Generation
  
Figure 6: APDA Research Processes in MSS 
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The results of aggregated data need further processes such as additive and non-additive 
statistical functions to benefit other mobile users in MSS. Thus, an extended version of 
APDA is proposed to determine a maximal value of the aggregated data. Other statistical 
functions also use the same concept of maximal value finding and will not be described 
in this thesis. The maximal value finding determines a maximum value without revealing 
any contents of mobile data. 
In another mobile computing paradigm i.e. MCC, a new LHE scheme is proposed to allow 
the data generated by mobile devices to be processed arbitrarily by a cloud server without 
decryption. The LHE scheme leverages integers to achieve good simplicity and better 
efficiency. This scheme consists of three research processes, which are for key generation, 
data encryption and data processing and recovery as shown in Figure 7. Briefly, the Data 
User (DU) uses two primary keys to generate a secret key in the key generation process.  
DU then sends this secret key to Data Contributors (DCs) securely. DCs use such a key 
for encrypting their data in the data encryption process prior to submitting the ciphertext 
data to CS. Having received the ciphertexts data from DCs, CS then processes the 
ciphertexts data without decryption in the data processing process and transmit the result 
to DU. Finally, DU decrypts the received result to recover its plaintext data in the data 
recovery process. For simplicity, Figure 7 illustrates the flow of the aforementioned 
processes to implement the LHE scheme.    
Data Encryption
Data Processing and 
Recovery
Key Generation
 
Figure 7: LHE Research Process in MCC 
3.4.3 VALIDATION TECHNIQUES 
In this research work, we have selected several parameters to measure data 
confidentiality, data integrity, users’ privacy, users’ accountability and scheme 
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efficiency. Those measurement parameters are crucial to validate whether our proposed 
schemes can achieve all the objectives listed in Chapter 1. In brief, we use a suitable 
length of keys to measure data confidentiality and users’ accountability whereas a 
homomorphic MAC is used to measure data integrity. In addition, we use time to measure 
the scheme’s efficiency. We will prove that our proposed schemes can be validated by 
using all the measurement parameters theoretically and will be detailed in Chapter 5 and 
6. Furthermore, our scheme’s efficiency will be proved by using a simulation approach 
that will be conducted to validate that our scheme can provide better efficiency compared 
to the chosen scheme. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has covered some fundamental concepts of mathematics like prime numbers, 
modulo arithmetic and GCD algorithms that have been exploited to develop FHE 
encryption schemes. Each concept is defined for understanding and clarification 
purposes. Furthermore, we have briefly introduced some background of FHE schemes. 
The improvement on such schemes provides a great promise for encrypted data to be 
processed without decryption, thus allowing resource-limited devices like mobile phones 
to enjoy huge computing resources and massive storage spaces provided by CSPs in MSS 
and MCC. By using such a scheme, existing approaches like data offloading and data 
aggregation can be tailored to run on mobile devices in an efficient and secure manner 
while reducing their energy consumption. At the end of this chapter, we have described 
our research methodology to highlight the selected network settings to be investigated. In 
addition, we have also provided the reason for selecting some existing methods to be 
enhanced prior to proposing our schemes. Finally, we provide a brief explanation on 
validation techniques to validate that our proposed scheme can achieve all the objectives 
listed in Chapter 1. In the next chapter, we will provide our first solution to be proposed 
in MSS. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCOUNTABLE PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA 
AGGREGATION IN MSSS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Data aggregation is a good technique for implementation in MSS as this technique offers 
great advantages to prolong the network lifetime of such a system. Nonetheless, this MSS 
setting could consist of untrusted parties like a curious AS and malicious MNs together 
with untrusted intermediary network devices like wireless routers. Thus, the data 
outsourced to each of these parties or devices needs to be protected as it may contain 
sensitive information, which relates to the data owner such as location and health 
information. As a result, this MSS setting demands a suitable technique like a privacy-
preserving data aggregation to be implemented to preserve users’ privacy during the 
aggregation process. This technique allows an AS to collect and process sensor data in a 
way that the data should be kept secret and the aggregator or other nodes learn nothing 
from the intermediary or the final aggregated data.  
A lot of privacy-preserving data aggregation techniques have been proposed and 
improved upon [21], [23], [25], [36], [67]. Those techniques have worked well and 
preserved the privacy of data users by leveraging a homomorphic encryption scheme [16], 
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[18], [23], [172], [173]. Nevertheless, such techniques cannot be directly implemented by 
mobile nodes like smartphones and tablets in MSSs as sensor nodes in WSNs. The main 
reason is that, the sensor nodes in WSNs are statically distributed in an observation area 
for monitoring and data collection purposes. In such a distribution, each node can be 
assigned to a pre-shared key for a secure communication. In contrast, mobile nodes in 
MSSs are moving in and out of the networks, which makes assigning a key for each node 
beforehand is a very challenging task [23], [77]. In addition, those devices belong to 
individuals (with diverse interests), who contribute to and involve in aggregating the data 
[1], [23], [77]. Furthermore, an aggregated data received by an AS needs to be verified in 
order to get a genuine result without revealing any information of individual data to the 
AS [11], [15], [18], [22], [23], [172], [174].  
Even though the existing techniques support a full verification on privacy-preserving data 
aggregation, their efficiency in terms of computation complexity and execution time still 
can be improved. At the same time, a better scheme could be proposed to increase the 
performance of mobile devices, which have limited computing resources [23]. By using 
those methods, a new verification technique on the aggregated data by an AS provides 
two important results, which are positive verification (the aggregated data is genuine) and 
negative verification (the aggregated data consists of fake data). On the one hand, the 
former result allows the AS to process the aggregated data to retrieve some important 
statistical results like Count, Average, Min/Max and Percentile. Existing schemes [1], 
[23], [67], [71], [77] allow those results to be computed in an encrypted form, thus 
preserving the privacy of the participating mobile users. Nevertheless, the aforementioned 
schemes suffer from efficiency issues due to their high complexity. On the other hand, 
the negative verification on a wrong aggregated result could be caused by the following 
reasons: 
(i) Either child or parent nodes submit wrong data to their ancestor. 
(ii) Both child and parent nodes submit wrong data to their ancestor. 
(iii) Parent nodes aggregate data wrongly.  
The negative verification requires further actions to be taken by the aggregator to 
determine any nodes, which have misbehaved by submitting wrong data or aggregate the 
data wrongly. Whenever the misbehaved nodes are detected, they have to re-submit the 
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correct data to allow the aggregator to generate a correct statistical result. This 
determination process of such nodes is called misbehaviour nodes detection.  
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing schemes is able to support mobile 
users’ accountability in MSSs and provide an efficient verification on the aggregated data 
in a privacy-preserving manner. Within limited resources on small devices, it is a very 
challenging task to efficiently identify any nodes, which have misbehaved from the 
aggregated data. At the same time, it is even more challenging to cater for all security 
aspects such as data security, users’ privacy and functionality on a ciphertext. Based on 
such reasons, an exploration on partially HE schemes has received a great deal of 
attention. A low complexity scheme is called for to support statistical functions like 
additive and non-additive functions on ciphertext data [23]. Thus, such requirements have 
demanded an improved partially HE scheme to be proposed. 
As a result, in this chapter, we propose a novel Accountable Privacy-preserving Data 
Aggregation (APDA) method that allows mobile data to be aggregated in a secure manner 
without compromising the privacy of the users to an AS. Our method is essential to 
achieve our first, second and third objectives as listed in the introduction chapter. This 
method operates in three operational modes:  
(i) Weak accountability, which enables to track down suspicious or misbehaved nodes 
although some suspicious nodes might not have misbehaved. 
(ii) Strong accountability, which enables to pinpoint exactly which nodes have 
misbehaved. 
(iii) Hybrid accountability, which is a combination of the above two modes to precisely 
identify misbehaved nodes among suspicious ones. 
The above three modes will be referred to APDAW, APDAS and APDAH, respectively. 
As will be made clear in the next few subsequent sections, although APDAW may not be 
able to determine which nodes have certainly misbehaved in an aggregation, this method 
involves less computation and communication, which make it more efficient. Conversely, 
APDAS can accurately decide which nodes have misbehaved with lower efficiency. To 
take advantage of both strengths from the two modes and rectify both schemes’ 
weaknesses, APDAH provides a mixed solution by running APDAS only on the suspicious 
nodes identified by APDAW in the previous round of aggregation and applying APDAW 
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to the rest. Evidently APDAH has two special cases of APDAH. That is, APDAH becomes 
APDAW when there is no suspicious node, and it is the same as APDAS when every node 
is suspicious. This promises the hybrid combination will provide the certainty of 
misbehaviour identification among the suspicious nodes while offering balanced 
efficiency (i.e. it is between those of APDAS and APDAW with its scale depending on the 
number of suspicious nodes).  
In the next section, we will describe a threat model in MSSs to be a guideline for designing 
our new solution scheme.  
4.2 THREAT MODEL 
In MSSs, an AS and Mobile Nodes (MNs) communicate with one another to aggregate 
sensing data via a hierarchical data aggregation technique so as to allow additive and non-
additive statistical functions to be retrieved from the aggregated data. By using this 
technique, the AS sends a request to MNs via wireless devices like wireless router or 
network provider infrastructures to collect information from MNs such as personal data 
(e.g. health, monthly salary or home address information) or sensed data about the 
surrounding area (e.g. crowd in an event, road congestion or local weather information). 
After receiving the request and having the related information, MNs will response to the 
AS by submitting the data they have possessed. However, as such information is closely 
related to MNs (e.g. their locations and health conditions), submitting the data via the 
aforementioned technique leads to the exposure of the data to a curious AS, malicious 
MNs, network infrastructures or an intermediary party like an adversary that observes the 
aggregation process. In order to give a better description about the threats, we divide them 
into internal and external threats, which are elaborated separately below. 
4.2.1 INTERNAL THREAT 
In a hierarchical data aggregation setting, an AS and MNs are normally assumed to be 
trusted parties. Nevertheless, they may be curious or malicious and have an intention to 
reveal the content of the final or intermediate aggregated data for its curiosity or other 
purposes. To reveal such information, they may launch several attacks that can be 
described as follows: 
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(i) At the top of our hierarchical structure, the AS receives data to be processed in its 
ciphertext form. However, the curious AS may want to discover the content of the 
data to reveal the privacy of MNs.  
(ii) In our hierarchical data aggregation, each MN transmits the sensed data in the 
ciphertext form to its parent node for aggregation purposes. However, a malicious 
parent node may want to reveal the contents of the received data to invade the 
privacy of a specific MN. In addition, as MNs belong to individuals with diverse 
interests, it is difficult to ensure all MNs are reliable in MSSs.  
4.2.2 EXTERNAL THREATS 
In our proposed system, all the communications among an AS and MNs are executed via 
open wireless devices like Wi-Fi routers. Such devices are not secure and reliable as they 
are made public and thus vulnerable to external attacks like data interception and Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks [175]. Those attacks can be orchestrated by an adversary in the 
following scenarios considered in this chapter: 
(i) An adversary node that observes the aggregation process and may want to 
eavesdrop on some communication devices between the AS and MNs. 
(ii) An adversary or malicious node, which intends to join the aggregation by 
submitting or aggregating false or fake data to prevent the AS from generating the 
correct result. 
(iii) An adversary node that attempts to compromise and manipulate some MNs to 
reveal other nodes’ data and thus invade their privacy.  
(iv) Both AS and mobile devices communicate wirelessly through network 
infrastructures like wireless routers. Such infrastructures may vulnerable to 
physical attacks. Nevertheless, such attacks will not be considered in this thesis and 
will be highlighted in future works. 
4.3 DESIGN GOAL 
Based on some related aspects and the description of the above threats, we design our 
scheme to fulfil the following requirements: 
(i) Scheme Applicability: Most of the existing verifiable privacy-preserving data 
aggregation schemes are designed with different capabilities such as for WSNs with 
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static topologies. In contrast, MSSs consist of mobile nodes that are dynamically 
moving in and out of the networks.  Thus, we need to design a scheme that allows 
mobile nodes with a mobile topology to sense and aggregate data under a reasonable 
cost. 
(ii) Data Security and User Privacy: In MSSs, an AS could be curious while MNs could 
be malicious. Thus, we need to design a scheme that allows data to be aggregated 
hierarchically and processed in its ciphertext form so as to prevent an AS and MNs 
from disclosing the aggregated data. Such a scheme preserves the privacy of 
individual mobile users. 
(iii) Data Integrity: In MSSs, an AS and MNs communicate via public wireless devices. 
As such a communication device is not secure and reliable, we need to design a 
scheme that allows the aggregated data to be verified by the AS in a privacy-
preserving manner, so as to protect the integrity of the aggregated data. 
(iv) Scheme Functionality: In both WSNs and MSSs, retrieving some essential 
information on the aggregated data is the main purpose of acquiring the aggregated 
data. Thus, we need to design a scheme that allows maximal value finding to be 
computed over the aggregated data in a privacy-preserving manner. Furthermore, 
such a method could be developed further to compute other comparative operations 
like Average, Percentile and Histogram in the similar way. 
(v) User Accountability: In MSSs, the aggregation process could involve misbehaving 
nodes, which contribute fake data to the aggregation process. Detecting such a node 
with certainty and efficiency in such a system is a very challenging task as 
communicated data is encrypted to preserve users’ privacy. Thus, we need to design 
a scheme that allows misbehaved nodes to be detected with certainty in a privacy-
preserving manner and at a reasonable cost.   
In the following section, we provide our first solution, i.e. APDAW. We describe all the 
processes executed by each MN and an AS, including commitment generation, 
aggregated data encryption, aggregated data recovery, misbehaved nodes tracking and 
privacy improvement.  
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4.4 PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA AGGREGATION WITH WEAK ACCOUNTABILITY 
(APDAW) 
For implementing APDA in an aggregation process in MSS, several parameters need to 
be set beforehand. Suppose that there are n mobile devices participating in data 
aggregation, each of which is denoted as nodes 𝑢𝑖 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) and there is an AS for 
collecting aggregated data from each of nodes 𝑢𝑖. A hierarchical structure is used to 
represent the mobile devices as nodes and their connections as links. All nodes in the 
network are connected wirelessly.  Furthermore, we assume that every two connected 
nodes have already authenticated each other and established a secure communication 
channel between them if necessary.  
  
Figure 8: A MSS setting 
Figure 8 provides an overview of MSS setting and inherent security flaws of MSS. Such 
flaws could be remedied by appropriate techniques such as privacy-preserving methods 
proposed in [21], [23], [25], [36], [67]. In our setting, each network consists of four 
different types of nodes namely, leaf nodes, parent nodes, a root node and an AS. Each 
node has different roles and capacities. Leaf nodes act as data contributors to their parent 
nodes. They consist of mobile devices, which have computing and storing limitations like 
smartphones or tablets. Parent nodes act as data aggregators for their children in addition 
to the role of data contributors. They aggregate their own data with their children’s data 
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and send the results to their parents. This aggregation and forwarding process is repeated 
until the root node receives the data from its children, which acts as a special parent node 
for the final data aggregation and transfers the aggregated result to the AS. Finally, the 
AS collects the aggregated data, extracts the information needed, and checks its integrity.  
4.4.1 AGGREGATED DATA ENCRYPTION 
This sub-section describes the APDAW process on an aggregated data encryption via the 
hierarchical structure described earlier. Similar to the work in [23], each round of data 
aggregation has two phases, commitment collection and data aggregation. The 
commitment collection phase allows an AS to collect commitments from all the nodes, 
which will collectively enable the AS to check the integrity of the aggregated result to be 
detailed later. The commitment of each node should be bound to its value to be 
aggregated, but the AS cannot infer the value from the commitment in order to preserve 
the node’s data privacy. The data aggregation phase allows all the nodes to contribute 
their values to the aggregation in an encrypted form in a Bottom-Up (BU) way along the 
hierarchical node structure until the root node completes its data aggregation and passes 
the result to the AS. The AS can then decrypt the result to reveal the aggregated value 
without knowing the individual values added by different nodes and examine its match 
to the commitments collected to ensure its integrity. The processes of collecting the 
commitments and aggregating ciphertext data by each node using APDAW can be 
illustrated in Figure 9. In addition, Figure 10 shows the process executed by the AS for 
collecting the commitment, recovering the aggregated data and integrity checking based 
on the commitments collected.  
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Submits 𝛼𝑖 to 𝑢𝑖’s parent or AS if 𝑢𝑖 is the root 
Initialises 𝑑𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 
Computes 
 𝑒𝑖 = 2
𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉𝑏𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖  
Generates commitment: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 
Submits (𝑐𝑖,𝑢𝜌 ) to AS for 
commitment collection 
End 
Start 
Figure 9: Commitment Generation and Aggregated Data Encryption by each 
node using APDAW 
Aggregated Data Encryption, 𝛼𝑖 
𝛼𝑖 = (𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 )mod 𝑞  
 
Receives initial values from AS:  
𝜏, 𝑔, 𝑝, 𝑞 and 𝑛 
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As described earlier, each round of data aggregation consists of two phases and the details 
are presented as follows. To create the commitments in the first phase, we adopt the 
Schnorr signature scheme’s parameters [176]. Namely, 𝑝 is a large prime, 𝑞 is a prime 
factor of 𝑝 − 1, and 𝑔 (1 < 𝑔 < 𝑝) is a generator such that 𝑔𝑞mod 𝑝 = 1.  
Let 𝑑𝑖 be a value of a node 𝑢𝑖 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛), which 𝑢𝑖 will contribute to the data 
aggregation. Since 𝑑𝑖 may be within a small range, it is necessary to randomise 𝑑𝑖 to 
enlarge its range before the commitment generation to make the discovery of 𝑑𝑖 from its 
associated commitment harder. The randomisation of 𝑑𝑖 is the same as that defined in 
[23] and repeated below: 
𝑒𝑖 = 2
𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉𝑏𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖 , for every 𝑖 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛)   (4.1) 
Here, 𝜏 is the maximal bit length of value 𝑑𝑖 to be aggregated, and 𝑏𝑖 is a random number 
Yes 
No 
Start 
Initialises and sends 𝑛, 𝜏, 𝑝, 𝑞, and 𝑔 to all the nodes 
Receives 𝛼𝑡 from 𝑢𝑡 to compute: 
𝑒 = (𝛼𝑡 −∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑞  
 𝑔𝑒 mod 𝑝 =
( 𝑐𝑖) mod 𝑝
𝑛
𝑖=1  ? 
End 
Computes: 
đ = é mod 2𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉ 
Invokes 
misbehaved 
node tracking 
process 
Figure 10: Commitment Collection, Aggregated Data Recovery and Integrity 
Checking by AS using APDAW 
Receives (𝑐𝑖,𝑢𝜌 ) from each node 𝑢𝑖  
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picked up by 𝑢𝑖, of which the bit size 𝑙𝑏 is determined in terms of the difficulty of 
exhaustive search for decryption. 2𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉ in 𝑒𝑖 implies 2
𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉ > ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , which is 
needed for the AS to recover the aggregated result as to be detailed in Sub-section 4.4.2. 
From the definition of 𝑒𝑖, it is clear that 𝑒𝑖’s bit size is 𝑙𝑒 = 𝜏 + ⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉ + 𝑙𝑏. 
Additionally, we require ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 < 𝑞 that can always be satisfied by selecting a suitable 
size of 𝑞. This condition is needed to allow the AS decrypting the aggregated data in Sub-
section 4.4.2. 
In order to generate its commitment, 𝑢𝑖 computes: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑒𝑖mod 𝑝     (4.2) 
and sends (𝑐𝑖, 𝑢𝜌 ) to the AS securely. Here, 𝑢𝜌  is the identity of 𝑢𝑖’s parent, and this 
information enables the AS to build the hierarchical relationships among all the nodes, 
which are required for misbehaved node tracking to be presented in Sub-section 4.4.3. 
Note that each commitment 𝑐𝑖 submitted to and successfully authenticated by the AS is 
assumed to contain correct 𝑒𝑖 [23].  
After the successful completion of the above phase, the data aggregation phase begins 
with the leaf nodes with no children. Each of these nodes sends its encrypted value to be 
defined below to its parent. Every parent node then aggregates all the received values 
with its own encrypted one and passes the result to its parent. This process is repeated 
until the root node finishes its data aggregation and sends the result to the AS. Finally, 
the AS decrypts the received result to recover the aggregated value and checks its integrity 
based on the commitments collected in the first phase. In addition, we have extended this 
phase to include a process for identifying possible misbehaved nodes if the aggregated 
value does not match the commitments, so that certain actions can be taken to further 
investigate such nodes in subsequent aggregations. The detail of this process will be 
specified in Sub-section 4.4.3. 
We now present how a node 𝑢𝑖 generates its aggregated data to be sent to its parent, which 
is different from the method given in [23]. Let {𝛼𝑣1 , … , 𝛼𝑣𝜎} denote a set of values 
received by 𝑢𝑖 from its 𝜎 children. Here we assume that there exists a secure 
communication channel between 𝑢𝑖 and each of its children for encrypted and 
authenticated data transmissions, and any unauthorised nodes and even the AS cannot 
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decrypt the encrypted data. 
To generate its aggregated value, 𝑢𝑖 performs the following calculation: 
𝛼𝑖 = (𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 +∑ 𝛼𝑣𝑗) mod 𝑞
𝜎
𝑗=1       (4.3)  
Here, 𝑒𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1  is an aggregation of all the received values 𝛼𝑣𝑗  together with 𝑢𝑖’s 
own value 𝑒𝑖, where ∑ 𝛼𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 = 0 when 𝑢𝑖 is a leaf node. 𝛼𝑖 is the encryption of the 
aggregation with 𝑢𝑖’s commitment 𝑐𝑖 as a secret key. This encryption is different from 
the one in [23] that uses a hash yielded from a secret key shared with the AS. Since 𝑢𝑖 
submitted 𝑐𝑖 to the AS securely, 𝑐𝑖 can be treated as a shared secret key between them. 
This avoids the hash calculation used in [23] so as to improve the efficiency of data 
encryption by each node and decryption by the AS.   
After the generation of 𝛼𝑖, 𝑢𝑖 sends 𝛼𝑖 to its parent 𝑢𝜌  securely.  Note that 𝑢𝜌  cannot 
decrypt 𝛼𝑖 without knowing 𝑐𝑖. Although the AS can decrypt 𝛼𝑖 with stored 𝑐𝑖, the AS is 
unable to get 𝛼𝑖 as 𝛼𝑖 is sent to 𝑢𝜌  securely. 
Having received and authenticated the data from all the children, 𝑢𝜌  yields its aggregated 
data in the same way as 𝑢𝑖 did, and sends the result to its parent. This process is repeated 
until the root node passes its aggregated data to the AS. Then, the AS will recover the 
plaintext result by executing a data recovery process that will be described in the 
following sub-section. 
4.4.2 AGGREGATED DATA RECOVERY 
In this sub-section, the process of recovering the aggregated data from its ciphertext form 
is described as follows. Upon the reception of result 𝛼𝑡 from root node 𝑢𝑡, the AS 
confirms the authenticity of 𝛼𝑡. If the confirmation is positive, the AS decrypts 𝛼𝑡 with 
collected commitments 𝑐𝑖 to recover the aggregated randomised value é by computing: 
é = (𝛼𝑡 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑞       (4.4) 
This is due to the following relationships where ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 < 𝑞 as stated in Sub-section 
4.4.1: 
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 𝑒 = (𝛼𝑡 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑞  
= (𝑒𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑣𝑗 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑞
𝜎
𝑗=1   
= (∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑞  
= ∑ 𝑒𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1 .  
The above relationship is true because of (∑ 𝛼𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 )mod 𝑞 = ∑ (𝑒𝑣𝑗 + 𝑐𝑣𝑗)
𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑞, 
leading to:   
 (𝑒𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 )mod 𝑞 = (𝑒𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + ∑ (𝑒𝑣𝑗 + 𝑐𝑣𝑗)
𝜎
𝑗=1 )mod 𝑞  
= (∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑞. 
After the recovery of é, the AS checks its integrity based on commitments 𝑐𝑖 by 
confirming: 
𝑔𝑒 mod 𝑝 = ( 𝑐𝑖) mod 𝑝
𝑛
𝑖=1     (4.5)  
This relation is because of: 
𝑔𝑒 mod 𝑝 = 𝑔∑ 𝑒𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1 mod 𝑝 = ( 𝑔𝑒𝑖) mod 𝑝𝑛𝑖=1 = ( 𝑐𝑖) mod 𝑝
𝑛
𝑖=1 .  
If the above check is successful, the AS completes the aggregation process by calculating 
the aggregated value: 
đ = é mod 2𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉     (4.6) 
Based on the condition 2𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉ > ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  given in Sub-section 4.4.1, the above 
calculation results in: 
đ = é mod 2𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉ = (∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 2
𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉ = (∑ (2𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉𝑏𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) 
mod 2𝜏+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛⌉ = ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
However, if the integrity check fails, it means that some node(s) misbehaved by sending 
out incorrect data, so the AS initiates the tracking process to be introduced in the next 
sub-section to identify possible nodes, which have misbehaved based on the AS’s 
collected node commitments.  
4.4.3 MISBEHAVED NODE TRACKING 
This sub-section describes a tracking process of misbehaving nodes if the integrity check 
has failed based on Equation 4.5. This process should enable the identification of the 
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nodes without compromising individual nodes’ data privacy. The tracking process 
consists of two stages: 
(a) The AS will ask each node 𝑢𝑖 to send 𝑧𝑖 = (𝑔
𝛼𝑖  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 to the AS securely. 
Note that although the AS knows each commitment 𝑐𝑖 included in 𝛼𝑖 as a key, the AS 
cannot derive any value 𝑒𝑖 from 𝑧𝑖 (see Section 5.2 for a detailed analysis).  
(b) Having received and authenticated such values 𝑧𝑖 from all the nodes, the AS then 
constructs its own value 𝑦𝑖 for every node 𝑢𝑖 from the stored commitments in a BU 
way (a top-down (TD) checking method will be discussed later in this sub-section) 
along the hierarchical node structure and compares 𝑦𝑖 with 𝑧𝑖 received in the first 
stage. A mismatch between them (i.e. 𝑦𝑖 ≠ 𝑧𝑖) indicates a misbehaved node, as the 
aggregated result associated with 𝑧𝑖 is different from the committed one 
corresponding to 𝑦𝑖. In this case, one of the following scenarios must have led to the 
mismatch:  
(i) 𝑢𝑖 misbehaved for wrong 𝑧𝑖, although all its children sent their correct data to 
𝑢𝑖.  
(ii) Some of the children misbehaved by sending incorrect data to 𝑢𝑖, although 𝑢𝑖 
behaved honestly to yield 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖.  
(iii) Both 𝑢𝑖 and some of its children misbehaved for the wrong data generations. 
To pinpoint the misbehaved node(s), the AS needs to verify whether each child 𝑢𝑗  
submitted correct 𝛼𝑗 to 𝑢𝑖. As assumed in Sub-section 4.4.1, there is a secure 
communication channel between 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑗  for message encryption and authentication, 
so the verification can be done based on the authentication information. However, a 
main problem with such a verification is that the AS has to get hold of 𝛼𝑗 for the 
verification, which enables AS to decrypt 𝛼𝑗 in the way defined in Equation 4.4 for the 
discovery of the corresponding intermediary aggregated result. This weakens the data 
privacy. Hence, the scheme proposed in this section does not perform such 
verification. Instead it simply identifies 𝑢𝑖 and its children as suspicious nodes for the 
misbehaviour. This scheme can work with the one to be defined in Section 4.5 to 
determine exactly which node is guilty of the misbehaviour in successive aggregations. 
There is a special case for 𝑢𝑖 when 𝑢𝑖 is a leaf node. The mismatch between 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 
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(i.e. 𝑦𝑖 ≠ 𝑧𝑖) indicates that 𝑢𝑖 certainly misbehaved because in this situation 𝑢𝑖 has no 
children to blame for the generation of its incorrect 𝑧𝑖 (or 𝛼𝑖). The AS needs to take 
certain actions against such misbehaviour, e.g. expelling 𝑢𝑖 from further aggregations.  
After the above identification of the misbehaved or suspicious nodes, the AS can carry 
on its examination of other nodes. To continue, the AS first requests 𝑢𝑖’s parent 𝑢𝜌  to 
send 𝑧𝑖
′ = 𝑔𝛼𝑖  mod 𝑝 to the AS securely if 𝑢𝑖 is not the root, where 𝑢𝜌  got 𝛼𝑖 from 𝑢𝑖 
during the data aggregation. The AS then assigns received 𝑧𝑖
′ to 𝑦𝑖 (i.e. 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖
′) so that 
the AS can proceed with its value construction and inspection for 𝑢𝜌 . This tracking 
process continues until the root node has been examined.  
For simplicity, we provide a flow chart as in Figure 11 to illustrate the process involves 
for detecting misbehaved nodes using APDAW. 
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Figure 11: The Misbehaviour Nodes Tracking Process by AS using APDAW 
We now present the above tracking method in detail. Having received and authenticated 
values 𝑧𝑖 from all the nodes in the first stage, the AS starts the construction of its values 
𝑦𝑖 in the second stage. It first builds the hierarchical node relationships from the parent 
node information stored with the commitments. For example, to find all the children of a 
given node 𝑢𝑖, the AS searches the commitments to spot those with 𝑢𝑖 as the parent (see 
Sub-section 4.4.1) so that the nodes associated with those commitments are the children 
of 𝑢𝑖, and if no such commitments are found, 𝑢𝑖 is a leaf node without any child. 
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The AS then begins with the leaf nodes for the value construction. For each leaf node 𝑢𝑖, 
the AS applies its stored commitment information (𝑐𝑖, 𝑢𝜌 ) with 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑒𝑖  mod 𝑝 defined 
in Equation 4.2 to perform: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖𝑔
𝑐𝑖mod 𝑝      (4.7) 
The AS then compares 𝑦𝑖 with 𝑧𝑖 received from 𝑢𝑖. If 𝑦𝑖  mod 𝑞 ≠ 𝑧𝑖, 𝑢𝑖 certainly 
misbehaved due to its leaf node status, as discussed earlier. This check is based on the 
fact below for correct 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 (see Sub-section 4.4.1): 
𝑦𝑖 mod 𝑞 = (𝑐𝑖𝑔
𝑐𝑖  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 = (𝑔𝑒𝑖+𝑐𝑖 mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 = (𝑔𝛼𝑖  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 =
𝑧𝑖. 
The AS continues the check for all the leaf nodes. Suppose that the value 𝑧𝑖 received from 
every leaf node 𝑢𝑖 is valid. The AS then moves to construct the value 𝑦𝜌  of each parent 
node 𝑢𝜌  of some leaf nodes with stored information (𝑐𝜌 , 𝑢𝑔 ) and generated values 
{𝑦𝑣1 , … , 𝑦𝑣𝜎} for all the 𝜎 chidren of 𝑢𝜌 . This requires the following calculation: 
𝑦𝜌 = (𝑐𝜌 𝑔
𝑐𝜌  𝑦𝑣𝑗)
𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝     (4.8) 
Similar to the comparison for the leaf nodes, the AS compares 𝑦𝜌  with 𝑧𝜌  received from 
𝑢𝜌  to confirm 𝑦𝜌  mod 𝑞 = 𝑧𝜌 , which is based on the following relationships:  
𝑦𝜌  mod 𝑞 = (𝑐𝜌 𝑔
𝑐𝜌 ( 𝑦𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 )mod 𝑝)mod 𝑞  
= (𝑔𝑒𝜌 +𝑐𝜌 ( 𝑔
𝛼𝑣𝑗𝜎
𝑗=1 ) mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞   
= (𝑔
𝑒𝜌 +𝑐𝜌 +∑ 𝛼𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1  mod 𝑝)mod 𝑞  
= (𝑔𝛼𝜌  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 
 = 𝑧𝜌 . 
If 𝑦𝜌  mod 𝑞 ≠ 𝑧𝜌  (i.e. 𝑧𝜌  is incorrect), 𝑢𝜌  and its 𝜎 children are deemed as suspicious 
nodes for the misbehaviour of generating wrong 𝑧𝜌 . 
The above result for 𝑢𝜌  can be extended to any other nodes including the root. Thus, the 
AS repeats such value construction and comparison for every parent. Afterwards, the next 
upper level of parent nodes will be examined in the same way. This process continues 
until the root node is checked. 
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The aforementioned tracking method follows a BU process to examine every node for the 
misbehaviour identification. However, if a node 𝑢𝑖 and all its descendants behaved 
correctly, the inspection of 𝑢𝑖’s value 𝑧𝑖 alone by the AS is sufficient to confirm the 
correctness of all its descendants’ values. In other words, correct 𝑧𝑖 assures that all the 
descendants of 𝑢𝑖 behaved correctly without checking them, so as to accelerate the 
tracking process. This is because if any descendant 𝑢𝑗  misbehaved, its incorrect 𝛼𝑗 would 
be eventually aggregated into 𝑢𝑖’s output 𝛼𝑖, resulting in wrong 𝛼𝑖 and hence invalid 𝑧𝑖 
that would fail the AS’s inspection. Note that 𝑢𝑖 could misbehave by sending correct 𝑧𝑖 
to the AS but a wrong 𝛼𝑖
′ to its parent in order to avoid being detected by the AS. However, 
such misbehaviour can be spotted when the parent node is examined. This misbehaved 
node tracking follows a Top-Down (TD) process. 
The above discussion also implies that incorrect 𝛼𝑖 or 𝑧𝑖 itself is insufficient to judge 
whether 𝑢𝑖 misbehaved, as its result 𝛼𝑖 (or 𝑧𝑖) depends on those from its descendants. In 
this case, it is necessary to examine the behaviours of 𝑢𝑖’s descendants as well. One way 
of the examination is to use the BU tracking method described earlier in this sub-section. 
Alternatively, a TD tracking process can be employed, but after some descendants have 
been recognised as misbehaved, the BU process is also required to work upwards to 
confirm whether their ancestors also misbehaved. Evidently, running both the TD and BU 
examinations slows down the tracking process. Thus, we only use the TD examination to 
identify correctly behaved nodes, rather than chasing misbehaved nodes, at a higher level 
so as to exclude the inspection of their descendants for better efficiency. 
Another issue of the TD checking is about how many levels of nodes should be checked. 
It can only gain better efficiency when the nodes checked are fewer than those confirmed 
as good nodes and excluded from the checking. Otherwise, it would be simpler to run the 
BU tracking process defined earlier. Nevertheless, determining the number of such levels 
is challenging, as it relies on several factors such as how many nodes may misbehave and 
where they could locate in the aggregation tree or hierarchy, which are unknown 
beforehand. Therefore, we only check all the children of the root node in this work as to 
be detailed below, and further checking can be applied at other levels. For example, if a 
child 𝑢𝑖 of the root fails the examination and has multiple levels of descendants, then the 
nodes at the middle level are inspected to see whether the nodes below the middle level 
  
 
65 
 
are good and can be ruled out from the inspection.  
To check 𝑧𝑖 received from each child 𝑢𝑖 of the root node, the AS first determines the set 
of all the descendants of 𝑢𝑖, {𝑢𝑣1 , … , 𝑢𝑣𝜎}, and collects the set of values, {𝑐𝑣1 , … , 𝑐𝑣𝜎}, 
from their commitments. The AS then computes: 
?̌?𝑖 = (𝑐𝑖 + ∑ 𝑐𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 ) mod 𝑞, and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 𝑔
𝑐̌𝑖( 𝑐𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 ) mod 𝑝  (4.9) 
If 𝑦𝑖 mod 𝑞 = 𝑧𝑖 (i.e. 𝑧𝑖 is correct), all the descendants of 𝑢𝑖 are deemed as good nodes 
and hence excluded from the further checking. This improves the efficiency of the 
misbehaviour tracking process, particularly when the number of the descendants is large. 
The above verification is based on the following relationships: 
𝑦𝑖  mod 𝑞 = (𝑐𝑖 𝑔
𝑐̌𝑖( 𝑐𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 ) mod 𝑝)mod 𝑞  
= (𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑔
𝑐𝑖 +∑ 𝑐𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 ( 𝑔
𝑒𝑣𝑗𝜎
𝑗=1 ) mod 𝑝)mod 𝑞  
= (𝑔
𝑒𝑖+𝑐𝑖+∑ (𝑒𝑣𝑗+ 𝑐𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 ) mod 𝑝)mod 𝑞 
= (𝑔𝛼𝑖  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 
 = 𝑧𝑖.  
Having examined all the children of the root node and excluded the good nodes for further 
checking, the AS initiates the BU tracking process defined earlier to inspect all the other 
nodes for the misbehaviour identification. Note that the AS makes use of the good child 
nodes’ already computed values 𝑦𝑖, together with those constructed in the BU way for the 
suspicious child nodes, to yield the root node’s value 𝑦𝑡. 
4.4.4 PRIVACY IMPROVEMENTS 
The APDAW approach presented in the previous sub-sections works well under the 
assumption that there is no collusion between the AS and any nodes involved in the 
aggregation. Otherwise, it is vulnerable if the AS colludes with a node 𝑢𝑖 to obtain and 
decrypt its data such as 𝛼𝑖 for the intermediary aggregated result or even individual node 
values, resulting in a breach of the data privacy. To counter this threat, the work in [23] 
proposes ideas of data slicing and mixing to enhance the protection of individual node 
values so that the AS would have to compromise multiple nodes in order to obtain a 
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node’s value, which is much harder to achieve. 
Two methods are presented in [23] to implement the above ideas. The first one is to divide 
a node 𝑢𝑖 ’s value 𝑒𝑖 defined in Equation 4.1 into 𝛽 + 1 random slices such that: 
𝑒𝑖 = ∑ ?̀?𝑖,𝑗
𝛽+1
𝑗=1 mod 𝑞     (4.10) 
𝑢𝑖 sends each slice ?̀?𝑖,𝑗 to a different parent 𝑢𝜌  securely for aggregation. This means that 
if 𝑢𝑖 is secure, the AS would have to compromise or collude with at least these 𝛽 + 1 
parents to get 𝑒𝑖 (e.g. when 𝑢𝑖 is a leaf node). The larger 𝛽 is, the more difficult the AS 
can gain 𝑒𝑖. 
Our APDAW approach can accommodate this slicing method by expanding 𝑢𝑖’s 
commitment into {(𝑐𝑖,1, 𝑢𝜌 1),… , (𝑐𝑖,𝛽+1, 𝑢𝜌 𝛽+1)}, where each slice ?̀?𝑖,𝑗 has a tuple 
(𝑐𝑖,𝑗 , 𝑢𝜌 𝑗) with 𝑐𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑔
𝑠̀𝑖,𝑗  mod 𝑝 and 𝑢𝜌 𝑗 as a parent node receiving the slice from 𝑢𝑖. 
Then 𝑢𝑖 transfers each non-aggregated slice ?̀?𝑖,𝑗 (1 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝛽 + 1) to parent 𝑢𝜌 𝑗 separately 
and securely, i.e. ?̀?𝑖,𝑗 is encrypted with a key shared solely between 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝜌 𝑗[23] and 
𝑢𝜌 𝑗 then decrypts the encryption received to recover ?̀?𝑖,𝑗 for its data aggregation. 𝑢𝑖 only 
aggregates ?̀?𝑖,𝛽+1 with any received data, including non-aggregated slices from some of 
its children, to yield 𝛼𝑖 as defined in Equation 4.3. This indicates that each node 𝑢𝑖 applies 
only 𝑐𝑖,𝛽+1 as a key for the encryption of its aggregated data. Thus, the AS uses 
∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝛽+1
𝑛
𝑖=1  to decrypt the final aggregated data received (see Equation 4.4). 
During the tracking process, each node 𝑢𝑖 only sends 𝑧𝑖 = (𝑔
𝛼𝑖mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 to the AS. 
To construct 𝑦𝑖 to check the correctness of each 𝑧𝑖, the AS divides 𝑢𝑖’s children into two 
groups, {𝑢𝑣1, …, 𝑢𝑣𝜎} with each node 𝑢𝑣𝑗  linked to stored (𝑐𝑣𝑗,𝜑, 𝑢𝑖) where 1 ≤ 𝜑 < 𝛽 +
1, and {𝑢𝑣 1, …, 𝑢𝑣 𝜎 } with each node 𝑢𝑣 ?̌? associated to (𝑐𝑣 ?̌?,𝛽+1, 𝑢𝑖). Here, the two groups 
are empty if 𝑢𝑖 is a leaf node. This case means that in the data aggregation stage, 𝑢𝑖 
received a non-aggregated slice from each 𝑢𝑣𝑗  in the first group and the aggregated slice 
from each 𝑢𝑣 ?̌?  in the second group, and these slices were then aggregated with 𝑢𝑖’s slice 
𝑣𝑖,𝛽+1 to create 𝛼𝑖. Hence, the AS performs the following calculation to yield 𝑦𝑖: 
𝑦𝑖 = (𝑐𝑖,𝛽+1𝑔
𝑐𝑖,𝛽+1( 𝑐𝑣𝑗,𝜑
𝜎
𝑗=1 (1≤𝜑<𝛽+1) )( 𝑦𝑣 𝑗
𝜎 
𝑗=1 )) mod 𝑝  (4.11) 
The AS applies 𝑦𝑖 to check 𝑧𝑖 received from 𝑢𝑖, in the way described in Sub-section 4.4.3. 
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This checking mechanism is based on the value of 𝑦𝑖, where: 
𝑦𝑖  mod 𝑞   = (𝑐𝑖,𝛽+1𝑔
𝑐𝑖,𝛽+1 ( 𝑐𝑣𝑗,𝜑
𝜎
𝑗=1 (1≤𝜑<𝛽+1) ) ( 𝑦𝑣 𝑗
𝜎 
𝑗=1 )mod 𝑝)mod 𝑞  
 = (𝑔𝑠̀𝑖,𝛽+1+𝑐𝑖,𝛽+1 ( 𝑔
𝑠?̀?𝑗,𝜑𝜎
𝑗=1 (1≤𝜑<𝛽+1) ) ( 𝑔
𝛼𝑣 𝑗𝜎 
𝑗=1 ) mod 𝑝)mod 𝑞  
  = (𝑔
𝑠̀𝑖,𝛽+1+𝑐𝑖,𝛽+1+∑ 𝑠?̀?𝑗,𝜑
𝜎
𝑗=1 (1≤𝜑<𝛽+1) +∑ 𝛼𝑣 𝑗
𝜎 
𝑗=1  mod 𝑝)mod 𝑞  
 = (𝑔𝛼𝑖  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 
= 𝑧𝑖.  
Evidently, APDAW can also offer the enhanced privacy while retaining the accountability.  
The second method given in [23] does not slice 𝑢𝑖 ’s value 𝑒𝑖 but instead lets 𝑢𝑖 
collaborate with a number of other nodes to encrypt 𝑒𝑖 with the keys that are each shared 
only between 𝑢𝑖 and one of the collaborative nodes. The encryption is designed in such a 
way that when the root passes the final aggregated result to the AS, encrypted 𝑒𝑖 is already 
decrypted during the aggregation process. Thus there is no additional decryption needed 
from the AS. Evidently, to obtain 𝑒𝑖, the AS has to gain access to these collaborative 
nodes’ shared keys for the decryption, which is more difficult to accomplish. For further 
details, please refer to paper [23]. 
Our APDAW approach can also incorporate the above method by simply replacing 𝑒𝑖 with 
its encrypted version and then performing the data aggregation and recovery as well as 
misbehaviour node tracking in the normal way described in Sub-sections 4.4.1-4.4.3. This 
enhances APDAW with stronger privacy protection while still offering the accountability. 
This method will be further exploited in Section 4.6.  
4.5 ACCOUNTABILITY ENHANCEMENT 
This section describes the enhancement versions of APDAW to allow misbehaved nodes 
to be detected certainly during an aggregation process. The two improved versions of 
APDA are APDAS and APDAH, and the details of both versions are presented below. 
4.5.1 APDAS FOR STRONG ACCOUNTABILITY 
This sub-section describes a strong version of our privacy-preserving data aggregation. 
As discussed in Sub-section 4.4.3, to surely identify a misbehaved node, a signature 
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created by the node on its aggregated data is required to hold the node accountable for its 
behaviour. In this sub-section, we propose a scheme to embed a built-in signature of each 
node in its aggregated data to accomplish the strong accountability for APDAS. The main 
idea used for the scheme is to extend the aggregated data item 𝛼𝑖 (defined in Equation 
4.3) of each node 𝑢𝑖 by yielding a signature of 𝑢𝑖 on 𝛼𝑖 with its private key 𝑘𝑖 and then 
combining 𝛼𝑖 and the signature to form a new aggregated data item ?̅?𝑖. As a result, ?̅?𝑖 
serves as not only the encryption of 𝑢𝑖’s data but also its signature on the data so that 𝑢𝑖 
cannot falsely deny the generation of ?̅?𝑖. 
The key benefit from the above built-in signature solution is two-fold. First, it allows 
nodes to generate and verify such a signature more efficiently than a separate signature. 
Secondly, the solution also enables the AS to examine these built-in signatures more 
efficiently for tracking down misbehaved nodes, without overloading the AS for the 
decryption of the final aggregated data. These advantages will be discussed further in the 
data verification and misbehaviour tracking process for APDAS. Prior to describing the 
process of APDAS in detail, we provide Figure 12 to illustrate the process for the 
commitment generation and aggregated data encryption performed by each MN using 
APDAS. In addition, Figure 13 shows the process of the commitments collection from all 
MNs, aggregated data recovery and integrity checking executed by the AS.  
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Figure 12: Commitment Generation, Aggregated Data Encryption and Integrity 
Checking by each node using APDAS 
 
 
 
 
We now elaborate the above idea to extend APDAW to incorporate the built-in signatures. 
To create a signature, the AS needs to assign a pair of private and public keys, 𝑘𝑖 and 𝜇𝑖, 
to each node 𝑢𝑖 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) based on parameters 𝑝, 𝑞 and 𝑔 defined in Sub-section 4.4.1.  
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The AS begins with selecting two random primes 𝑟 and 𝜂 (1 < 𝑟 < 𝑞, 1 < 𝜂 < 𝑞 and 
𝜂 < 𝑟) as its secret keys to compute 𝜍 = 𝑟𝜂−1mod 𝑞, where 𝜂−1 is the modular 
multiplicative inverse of 𝜂 modulo 𝑞. For each node 𝑢𝑖, the AS chooses a number 𝑤𝑖 (1 <
𝑤𝑖 < 𝑞) such that 𝑤𝑖𝜍 > 𝑞, to define 𝑢𝑖’s private and public keys: 
𝑘𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝜍 mod 𝑞, and 𝜇𝑖 = 𝑔
−𝑘𝑖mod 𝑝    (4.12) 
The bit lengths of 𝑟, 𝜂 and 𝑤𝑖 in each private key need to meet the following conditions: 
(a) 𝑙𝑒 + ⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝜂⌉ < ⌊𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑟⌋     (4.13a) 
(b) 𝑙ℎ + 𝑙𝑤 + ⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑟⌉ < ⌊𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑞⌋    (4.13b) 
Here, 𝑙𝑒 defined in Sub-section 4.4.1 is the maximum bit length of 𝑒𝑖, 𝑙ℎ expresses the bit 
length of hash values to be used for signatures, and  𝑙𝑤 denotes the maximum bit length 
of 𝑤𝑖.  
The condition (4.13a) above implies 𝜂 ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 < 2
𝑙𝑒𝜂𝑛 ≤ 2𝑙𝑒+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛+𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝜂⌉ < 𝑟, and the 
condition (4.13b) indicates ℎ𝑟 ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 < 2
𝑙ℎ+𝑙𝑤𝑛𝑟 ≤ 2𝑙ℎ+𝑙𝑤+⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑛+𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑟⌉ < 𝑞, where h 
is a hash value. These two conditions are needed in order to allow the AS to decrypt the 
final aggregated data while providing built-in signatures for accountability, which will be 
explained further. After the key generation, the AS sends each pair of keys 𝑘𝑖 and 𝜇𝑖 to 
the corresponding node 𝑢𝑖 securely and stores them for the accountability checking to be 
presented later.  
Additionally, the public keys need to be distributed to relevant nodes for signature 
verifications. One way for the key distribution is to ask the AS to issue a certificate to 
each node for its public key, and then to let the nodes pass their certificates to others that 
need to verify their signatures. Alternatively, an identity based scheme such as the one 
given in [177], [178] can be employed to allow the AS to create a pair of private and 
public keys for each node from its identity so that others can generate the node’s public 
key from its identity. This avoids the above public key certification. For simplicity, we 
do not specify any particular means for public key distribution in this thesis. We simply 
assume that when a node needs to verify a signature, it has already got the valid public 
key for the verification. 
We now present how to incorporate signatures into the data aggregation specified in 
Section 4.4. The commitment phase described in Sub-section 4.4.1 remains unchanged. 
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The extension begins with the data aggregation phase and is defined below in four parts 
for aggregated data encryption, data verification, aggregated data recovery and 
misbehaviour nodes tracking. The details of each part of the extension are described as 
follows. 
(i) Aggregated Data Encryption  
The aggregated data item 𝛼𝑖 of every node 𝑢𝑖 in Equation 4.3 is extended as follows: 
𝑥𝑖 = (𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 + ∑ ?̅?𝑣𝑗) mod 𝑞
𝜎
𝑗=1 , 𝑧?̅? = 𝑔
𝑥𝑖  mod 𝑝, and 
?̅?𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖 + ℎ(𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑧?̅? mod 𝑞)𝑘𝑖) mod 𝑞   (4.14) 
Here, {?̅?𝑣1 , … , ?̅?𝑣𝜎} denotes a set of aggregated values received by 𝑢𝑖 from its 𝜎 children, 
assuming that the correctness of each value has been verified by 𝑢𝑖 as to be detailed later. 
s is the session number for the current aggregation. 𝑥𝑖 represents the aggregation of all 
the received values ?̅?𝑣𝑗  (1 ≤ j ≤ σ) together with 𝑢𝑖’s own data 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖. 𝑧?̅? is intended to 
allow 𝑢𝑖’s signature on 𝑥𝑖 to be verifiable by another node with no need to know 𝑥𝑖 as to 
be detailed below. ℎ(𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑧?̅? mod 𝑞) is a hash of 𝑠, node identity 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑧?̅? concatenated 
by the operator ‘||’, which signifies the aggregated data processed by 𝑢𝑖 in the current 
session. Evidently, ?̅?𝑖 serves as an encryption of 𝑒𝑖 + ∑ ?̅?𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1  via 𝑐𝑖 +
ℎ(𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑧?̅? mod 𝑞)𝑘𝑖 and a signature on 𝑧?̅? (or ℎ(𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑧?̅?  mod 𝑞)) signed with 𝑢𝑖’s 
private key 𝑘𝑖. It is easy to see from the formations of 𝛼𝑖 and ?̅?𝑖 that 𝛼𝑖 is extended to 
include the embedded signature part ℎ(𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑧?̅? mod 𝑞)𝑘𝑖 to form ?̅?𝑖. 
After the generation of ?̅?𝑖, 𝑢𝑖 sends (𝑧?̅?, ?̅?𝑖) to its parent 𝑢𝜌  for verification prior to be 
aggregated with its parent’s data. 
(ii) Aggregated Data Verification 
To verify the correctness of (𝑧?̅?, ?̅?𝑖) received, 𝑢𝜌  checks the following condition, where 
𝑢𝜌  knows 𝑢𝑖’s public key 𝜇𝑖 as assumed earlier: 
𝑔?̅?𝑖𝜇𝑖
ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑖‖?̅?𝑖 mod 𝑞)mod 𝑝 = 𝑧?̅?    (4.15) 
If the above condition holds, 𝑢𝜌  accepts (𝑧?̅?, ?̅?𝑖) because no other node could produce 
signature ?̅?𝑖 on 𝑧?̅? without knowing private key 𝑘𝑖. Otherwise, 𝑢𝜌  rejects (𝑧?̅?, ?̅?𝑖) and 
requests 𝑢𝑖 to send correct ones.  
The above condition is based on the following fact: 
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𝑔?̅?𝑖𝜇𝑖
ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑖‖?̅?𝑖 mod 𝑞) mod 𝑝 
= 𝑔𝑥𝑖+ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑖‖?̅?𝑖 mod 𝑞)𝑘𝑖𝑔−ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑖‖?̅?𝑖 mod 𝑞)𝑘𝑖mod 𝑝 
= 𝑔𝑥𝑖  mod 𝑝 
= 𝑧?̅?. 
In the case where 𝑢𝜌  has multiple children, it can perform the above signature verification 
for all the children’s signatures together rather than separately to reduce the number of 
exponentiations involved, which are the most costly computations. Let 
{(𝑧?̅?1 , ?̅?𝑣1),… , (𝑧?̅?𝜎 , ?̅?𝑣𝜎)} denote the data received by 𝑢𝜌  from its 𝜎 children. For the joint 
signature verification, 𝑢𝜌  calculates: 
?̂?𝑖 = ∑ ?̅?𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑞, and 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑔
?̂?𝑖mod 𝑝    (4.16) 
and then confirms the following condition:  
𝑓𝑖 𝜇𝑣𝑗
ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑣𝑗‖?̅?𝑣𝑗 mod 𝑞)𝜎
𝑗=1  mod 𝑝 =  𝑧?̅?𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝   (4.17) 
This relation is due to: 
 
𝑓𝑖 𝜇𝑣𝑗
ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑣𝑗‖?̅?𝑣𝑗 mod 𝑞)𝜎
𝑗=1  mod 𝑝  
= 𝑔
∑ ?̅?𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1  𝜇𝑣𝑗
ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑣𝑗‖?̅?𝑣𝑗  mod 𝑞)𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝  
=  𝑔
?̅?𝑣𝑗𝜇𝑣𝑗
ℎ(𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑣𝑗‖?̅?𝑣𝑗mod 𝑞)𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝  
=  𝑧?̅?𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝. 
Clearly, the joint signature verification incurs 𝜎 + 1 exponentiations, whereas the 
separate verification of each signature requires a total of 2𝜎 exponentiations. Hence the 
former is computationally more efficient. 
(iii) Data Recovery  
The above aggregated data generation and verification are repeated by each node until 
root node 𝑢𝑡 passes its aggregated data (𝑧?̅?, ?̅?𝑡) to the AS. Similarly, the AS needs to 
inspect the validity of (𝑧?̅?, ?̅?𝑡) and then decrypts ?̅?𝑡 for the recovery of the aggregated 
randomised value é by: 
é = (((?̅?𝑡 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )𝜂 mod 𝑞) mod 𝑟) /𝜂    (4.18) 
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The above relation is due to the following relationships: 
é = (((?̅?𝑡 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )𝜂 mod 𝑞) mod 𝑟) /𝜂  
= (((𝑥𝑡 + ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑡‖𝑧?̅? mod 𝑞)𝑘𝑡 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )𝜂 mod 𝑞) mod 𝑟) /𝜂  
= (((𝑒𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + ∑ ?̅?𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 + ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑡‖𝑧?̅? mod 𝑞)𝑘𝑡 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) 𝜂 mod 𝑞)mod 𝑟) /𝜂  
= (((∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 +∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑧?̅? mod 𝑞)𝑘𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )𝜂 mod 𝑞) mod 𝑟) /𝜂  
= (((∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 +∑ ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑧?̅?  mod 𝑞)𝑤𝑖𝑟𝜂
−1𝑛
𝑖=1 )𝜂 mod 𝑞) mod 𝑟) /𝜂  
= (((𝜂 ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑟∑ ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑧?̅? mod 𝑞)𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑞) mod 𝑟) /𝜂  
= ((𝜂 ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑟∑ ℎ(𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑧?̅?mod 𝑞)𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑟)/𝜂  
= (𝜂 ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝜂  
= ∑ 𝑒𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1 .  
The above relationships make use of the conditions (4.13a) and (4.13b) stated earlier, 
namely 
𝜂 ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 < 𝑟, and  𝜂 ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑟∑ ℎ(𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑧?̅?mod 𝑞)𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 < 𝑞. 
After the recovery of é, the AS checks its integrity and derives result đ using Equations 
4.5 and 4.6 respectively.  
(iv) Misbehaviour Tracking  
The combined TD and BU tracking processes presented in Sub-section 4.4.3 are also 
applicable here after extensions. Prior to describing the tracking process using APDAS in 
detail, we provide a flow chart as in Figure 14.  
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We first extend the BU process to accurately identify misbehaved nodes. In the first stage 
of the process, each node 𝑢𝑖 sends ?̌?𝑖 = 𝑧?̅? mod 𝑞 to the AS securely. In the second stage, 
the AS constructs the following value for each leaf node 𝑢𝑖 as defined in Equation 4.7: 
?̅?𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖𝑔
𝑐𝑖  mod 𝑝 
and confirms ?̅?𝑖 mod 𝑞 = ?̌?𝑖, where  
?̌?𝑖 = 𝑧?̅? mod 𝑞 = (𝑔
𝑥𝑖  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 = (𝑔𝑒𝑖+𝑐𝑖  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 =
(𝑐𝑖𝑔
𝑐𝑖  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞. 
Suppose that every ?̅?𝑖 matches received ?̌?𝑖 (i.e. ?̅?𝑖  mod 𝑞 = ?̌?𝑖). The AS then proceeds to 
build a value ?̅?𝜌  for each parent node 𝑢𝜌  of some leaf nodes with its stored commitment 
information (𝑐𝜌 , 𝑢𝑔 ). Let {?̅?𝑣1 , … , ?̅?𝑣𝜎} be the set of values constructed by the AS for the 
𝜎 chidren of 𝑢𝜌 . The AS applies them to yield ?̅?𝜌  as follows: 
𝜀?̅? = (𝑐𝜌 + ∑ ℎ (𝑠||𝑢𝑣𝑗||?̅?𝑣𝑗mod 𝑞) 𝑘𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 )mod 𝑞, and 
?̅?𝜌 = 𝑐𝜌 𝑔
?̅?𝜌 ( ?̅?𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 ) mod 𝑝                            (4.19) 
This leads to the following relationships:  
?̅?𝜌  = 𝑐𝜌 𝑔
?̅?𝜌 ( ?̅?𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 ) mod 𝑝  
= 𝑔𝑒𝜌 𝑔
𝑐𝜌 +∑ ℎ(𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑣𝑗‖?̅?𝑣𝑗  mod 𝑞)𝑘𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 𝑔
∑ 𝑥𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝 
= 𝑔
𝑒𝜌 +𝑐𝜌 +∑ (𝑥𝑣𝑗+ℎ(𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑣𝑗‖?̅?𝑣𝑗mod 𝑞)𝑘𝑣𝑗)
𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝 
= 𝑔
𝑒𝜌 +𝑐𝜌 +∑ ?̅?𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝 
= 𝑔𝑥𝜌 mod 𝑝 
 = 𝑧?̅? . 
Hence, the AS compares between constructed  ?̅?𝜌  and received ?̌?𝜌 . If ?̅?𝜌  mod 𝑞 = ?̌?𝜌  (i.e. 
both 𝑢𝜌  and its children behaved properly), the AS then continues its value construction 
and comparison for other nodes. Otherwise, some of 𝑢𝜌  and its children misbehaved. In 
this case, the AS needs a further investigation by verifying the signatures of 𝑢𝜌 ’s children 
Figure 14: The Misbehaviour Nodes Tracking Process by AS using APDAS 
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in the joint way defined earlier to see whether some of them submitted wrong data to 𝑢𝜌 .  
 For this verification purpose, the AS requests 𝑢𝜌  to send its possessed {𝑧?̅?1
′ , … , 𝑧?̅?𝜎
′ } and 
𝑓𝜌  to the AS. Note that the AS knows the public key 𝜇𝑣𝑗  of every child 𝑢𝑣𝑗 . If the joint 
signature verification is negative (i.e. 𝑓𝜌  𝜇𝑣𝑗
ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑣𝑗‖?̅?𝑣𝑗
′ mod 𝑞)𝜎
𝑗=1  mod 𝑝 ≠
 𝑧?̅?𝑗
′𝜎
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝), the AS concludes that 𝑢𝜌  misbehaved because 𝑢𝜌  failed to properly 
carry out the same verification. Here, although the AS could further inspect each child’s 
signature to confirm whether some of them are guilty of wrong doing as well, this would 
impose extra resource consumptions on 𝑢𝜌  for providing the signatures to the AS, and 
misbehaved 𝑢𝜌  could refuse to cooperate with the AS for the inspection. Thus we do not 
check the children’s behaviour in this case.  
Otherwise, the positive verification outcome means that each child 𝑢𝑣𝑗  cannot deny the 
provision of its 𝑧?̅?𝑗
′  to 𝑢𝜌 . The AS then examines the correctness of every 𝑧?̅?𝑗
′  by 
comparing it with constructed ?̅?𝑣𝑗 . If each pair of 𝑧?̅?𝑗
′  and ?̅?𝑣𝑗  match (i.e. 𝑧?̅?𝑗
′ = ?̅?𝑣𝑗 , 
meaning that 𝑧?̅?𝑗
′  is correct), 𝑢𝜌  surely misbehaved as invalid ?̌?𝜌  can only be caused by 
𝑢𝜌 ’s own data. Conversely, when a pair of 𝑧?̅?𝑗
′  and ?̅?𝑣𝑗 do not match (i.e. 𝑧?̅?𝑗
′ ≠ ?̅?𝑣𝑗), 𝑢𝑣𝑗  
is guilty of supplying incorrect 𝑧?̅?𝑗
′  to 𝑢𝜌 , which is evidenced by its verified signature (i.e. 
𝑢𝑣𝑗  correctly signed incorrect 𝑧?̅?𝑗
′ ). After the identification of the misbehaved nodes 
among all the children, the AS also checks whether 𝑢𝜌  misbehaved, by constructing ?̅?𝜌 
′  
from 𝑓𝜌  received from 𝑢𝜌  instead of correct {?̅?𝑣1
′ , … , ?̅?𝑣𝜎
′ } built by the AS:  
?̅?𝜌 
′ = 𝑐𝜌 𝑔
𝑐𝜌 𝑓𝜌  mod 𝑝    (4.20) 
and confirming ?̅?𝜌 
′  mod 𝑞 = ?̌?𝜌  due to the relation below: 
?̅?𝜌 
′  mod 𝑞 = (𝑔𝑒𝜌 +𝑐𝜌 𝑓𝜌  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 = (𝑔
𝑒𝜌 +𝑐𝜌 +∑ ?̅?𝑣𝑗
𝜎
𝑗=1  mod 𝑝)mod 𝑞 =
(𝑔𝑥𝜌  mod 𝑝) mod 𝑞 = ?̌?𝜌 . 
The purpose for the above check is to see whether 𝑢𝜌  correctly yielded its ?̌?𝜌  from 𝑓𝜌 . If 
?̅?𝜌 
′  mod 𝑞 ≠ ?̌?𝜌 , 𝑢𝜌  misbehaved as well. Otherwise, ?̅?𝜌 
′  mod 𝑞 = 𝑧?̅?  would be the result. 
After the completion of the above examination, the AS uses the same way to carry on the 
tracking process. Similar to the tracking in Sub-section 4.4.3, in the case of incorrect ?̌?𝜌 , 
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the AS asks 𝑢𝜌 ’s parent 𝑢𝑔  to send its possessed 𝑧?̅?  to the AS securely if 𝑢𝜌  is not the 
root. The AS then assigns received 𝑧?̅?  to ?̅?𝜌  (i.e. ?̅?𝜌 = 𝑧?̅? ) so as to enable the subsequent 
construction of ?̅?𝑔  for 𝑢𝑔  to proceed. This tracking process continues until the root node 
is checked.  
To extend the TD tracking process discussed in Sub-section 4.4.3, let 𝑢𝜌  be a child of the 
root node. The AS then finds out all the descendants of 𝑢𝜌 , expressed as {𝑢𝑣1 , … , 𝑢𝑣𝜋}, 
and utilises the values in {?̌?𝑣1 , … , ?̌?𝑣𝜋} received from these descendants, rather than those 
constructed by the AS, to compute: 
𝜀?̌? = (𝑐𝜌 + ∑ 𝑐𝑣𝑗
𝜋
𝑗=1 + ∑ ℎ (𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑣𝑗 ‖?̌?𝑣𝑗) 𝑘𝑣𝑗
𝜋
𝑗=1 )mod 𝑞, and 
?̌?𝜌 = 𝑐𝜌 𝑔
?̌?𝜌  𝑐𝑣𝑗
𝜋
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝      (4.21) 
This relation is due to: 
?̌?𝜌  = 𝑐𝜌 𝑔
?̌?𝜌  𝑐𝑣𝑗
𝜋
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝  
= 𝑔𝑒𝜌 𝑔
𝑐𝜌 +∑ 𝑐𝑣𝑗
𝜋
𝑗=1 +∑ ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑣𝑗‖?̌?𝑣𝑗)𝑘𝑣𝑗
𝜋
𝑗=1  𝑔
𝑒𝑣𝑗𝜋
𝑗=1 mod 𝑝  
= 𝑔
𝑒𝜌 +𝑐𝜌 +∑ (𝑒𝑣𝑗
𝜋
𝑗=1 +𝑐𝑣𝑗+ℎ(𝑠‖𝑢𝑣𝑗‖?̌?𝑣𝑗)𝑘𝑣𝑗)mod 𝑝 .  
As each descendant 𝑢𝑣𝑗  contributes 𝑒𝑣𝑗 + 𝑐𝑣𝑗 + ℎ (𝑠||𝑢𝑣𝑗||?̌?𝑣𝑗) 𝑘𝑣𝑗  to the aggregation, it 
is clear that ?̌?𝜌  represents the aggregation of all the contributions of 𝑢𝜌 ’s descendants 
together with 𝑢𝜌 ’s own contribution 𝑒𝑣𝑗 + 𝑐𝑣𝑗 . If ?̌?𝜌  mod 𝑞 = ?̌?𝜌  (i.e. ?̌?𝜌  is correct), the 
AS can exclude 𝑢𝜌 ’s descendants from further checking.  
4.5.2 APDAH FOR HYBRID ACCOUNTABILITY 
Comparing APDAW presented in Section 4.4 with APDAS in Sub-section 4.5.1, it is clear 
that APDAW offers better efficiency as APDAS requires additional exponentiations for 
data generation and verification as well as extra data transmission. However, the higher 
computational costs incurred by APDAS bring the benefit of stronger accountability to 
pinpoint misbehaved nodes, whereas APDAW can identify a group of suspicious nodes 
without the certainty on which of them actually committed the misbehaviour.  
One way to balance the strengths and weaknesses of the two methods is to apply them in 
a combined manner, represented as APDAH. That is, APDAW operates first. If the 
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aggregated result fails the integrity check by Equation 4.5, the tracking process of 
APDAW will enable the AS to find a group of misbehaved or suspicious nodes. In the 
next round of data aggregation, the AS specifically targets those suspicious nodes by 
demanding them to run APDAS and letting the rest continue the operation with APDAW. 
If some suspicious nodes misbehave again, APDAS will certainly spot them. It is also 
possible that a repeated failure of the integrity check leads to the identification of new 
suspicious nodes, so that APDAS needs to expand its operation to cover these new nodes 
in the subsequent round of aggregation. In the worst case, every node eventually executes 
APDAS. On the other hand, when there is no misbehaved node, only APDAW is 
implemented on all the nodes.   
There are two main differences in running APDAW and APDAS separately. First, any 
node 𝑢𝜌  with a mixture of normal and suspicious children only needs to verify the 
signatures received from those suspicious children. Secondly, in the tracking process, 𝑢𝜌  
only passes the signature information of its suspicious children to the AS for verification 
in case a further investigation is required and the signature part of 𝜀?̅?  constructed for 𝑢𝜌  
by the AS only includes the signatures of the suspicious children (see Sub-section 4.5.1). 
In other words, reducing the number of suspicious children to 0 turns the value 
construction and verification for 𝑢𝜌  by APDA
S into that by APDAW.  
Hence the above differences do not affect the application of the signature verification and 
misbehaved node tracking methods of APDAS to APDAH. Additionally, the final 
aggregated value ?̅?𝑡 received by the AS may contain signatures only from some nodes. 
Similarly, the recovery method of APDAS remains valid for the AS to recover the 
aggregated result đ from ?̅?𝑡. Even when there is no signature included in ?̅?𝑡, the recovery 
method still works.  
Evidently APDAH achieves strong accountability for the behaviour of the targeted 
suspicious nodes, while offering a level of efficiency between those of APDAW and 
APDAS, depending on the number of suspicious nodes. The fewer suspicious nodes an 
aggregation involves, the more efficient APDAH is.  
To make APDAH more efficient, we take two measures to reduce the amounts of 
computation and communication. The first is to let the current round of data aggregation 
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skip the commitment collection phase and start directly from the data aggregation phase, 
after suspicious nodes have been identified using APDAW in the previous round. In other 
words, the current round is only to re-aggregate the data collected in the previous round, 
assuming that the data is still valid. 
The second measure is for the current round to request only the suspicious nodes to 
generate new data using APDAS, and to ask the non-suspicious nodes to do nothing or 
reuse their own data from the previous round for the new data re-aggregation through 
APDAW as to be detailed below. Evidently the two measures avoid commitment re-
generation and re-communication, exclude some non-suspicious nodes from the data re-
aggregation, and minimise the aggregation processing for the other non-suspicious nodes. 
These result in significantly reduced computations and communications for better 
efficiency.  
We now detail how to fulfil the above second measure. To begin with the current round 
of data aggregation, the AS should first notify each node 𝑢𝑖 of what to perform. We 
employ 2-bit codes for the notification, where the first bit of a code indicates whether 𝑢𝑖 
is a suspicious node with 0 = no and 1 = yes, and the second bit signifies whether 𝑢𝑖 has 
any suspicious descendant also with 0 = no and 1 = yes. This leads to the following 
combinations accompanied with the actions to be taken by 𝑢𝑖: 
00: 𝑢𝑖 does nothing in the current round. 
01: 𝑢𝑖 uses APDA
W to aggregate its own data together with those received from its 
children. 
10: 𝑢𝑖 initiates the current round by using APDA
S to aggregate its own data together with 
those received from its children in the previous round, or just yield its own data if 𝑢𝑖 
is a leaf node. 
11:  𝑢𝑖 applies APDA
S to aggregate its own data together with those received from its 
children.  
These codes are further interpreted below: 
(a) The first code is for the case where neither 𝑢𝑖 nor any of its descendants are 
suspicious nodes, meaning that its aggregated data passed to its ancestors in the 
previous round is still valid and hence there is no need for 𝑢𝑖 to do anything in the 
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current round. This case is also valid when 𝑢𝑖 is a leaf node with no descendant.  
(b) The second code is used when 𝑢𝑖 is not a suspicious node but at least one of its 
descendants is a suspicious node. In this case, 𝑢𝑖 utilises APDA
W to re-aggregate its 
data, which was produced in the previous round, with the data received in the 
previous round from each child with the 00 code plus the data newly generated in the 
current round from each child with a non-00 code. This means that 𝑢𝑖’s re-
aggregation reuses the previous data from each child of 𝑢𝑖, which is not a suspicious 
node and has no suspicious descendant, together with the new data from each child 
that is a suspicious node or has at least one suspicious descendant. 
(c) The third code is for the situation where 𝑢𝑖 is a suspicious node but has no suspicious 
descendants. That is, if 𝑢𝑖 is not a leaf node, each of its descendants has code 00 and 
does nothing in the current round. Hence, 𝑢𝑖 makes a start via APDA
S to yield its 
new data if 𝑢𝑖 is a leaf node, and yield and aggregate its new data with those received 
from its children in the previous round otherwise.  
(d) The fourth code applies when 𝑢𝑖 is a suspicious node and has at least one suspicious 
descendant. The only difference from the second case is that 𝑢𝑖 utilises APDA
S for 
the data re-aggregation. 
Based on these 2-bit codes, the AS forms a 2n-bit string ?̌? to define what each of the n 
nodes should do in the current round of data aggregation, and multicasts ?̌? to all the nodes 
that can then check their own codes. If a node 𝑢𝑖 has code 00 or 10, it either does nothing 
or makes a start with no need to get new data from its children. Otherwise (i.e. the code 
is 01 or 11), 𝑢𝑖 has to wait for new data from some of its children for the aggregation, and 
it can find out which children will send it the new data, by checking each child’s code in 
?̌?. If the code is not 00, 𝑢𝑖 needs to receive new data from this child, and otherwise (i.e. 
the child does nothing in the current round), 𝑢𝑖 simply reuses the data gathered from this 
child in the previous round for its aggregation.    
In addition, to maintain the data security, we slightly amend the formation of 𝑥𝑖 defined 
for APDAS in Equation 4.14 by replacing 𝑐𝑖 in 𝑥𝑖 with a new secret 𝑐 𝑖 to ensure that each 
re-aggregation via APDAS uses a new secret for the data encryption. To generate 𝑐 𝑖, node 
𝑢𝑖 gets its 𝑐𝑖 and the current session number 𝑠′ to calculate a hash ℎ́ = ℎ(𝑐𝑖‖ 𝑠′), 
concatenates ℎ́ multiple times (i.e. ℎ̃ = ℎ́‖…‖ℎ́) until the total bit length of ℎ̃ is at least 
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⌊𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑞⌋ − 1, and then takes the first ⌊𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑞⌋ − 1 bits of ℎ̃ as 𝑐 𝑖. Here we require that 
different aggregation rounds use different session numbers. The amended 𝑥𝑖 is given 
below: 
𝑥 𝑖 = (𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐 𝑖 + ∑ ?̅?𝑣𝑗) mod 𝑞
𝜎
𝑗=1     (4.22) 
Note that APDAW is applied only to a node 𝑢𝑖 with code 01 and 𝑢𝑖 simply reuses its data 
yielded in the previous round to aggregate new data from its descendants in the current 
round. Namely, 𝑢𝑖 does not generate new data in the current round, so there is no need to 
amend APDAW. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the aggregation tree is divided into two parts. 
The upper part consists of the nodes with codes 01, 10 and 11, which produce new 
aggregated data, whereas the lower part comprises those nodes with code 00, which do 
nothing in the current round of aggregation. Obviously, the bigger the lower part is, the 
less computation and communication are needed, and thus the more efficient the re-
aggregation is. 
Similarly, the misbehaviour tracking process also benefits from the above measure for 
better efficiency. This is because the AS only needs to gather necessary data from the 
nodes in the upper part and re-construct their corresponding values for comparison. The 
nodes in the lower part do not contribute to the new aggregation, so the AS simply reuses 
their values constructed in the previous round for the current misbehaviour tracking. 
Obviously, the bigger the lower part is, the more efficient the tracking process is.  
4.6 OTHER PRIVACY-PRESERVING OPERATIONS 
Our APDAM (M {W, S, H}) approach proposed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 can be extended 
to other privacy-preserving aggregations including a group of comparative operations 
such as the determination of a maximum, minimum, median or percentile for a given data 
set. As an example, in this section we illustrate a new way to apply APDAM for the AS 
to find the maximal value among those contributed by the n nodes, and also present a 
novel and more efficient method for the determination of a maximum. These solutions 
can be adapted to the other comparative operations.  
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4.6.1 MAXIMAL VALUE FINDING 
The main idea to be explored for such finding is to partition the range of the nodes’ data 
into a predefined number 𝛾 of equal size non-overlapped sub-ranges. For each sub-range, 
every node 𝑢𝑖 sets a number as 0 if its value 𝑑𝑖 falls outside the sub-range and 1 otherwise. 
𝑢𝑖 then concatenates its 𝛾 numbers into a single value 𝑑𝑖
′ in the ascending order from the 
lowest sub-range to the highest one. Clearly, 𝑑𝑖
′ contains at most one 1 with the rest being 
0s. Afterwards, such values 𝑑𝑖
′ are aggregated into a value đ’ for the AS using the APDAM 
approach. It is easy to see that each sub-range has a number in đ’, which counts the nodes 
with their data in the sub-range, and the total of these numbers is not more than n. The 
AS then picks up the highest sub-range with a nonzero number (i.e. the maximal value is 
in this sub-range) to repeat the above process for another round of range partition and 
data aggregation only within the selected sub-range. This continues until the number of 
values in a sub-range falls to 1, meaning that the value in the highest such sub-range with 
a non-zero number is the maximum.  
We now spell out the above Count-based Maximal value finding method, denoted as 
MaxC. As stated in Sub-section 4.4.1, the maximal bit length of a node value 𝑑𝑖 is 𝜏, 
namely, 𝑑𝑖 is in the range [0, 2
𝜏 − 1]. Let 𝛾 be set as 𝛾 = 2𝜃 representing the number of 
sub-ranges resulting from the partition of a given range with 𝜃 > 0. 𝜖 is the number of 
decimal digits needed to represent the largest number of nodes falling in a particular sub-
range, and 𝜏′ is the maximal bit length of a concatenated value 𝑑𝑖
′, where 𝜏′ =
⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2(10
𝜖 − 1)⌉𝛾 with ⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2(10
𝜖 − 1)⌉ being the maximal bit length of the number of 
nodes in any sub-range. This indicates that the number 𝑛  of rounds for range partition and 
data aggregation to determine the maximal value is 𝑛 = ⌈𝜏/𝜃⌉. Note that the last partition 
yields sub-ranges with only one value in each, and may result in fewer sub-ranges than 𝛾, 
in which case each node 𝑢𝑖 randomly sets 0 or 1 in concatenated value 𝑑𝑖
′ for any unused 
sub-range.  
Suppose that the 𝑠 th sub-range 𝑅𝛽−1,𝑠 = [𝛽−1,𝑠 ,𝛽−1,𝑠 
′ ] from the previous round 𝛽 − 1 
of range partition (1 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 𝑛 ) is selected for the next round 𝛽 of range partition, where 
𝑅𝛽−1,𝑠  is the original data range when 𝛽 = 1, i.e. 𝑅0,1 = [0, 2
𝜏 − 1]. The jth sub-range in 
the 𝛽th round is defined as: 
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𝑅𝛽,𝑗 = [𝛽−1,𝑠 + (𝑗 − 1)⌈2
𝜏−𝛽𝜃⌉,𝛽−1,𝑠 + 𝑗⌈2
𝜏−𝛽𝜃⌉ − 1]   (4.23) 
Here, 𝑗 is within 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝛾 for 1 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝑛  or 𝛽 = 𝑛  and 𝜏 mod 𝜃 = 0, meaning that each 
partition before the last one produces 𝛾 sub-ranges or the last partition also yields 𝛾 sub-
ranges when there is no unused sub-range, i.e. 𝜏 mod 𝜃 = 0. Otherwise, 𝑗 falls in 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤
2𝜏 mod 𝜃 for the case of 𝛽 = 𝑛  and 𝜏 mod 𝜃 ≠ 0, indicating that the number of sub-ranges 
created from the last partition is fewer than 𝛾. 
For example, given 𝜏 = 8 and 𝜃 = 3, the number of rounds needed to find the maximum 
is 𝑛 = ⌈𝜏/𝜃⌉ = ⌈8/3⌉ = 3, and the original data range is 𝑅0,1 = [0, 255]. The number of 
sub-ranges produced from each of the first two rounds is 𝛾 = 2𝜃 = 23 = 8, and the 
number for the last round is 2𝜏 mod 𝜃 = 28 mod 3 = 22 = 4. The sub-ranges for each round 
are listed below: 
Round1: 𝑅1,1 = [0, 31], 𝑅1,2 = [32, 63], 𝑅1,3 = [64, 95], 𝑅1,4 = [96, 127], 𝑅1,5 =
[128, 159],  
𝑅1,6 = [160, 191], 𝑅1,7 = [192, 223], 𝑹𝟏,𝟖 = [𝟐𝟐𝟒, 𝟐𝟓𝟓](selected sub-
range). 
Round 2: 𝑅2,1 = [224, 227], 𝑅2,2 = [228, 231], 𝑅2,3 = [232, 235], 𝑅2,4 =
[236, 239], 𝑅2,5 = [240, 243], 
𝑅2,6 = [244, 247], 𝑹𝟐,𝟕 = [𝟐𝟒𝟖, 𝟐𝟓𝟏] (selected sub-range), 𝑅2,8 =
[252, 255]. 
Round 3: 𝑅3,1 = [248, 248], 𝑹𝟑,𝟐 = [𝟐𝟒𝟗, 𝟐𝟒𝟗] (with the max), 𝑅3,3 = [250, 250], 
𝑅3,4 = [251, 251]. 
Here, we suppose that the number of nodes in 𝑅1,8 after the first round of data aggregation 
is greater than 0 (i.e. the maximal value is in this sub-range), so it is partitioned into 
another 8 sub-ranges for the second round. Assuming that the numbers of nodes in 𝑅2,8 
and 𝑅2,7 after the second round of data aggregation are 0 and over 0 respectively (i.e. the 
maximum is in 𝑅2,7), 𝑅2,7 is divided into 4 sub-ranges for the third round with each sub-
range containing only one value, meaning that it cannot be further partitioned. Let the 
numbers of nodes in 𝑅3,4 and 𝑅3,3 be both 0, and the number for 𝑅3,2 be 1. As 𝑅3,2 contains 
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only one value, the maximum is 249. 
Moreover, assume that 𝑢𝑖’s value 𝑑𝑖 is equal to maximum 249, and the number of nodes 
falling in any sub-range does not exceed 2 decimal digits, i.e. 𝜖 = 2. The number 𝑑𝑖
′ 
constructed by 𝑢𝑖 for each of the above three rounds is 𝑑𝑖
′ = 1014 for round 1, 𝑑𝑖
′ = 1012 
for round 2 and 𝑑𝑖
′ = 102 for round 3. The maximal bit length 𝜏′ of 𝑑𝑖
′ is 𝜏′ =
⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2(10
𝜖 − 1)⌉𝛾 = 7 × 8 = 56. 
The process for finding the maximum begins with the AS specifying 𝜏 based on the bit 
size of data 𝑑𝑖 possessed by the individual nodes as well as 𝜃 and 𝜖. To start the first 
round of data aggregation, the AS sends 𝜏, 𝜃 and 𝜖 to all the nodes. Each node 𝑢𝑖 then 
calculates the number of rounds, 𝑛 = ⌈𝜏/𝜃⌉, and the number of sub-ranges from each 
partition, 𝛾 = 2𝜃 or 𝛾 = 2𝜏 mod 𝜃 for the last round. 
For each round 𝛽 of range partition and data aggregation, every node 𝑢𝑖 defines all the 
sub-ranges based on Equation 4.23 for round 𝛽 using 𝜏 and 𝜃, and constructs 𝑑𝑖
′ with bit 
length 𝜏′ = ⌈𝑙𝑜𝑔2(10
𝜖 − 1)⌉𝛾 for data aggregation in relation to its 𝑑𝑖 and the defined 
sub-ranges, in the way described earlier. Afterwards, 𝑢𝑖 applies the agreed APDA
M to 
aggregate its 𝑑𝑖
′ with those received from its children if 𝑢𝑖 is not a leaf node, and sends 
the result to its parent or the AS if 𝑢𝑖 is the root. 
Upon receipt of the aggregated result for the current round, the AS decides the sub-range 
𝑅𝛽,𝑗 containing the maximum, and informs all the nodes of 𝑗 to start partitioning 𝑅𝛽,𝑗 for 
the next round of data aggregation. This continues until the last round successfully 
finishes, so that the AS obtains the maximal value. Evidently the AS gets the maximum 
without knowing which node has the value. Hence the data privacy is preserved. 
4.6.2 EFFICIENT MAXIMAL VALUE FINDING 
In this sub-section, we explore the idea described in Sub-section 4.6.1 in a new way. 
Instead of getting the number of nodes for each sub-range that contains the nodes’ values, 
we use a single bit to indicate whether there is a node with its value in the sub-range. This 
Bit-based Maximal value finding method, signified as MaxB, offers two benefits. The first 
is to increase the number of sub-ranges yielded from each round of partition to 𝛾 = 𝜏′, 
namely, every value 𝑑𝑖
′ becomes a bit string, and each of its 𝜏′ bits represents a sub-range. 
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This reduces the number of rounds needed to find the maximum so as to gain better 
efficiency. The second is to simplify the aggregation process using simpler and more 
efficient bitwise operations to replace the numerical ones, leading to a one-stage process 
for aggregation instead of the two-stage one presented in Sub-section 4.4.1. This has a 
positive impact on the efficiency and implementation of the method.  
We now present the new method in detail. It follows the same definitions of 𝜏, 𝑛 , 𝛾, 𝜃 
and 𝜏′ given in Sub-section 4.6.1, where 𝛾 = 𝜏′. Also the construction of each string 𝑑𝑖
′ 
remains similar, i.e. for each sub-range j (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝜏′), if node 𝑢𝑖’s value 𝑑𝑖 falls in the 
sub-range, the corresponding bit of 𝑑𝑖
′ , expressed as 𝑑𝑖
′[𝑗], is assigned 𝑑𝑖
′[𝑗] = 1, and 
otherwise 𝑑𝑖
′[𝑗] = 0.  
However, the aggregation of strings 𝑑𝑖
′ from all the n nodes is different. For each round 
of aggregation, every node 𝑢𝑖 directly sends its encrypted 𝑑𝑖
′, which will be defined later, 
to the AS in such a way that the AS cannot decrypt it to obtain 𝑑𝑖
′ but can get the following 
decrypted aggregation with ⊕ denoting the bitwise exclusive-or operation: 
?̅? =⊕𝑖=1
𝑛 𝑑𝑖
′, with ?̅?[𝑗] =⊕𝑖=1
𝑛 𝑑𝑖
′[𝑗] for every 𝑗 (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝜏′)              4.24 
If ?̅?[𝑗] = 1, there is at least one node with its value in the jth sub-range for the current 
round. It also means that there are an odd number of 1s in the jth bits among the n strings 
contributed by all the nodes, in order to yield ?̅?[𝑗] = 1. Nevertheless, when ?̅?[𝑗] = 0, it 
is possible that there are an even number of 1s in the jth bits. In other words, we cannot 
rule out that the maximum is not in a sub-range with 0 for its corresponding bit in ?̅?.  
To rectify the above problem, we replace each string 𝑑𝑖
′ with 𝜗 (> 0) strings, 𝑑𝑖,1
′ , …, 𝑑𝑖,𝜗
′ , 
which have the same length 𝜏′. To form these strings,  𝑢𝑖 checks every sub-range against 
its value 𝑑𝑖. If 𝑑𝑖 falls in the jth sub-range, 𝑢𝑖 randomly selects 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ [𝑗] = 1 or 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ [𝑗] = 0 
for every string 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′  (1 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝜗). For any other bit, 𝑢𝑖 simply sets 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ [𝑗]̅ = 0 (𝑗̅ ≠ 𝑗). The 
purpose for the use of these multiple strings and randomisation is to provide a high 
probability that in the case of at least one node with its value in the jth sub-range, there is 
a 𝑠 such that the n bits 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ [𝑗] (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) contain an odd number of 1s. Hence the result 
of aggregating these bits 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ [𝑗] via ⊕ is 1, denoted as ?̅?𝑠 [𝑗] = 1, which indicates that 
some nodes have their values in the jth sub-range. 
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After the above string construction, each node 𝑢𝑖 sends its encrypted 𝜗 strings, 𝑑𝑖,1
′ , …, 
𝑑𝑖,𝜗
′ , to the AS for aggregations. Similarly the AS can compute the following decrypted 
aggregation without obtaining individual strings 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ : 
?̅? = ⋁ ?̅?𝑠 
𝜗
𝑠 =1 = ⋁ (⊕𝑖=1
𝑛 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′𝜗
𝑠 =1 )                                             4.25 
Here, the bitwise-or operation signified as ⋁ implies that ?̅?[𝑗] is 1 if at least one of the 𝜗 
bits ?̅?𝑠 [𝑗] is 1.  
Number 𝜗 can be determined based on the required probability of letting the AS get 
?̅?[𝑗] = 1 when there is at least one node with its value in the jth sub-range. This 
probability is calculated as: 
?̅? =
2𝜗−1
2𝜗
                                                                4.26 
For example, given ?̅? = 0.999, 𝜗 = 10 is needed as the number of strings for each round 
of data aggregation. To generate 64 sub-ranges from a partition, each string (e.g. 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ ) has 
64 bits, and each node needs a total of 640 bits for its 10 strings. 
Similar to the MaxC method in Sub-section 4.6.1, the AS selects the highest sub-range 
with 1 in its associated bit in ?̅? (i.e. the maximum is highly likely in the sub-range) for 
the next round of range partition and data aggregation. This is repeated until the 𝑛  rounds 
are completed.   
To prevent the AS from gaining a node’s strings, we propose an encryption scheme based 
on the data mixing idea [23] discussed in Sub-section 4.4.4 to allow each node to 
collaborate with others for its string encryption. More specifically, suppose that a node 
𝑢𝑖 has agreed with 𝜎𝑖 (> 0) other nodes in {𝑢𝑣1 , … , 𝑢𝑣𝜎𝑖
} for the collaboration, and 𝑢𝑖 
shares a different key ?́?𝑖,𝑣𝑗  with each node 𝑢𝑣𝑗  (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝜎𝑖) where ?́?𝑖,𝑣𝑗 = ?́?𝑣𝑗,𝑖. Note that 
the collaboration is a mutual relationship in the sense that if 𝑢𝑣𝑗 is in 𝑢𝑖’s collaborator set, 
𝑢𝑖 also appears in 𝑢𝑣𝑗’s collaborator set. Also we suppose that two different nodes very 
likely have different sets of collaborative nodes. The details on how to find the 
collaborative nodes and establish the shared keys are given in [23].    
For the 𝛽th round of aggregation with a session number 𝑠, 𝑢𝑖 applies all the 𝜎𝑖 shared 
keys to encrypt its 𝑠 th string 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′  for every 𝑠 (1 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝜗): 
  
 
88 
 
?̅?𝑖,𝑠 = 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ ⊕ (⊕𝑗=1
𝜎𝑖 ℎ́(𝑠 ‖𝛽 ‖𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑢𝑣𝑗||?́?𝑖,𝑣𝑗))                       4.27 
Here, ℎ́() is a one-way hash function with the bit size of its output equal to the size 𝜏′ of 
𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ , where the output serves as a secret for the encryption of 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ . Note that the output 
size of a standard hash function such as SHA [179], [180] may be different from 𝜏′. If the 
size is longer, the first 𝜏′ bits are taken as the result of ℎ́(). Otherwise, multiple hashes 
(e.g. with each being the hash of the previous one apart from the first one) can be 
concatenated with a total length of at least 𝜏′, and then the first 𝜏′ bits are used as the 
output of ℎ́(). Additionally, for ‘𝑢𝑖‖𝑢𝑣𝑗’ in ℎ́(), we presume 𝑖 < 𝑣𝑗 , and otherwise 
‘𝑢𝑣𝑗||𝑢𝑖’ should replace ‘𝑢𝑖‖𝑢𝑣𝑗’. This ensures that both 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑣𝑗  generate the same 
hash value for their encryptions respectively.  
After the encryption, 𝑢𝑖 directly transfers the 𝜗 encrypted strings, ?̅?𝑖,1, …, ?̅?𝑖,𝜗, to the AS 
securely. Here we follow the same assumption in Sub-section 4.4.1 that the strings sent 
directly from each node to the AS are correct after they have been authenticated by the 
AS using an agreed scheme that is not part of the work proposed in this thesis.  
Once the AS has collected and successfully authenticated the strings from all the nodes, 
the AS aggregates them to produce: 
?̅? = ⋁ (⊕𝑖=1
𝑛 ?̅?𝑖,𝑠 
𝜗
𝑠 =1 )                                                    4.28 
This leads to the following decrypted result, showing the aggregation of all the strings 
contributed by the n nodes: 
?̅? = ⋁ (⊕𝑖=1
𝑛𝜗
𝑠 =1 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ )                                                     4.29 
It is easy to see this outcome because each secret hash ℎ́(𝑠 ‖𝛽 ‖𝑠 ‖𝑢𝑖‖𝑢𝑣𝑗||?́?𝑖,𝑣𝑗) in ?̅?𝑖,𝑠  
also appears in ?̅?𝑣𝑗,𝑠  as a secret, namely, the two identical secrets connected by the ⊕ 
operation cancel each other and hence contribute to the decryption of both ?̅?𝑖,𝑠  and ?̅?𝑣𝑗,𝑠 . 
This is why there is no additional decryption needed from the AS.   
Based on the above description, it is evident that the AS cannot recover an original string 
𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′  from ?̅?𝑖,𝑠  without knowing the associated secret hashes. Although the AS could make 
use of received ?̅?𝑖,𝑠  and ?̅?𝑣𝑗,𝑠  to try ?̅?𝑖,𝑠 ⊕ ?̅?𝑣𝑗,𝑠 , it is unlikely that the AS can get 𝑑𝑖,𝑠 
′ ⊕
  
 
89 
 
𝑑𝑣𝑗,𝑠 
′  as 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑣𝑗 very likely have different sets of collaborative nodes, namely, ?̅?𝑖,𝑠  and 
?̅?𝑣𝑗,𝑠  are very likely encrypted using different sets of secret hashes by 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑣𝑗 , 
respectively. 
4.6.3 HYBRID APPROACH 
The two methods MaxC and MaxB proposed in the previous two sub-sections can be 
combined to take advantage of MaxB for more quickly narrowing down the range 
containing the maximum and MaxC for more accurately determining the maximum. This 
hybrid approach is represented as MaxH.  
One way to implement MaxH is to utilise MaxB to more efficiently find the maximum 𝑚 , 
as it offers a much larger number of sub-ranges for each partition and hence fewer rounds 
of simpler data aggregation. However, there is a small probability that 𝑚  is not really the 
maximum, as discussed in Sub-section 4.6.2. Hence, after the identification of 𝑚  by 
MaxB, MaxC is employed to count how many nodes have their values in the range [𝑚 +
1, 2𝜏 − 1] with 𝜏 being the bit length of data 𝑑𝑖, as Max
C can certainly find the correct 
maximum but with lower efficiency. If the number is 0, 𝑚  is surely the maximum. 
Otherwise, MaxC continues its operation by partitioning [𝑚 + 1, 2𝜏 − 1] until a new 
maximum is found. This combined method assures the correctness of the maximum while 
showing a performance advantage. 
4.7 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we have detailed the development of APDA for misbehaved nodes 
detection and its extensions for finding the maximal value among aggregated data. We 
have proposed APDAW, APDAS and APDAH to allow data to be aggregated securely in 
a privacy-preserving manner. These methods also provide a novel approach to supporting 
the accountability of mobile users in the data aggregation process. In addition, the 
extended versions of APDA offer new ways for the maximum value finding. We have 
proposed MaxC, MaxB and MaxH to allow a maximum value to be determine without 
disclosing mobile users’ privacy to the CS. In the next chapter, our analysis on the 
schemes’ security and performance evaluation will be provided and discussed to support 
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our claim that all of the proposed schemes are efficient and secured to suit in MSS 
implementation.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION OF APDA AND MAX METHODS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we analyse the security of all the versions of APDA and Max proposed in 
the previous chapter. This chapter begins with a security analysis against both internal 
and external threats described in Chapter 4. Then, this chapter provides a comparison with 
existing methods to select the best one to be compared quantitatively with our scheme. 
Finally, our schemes’ experimental results and necessary discussions will be presented, 
which provides meaningful evidence to support the conclusions that we will make at the 
end of this chapter. 
5.2 SECURITY ANALYSIS 
By considering both internal and external threats described in Section 4.2, our scheme 
may face several attacks that intend to compromise the scheme’s security. Those attacks 
include: 
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(i) A curious AS, which intends to discover particular data that is related to a specific 
individual. Disclosing the data to the AS unavoidably breaches the privacy of the 
data owner.  
(ii) Malicious MNs, which intend to reveal the content of the sensed data from other 
nodes, which also unavoidably invades the privacy of the data owners.   
(iii) Communication link devices like Wi-Fi routers, which are public and not secure 
and reliable. 
(iv) An adversary, which prevents the AS from aggregating a correct result by 
submitting fake data to the aggregation process. 
Therefore, our scheme has been designed to prevent the aforementioned security attacks 
and can be analysed as below. 
5.2.1 A CURIOUS AS 
In MSSs, an AS is supposed to be a reliable party in the aggregation process. 
Nevertheless, it could be curious and want to discover the content of individual data it 
receives from each MN. This simple threat could lead to a disaster to the MNs as revealing 
their individual data to the AS would unavoidably disclose the privacy of the data owners. 
Our security analysis on such a threat can be further detailed as follows. 
(i) Commitment collection 
By using APDA, the AS receives the commitments sent by all MNs in the form of 𝑐𝑖 =
𝑔𝑒𝑖  mod 𝑝, which serves as a one-way function, for each node 𝑢𝑖. Any attempt to discover 
data content 𝑒𝑖 from commitment 𝑐𝑖 by the curious AS is well known to be hard due to 
the one-way feature of 𝑐𝑖. In detail, 𝑒𝑖 is the randomised data in a plaintext form, and the 
best known technique to derive 𝑒𝑖 from 𝑐𝑖 is by using the Number Field Sieve (NFS) 
[181], [182]. The success of solving this problem is dependent on the length of the 
modulus 𝑝. The complexity of the NFS method increases as the length of 𝑝 increases.  
To obtain 𝑒𝑖 from 𝑐𝑖, the AS may compute the discrete logarithm of 𝑐𝑖, which is 𝑒𝑖 in a 
multiplicative group modulo 𝑝 (i.e. ℤ𝑝
∗  and 𝑒𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑝
∗ ) as below: 
log𝑔 𝑐𝑖 =𝑒𝑖                                                      (5.1) 
If the AS can compute the above discrete logarithm, then it can retrieve 𝑢𝑖’s plaintext 𝑒𝑖. 
However, the computation is infeasible even when using the most efficient technique 
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known as NFS, as the size of 𝑝 is typically 1024 bits or larger [182]. Based on this reason, 
we can say that our proposed scheme does not allow the curious AS to retrieve any 
information about plaintext 𝑒𝑖 from commitment 𝑐𝑖 passed to the AS. 
(ii) Aggregated Data Encryption 
By using APDAW on the one hand, the data is transmitted securely via the hierarchical 
structure to prevent an individual data item from being disclosed to the AS. The data is 
aggregated using Equation 4.3 as below:  
𝛼𝑖 = (𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 +∑ 𝛼𝑣𝑗) mod 𝑞
𝜎
𝑗=1 . 
The AS only receives the final aggregated data 𝛼𝑡 and then decrypts it as follows:  
é = (𝛼𝑡 − ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑞. 
In this case, the AS is able to recover the final aggregated data, but not the data of any 
individual node as the AS does not receive any intermediately aggregated data. Hence our 
scheme preserves the data privacy of individual mobile users against the curious AS.  
Nevertheless, the intermediate aggregated data 𝛼𝑖 = (𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖) mod 𝑞 might face a brute 
force attack by a curious node as 𝛼𝑖 is transmitted to its parent for aggregation. Since 𝑒𝑖 
is encrypted using the commitment 𝑐𝑖 only known by the node 𝑢𝑖 and the AS, having an 
𝛼𝑖 by the curious node would not allow it to recover 𝑒𝑖. 
On the other hand, the security of ?̅?𝑖 that is encrypted using APDA
S is guaranteed as the 
scheme’s security level has been increased by embedding a signature signed with a private 
key 𝑘𝑖 (i.e. 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝜁 mod 𝑞) in the ciphertext data. Having ciphertext ?̅?𝑖 would not allow 
any curious node to reveal its content due to the plaintext being encrypted via both the 
commitment and signature. As long as key 𝑘𝑖 and commitment 𝑐𝑖 are not revealed to any 
curious node, the ciphertext is secured against the brute force attack on the ciphertext. 
Furthermore, as the AS distributes secret key 𝑘𝑖 to each node 𝑢𝑖 for encryption, a curious 
node might want to discover the information in  𝑘𝑖 by launching a brute force attack on 
the key itself. As described in Sub-section 4.5.1, each secret key 𝑘𝑖  contains 𝑟 (part of the 
master key for decryption), i.e. 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝜍 mod 𝑞 with 𝜍 = 𝑟𝜂
−1mod 𝑞. By having 𝑘𝑖, a 
curious node could try to gain some related information such as the size of 𝜂 as we have 
set 𝜂 < 𝑟. Nevertheless, having 𝑘𝑖will not allow the curious node to reveal any 
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information on 𝑟 as long as 𝜍 is not exposed to any node in the network and there is no 
known plaintext attack. 
(iii) Aggregated Data Verification and Misbehaved Node Detection 
In MSSs, data verification is an essential procedure to undergo before recovering the 
aggregated data in the plaintext form. The reason is that the data aggregation could come 
from misbehaving nodes that intend to prevent the aggregator from getting the correct 
result by submitting fake data during the aggregation process. By using APDA, the 
aggregated data can be verified based on the AS’s collected node commitments. Such a 
verification procedure guarantees the integrity of the aggregated data. The reason is that 
the AS can compare the collected node commitments with the received aggregated data 
based on Equation 4.5 as follows: 
𝑔𝑒 mod 𝑝 = ( 𝑐𝑖) mod 𝑝
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
As no information will be leaked in this verification process, the privacy of each MN is 
preserved.   
If the integrity check has failed, the AS can detect the misbehaved nodes without affecting 
the privacy of the mobile users. Such misbehaved nodes can be tracked down by using 
APDAW because all the nodes including the misbehaved ones have to submit 𝑧𝑖 directly 
to the AS. Then, the AS will compare the received 𝑧𝑖 from every node, 𝑢𝑖 with the 
constructed value 𝑦𝑖 based on its stored commitments. If both values are different, then 
the AS concludes node 𝑢𝑖 certainly misbehaved if 𝑢𝑖 is a leaf node with no children. In 
this case, the AS needs to take certain actions such as expelling 𝑢𝑖 from further 
aggregations as a result of this misbehaviour. Otherwise, the AS simply identifies node 
𝑢𝑖 and its children as suspicious nodes. In such misbehaviour node tracking, each 𝑧𝑖 
consists of individual ciphertext data 𝛼𝑖. Revealing 𝛼𝑖 allows the curious AS to decrypt it 
due to the AS possess the related individual key for the decryption. Nevertheless, this 
attack is intractable as 𝑧𝑖 is generated using the similar way to the commitment 
generation. Therefore, the data privacy of each individual MN is preserved against the 
curious AS. 
However, as described in Section 4.4, APDAW is not able to track down a misbehaved 
node with certainty if the node has children. The reason is that there is no verification 
  
 
95 
 
process executed by the node to verify its children data. In contrast, APDAS provides such 
verification so as to allow the misbehaved node to be tracked down at every level of the 
aggregation with certainty by the AS. In this verification process, each child has to submit 
its encrypted data 𝛼𝑖, embedded with a signature signed with its secret key, together with 
𝑧𝑖. However, 𝛼𝑖 is submitted to the AS in the form similar to that of the commitment 
generation (see Sub-section 4.5.1), namely the AS can verify but cannot obtain 𝛼𝑖.Thus, 
the data privacy of each individual MN is preserved against the curious AS. 
In addition, to allow the verification process by each parent node, public keys 𝜇𝑖 need to 
be distributed to relevant nodes. Based on the same security analysis described in Sub-
section 5.2.1 (i), disclosing the public keys 𝜇𝑖 will not allow any parties to retrieve any 
information about their associated secret keys 𝑘𝑖. 
We now describe the security analysis of this verification process as follows. The 
distribution of a public key 𝜇𝑖 using APDA
S attracts a curious node to recover the secret 
key 𝑘𝑖 from 𝜇𝑖 where: 
𝑘𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝜁 mod 𝑞 and 𝜇𝑖 = 𝑔
−𝑘𝑖  mod 𝑝 
For this purpose, the curious node computes the discrete logarithm of 𝜇𝑖: 
Log𝑔 𝜇𝑖 =−𝑘𝑖      (5.2) 
Retrieving the corresponding secret key enables the curious node to generate a correct 
signature on the corresponding ciphertext. However, according to [183], for large 𝑝 (i.e. 
𝑝 = 1024 bits), the best known algorithm for solving this problem is Pollard’s rho 
method, which takes about √𝜋𝑞/2 steps. In our scheme setting, since our choice of 𝑞 ≈
2186, then the expression (5.2) represents an infeasible amount of computation, so the 
public key is secure against the DLP attack.  
(iv) Maximal Value Finding 
In MSSs, an aggregator needs to communicate with all MNs to retrieve the maximum 
value within the aggregated data. In this thesis, we have proposed two methods MaxC and 
MaxB for maximal value finding on the data contributed by 𝑛 nodes. By using the former 
method, MNs respond to the AS’s request via the hierarchical data aggregation and the 
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response is delivered in an encrypted form based on the APDA approach. Thus, the 
security of the former method is inherited from the security of APDA. 
In contrast, the later method uses a different approach from APDA. By using this method, 
each MN directly transmits a number of encrypted strings ?̅?𝑖,𝑠  (encrypted using the bitwise 
exclusive OR operation) to the AS. The AS then collects and aggregates them to receive 
the response in a plaintext form as it’s already decrypted during the aggregation process 
as described in Sub-section 4.6.2. By using this scheme, the AS would not be able to 
retrieve any individual node’s original strings as we implement the idea of data mixing 
so that each node collaborates with others for its string encryption and decryption. 
Furthermore, each string is encrypted using a one-way hash function on a set of keys 
shared between a set of collaborative nodes. Without knowing the associated secret 
hashes, the AS would not be able to retrieve or decrypt any individual string 𝑑′𝑖,𝑠  from 
?̅?𝑖,𝑠 . If the AS picked any ?̅?𝑖 and ?̅?𝑣𝑖,𝑠  to perform ?̅?𝑖⊕ ?̅?𝑣𝑖,𝑠  , then the AS is unlikely to 
yield ?̅?𝑖⊕ ?̅?𝑣𝑖,𝑠  due to it is very likely that 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑣𝑖,𝑠  have different sets of collaborative 
nodes. This can be proven by using a simple probability test as follows. 
For this test, we let 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑣𝑗  be randomly distributed in a network consisting of 50 
nodes. We assume ?̅?𝑖,𝑠  and ?̅?𝑣𝑗,𝑠  are the data received from 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑣𝑗 respectively by the 
AS. We know that ?̅?𝑖,𝑠  and ?̅?𝑣𝑗,𝑠  are encrypted by using a set of keys shared between 𝑛 
collaborative nodes and the probability of 𝑢𝑖 or 𝑢𝑣𝑗to pick one node to be one of its 
collaborative nodes is 1 48⁄ . Thus, the probability of the two nodes to pick the same node 
to be one of their collaborative nodes is: 
𝑃(𝑋 ∩ 𝑌) = 𝑃(𝑋) × 𝑃(𝑌) = 1 48⁄ × 1 48⁄ = 1 2304⁄ = 0.0004 
As the probability is too small, we conclude that 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑣𝑗  are very likely to have 
different sets of collaborative nodes. 
5.2.2 MALICIOUS MNS 
By using APDA, each MN submits the sensed data to its parent node for the aggregation 
process. The parent node aggregates the received data with its own data hierarchically. In 
the situation where a malicious MN aggregates the data received from its children, it may 
want to discover the content of the data, which unavoidably breaches the data privacy of 
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its children. Nevertheless, since the sensed data is encrypted using the homomorphic 
encryption, the malicious MN would not be able to disclose any information without 
having the secret key that is only known by the data owner and the AS. In the case of the 
AS and MNs colluding to discover any contents of the intermediate aggregated data, our 
APDA still can protect the data via two types of methods, which are the slicing and mixing 
technique and encryption using a shared key between collaborative nodes. The former 
technique prevents the malicious MNs to discover any intermediate aggregated data as 
the data has been sliced prior to the encryption and aggregation process as defined in 
Equation 4.10, i.e. 
𝑒𝑖 = ∑ ?̀?𝑖,𝑗
𝛽+1
𝑗=1 mod 𝑞. 
The malicious MNs need to collaborate with 𝛽 + 1 parent nodes to discover the 
information that relates to the targeted MN. When the number of collaborative nodes is 
high, discovering the content of the data would be hard.  
In the second technique, data 𝑒𝑖  is encrypted using the secret keys shared between 𝑢𝑖 and 
each of its collaborative nodes. Such a key is created and kept secret by 𝑢𝑖 and one of its 
collaborative nodes. Therefore, the malicious MNs need to obtain the keys from all the 
collaborative nodes in order to decrypt encrypted 𝑒𝑖. This is hard to accomplish when the 
number of collaborative nodes is high.   
5.2.3 PUBLIC COMMUNICATION DEVICES 
In MSSs, all communication and data transmission are executed via open public wireless 
devices like Wi-Fi routers. As such devices are not reliable and vulnerable to several 
attacks like data interception and modification [175], the adversaries could attempt to 
intercept the communication devices to disclose information contained in the aggregated 
data. By using APDA, such attacks can be prevented as the data is transmitted in its 
ciphertext form. Attempting to discover the content of the ciphertext data will be 
intractable without a valid key for the decryption. Therefore, the adversary will be 
exhausted to invade the data privacy of mobile users. 
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5.3 A COMPARISON WITH EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
Our proposed APDA scheme has considered all essential requirements as stated in 
Section 4.3 to allow efficient data processing in its ciphertext form. In this section, we 
select some encryption schemes that can be compared directly to our scheme in terms of 
these requirements.  
5.3.1 SCHEME APPLICABILITY  
The existing encryption schemes have been designed based on specific target users and 
environments. Different users and environments require different security features with 
respect to different application scenarios.  For instance, the schemes like MAI, RPDA 
and VerDP are designed for WSNs, cloud environments or smart metering applications  
[36], [57], [69], [184] with static environments. In contrast, schemes like PDA, PPSense, 
PLAM and PPDM and VPA [23], [25], [66], [67], [70] are designed for MSSs, which 
consider mobility, data integrity and users’ privacy as their main requirements. Even 
though the later schemes are suitable to be implemented in MSSs, they are lack of other 
aspects like scheme functionality and users’ accountability. Furthermore, those schemes’ 
complexity needs to be reduced to prolong the battery lifetime of mobile devices. To 
remedy such limitations on those schemes, we have proposed a scheme that can be 
implemented in MSS as this scheme considers the issues of complexity, mobility, 
functionality and user accountability.  
5.3.2 DATA SECURITY AND USERS’ PRIVACY 
A scheme that provides data security and supports users’ privacy in data aggregation is 
really demanded to prevent a curious AS and malicious MNs from disclosing the data 
content and invading individual users’ data privacy for illegitimate interests. Thus, a 
homomorphic encryption scheme is the best option to encrypt the data in an aggregation 
process. This is due to the fact that, in these encryption schemes, all the computations on 
the aggregated data are done in its ciphertext form without decryption [23], [25], [36], 
[57], [66], [67], [69], [70], [72], [184]. Nevertheless, implementing those techniques 
prevents the aggregated data from being verified as such schemes do not provide any 
further avenues for aggregated data verification. Consequently, the genuine aggregated 
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data cannot be ensured by the aggregator for further processing to retrieve some statistical 
results on the aggregated data.  
5.3.3 DATA INTEGRITY 
The integrity of aggregated data is the main crucial aspect in data aggregation. The reason 
is that such data will be used for generating further important information to be referred 
by other users. Thus, schemes that could verify the integrity of the aggregated data have 
been proposed and designed as in [23], [25], [36]. Those schemes support such a 
requirement through a process called integrity checking. By using such a process, the 
aggregated data will be compared with the information collected at the beginning of the 
process to determine the genuineness of the final results. However, those schemes’ 
complexities are too high to implement in MSSs.  
The reason of such inefficiency is that each ciphertext involves many hash values and the 
computation of these values by each node consumes the energy of the node’s battery. In 
contrast, we have proposed a scheme, i.e. APDAW, which allows the aggregated data to 
be verified in a privacy-preserving manner without the need of hash functions. Such a 
design improves the efficiency of data to be aggregated and decrypted. Furthermore, by 
using the existing schemes, the AS has to create a lot of keys that need to be assigned to 
each node. As a result, such schemes require heavy computation especially on 
exponentiations. Furthermore, those schemes demand heavy communication costs for the 
AS to send a secret key to every node in the network. In contrast, our proposed scheme 
APDAW only uses a node’s commitment as its encryption key. Thus, the AS does not 
need to generate a unique key for every node so as to improve the efficiency of the whole 
system.   
5.3.4 SCHEME’S FUNCTIONALITY 
Another requirement for this comparison is the capability of a scheme to support 
statistical functions on the aggregated data. The proposed schemes in [23], [36], [67], [69] 
are able to support additive and non-additive functions on ciphertext data inefficiently. 
The main reason is that those schemes require heavy computation and communication 
costs to generate such statistical results. For instance, the work in [23] has proposed a 
technique for determining the maximal value of the aggregated data. This technique 
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requires more conversations to determine the maximum value of the aggregated data due 
to each conversation only dividing the range into half and this division leading to a long 
step by step process to complete. In contrast, the Max proposed in our scheme increases 
the range for every round so as to reduce the number of conversations for maximal value 
finding. Such a method increases the scheme efficiency as well as prolongs the network 
lifetime by reducing the communication costs on the whole network. Furthermore, in the 
improved version of MaxB, we have introduced a simpler and more efficient way for data 
to be processed by the AS without the need for decryption. Such an improvement leads 
to a one-stage process for aggregation instead of the two-stage process for MaxC.   
5.3.5 USERS’ ACCOUNTABILITY 
Finally, a scheme that supports accountability on mobile users is really demanded in the 
aggregation process. The reason is that, in data aggregation, some nodes may be curious, 
malicious or both. To the best of our knowledge, MAI [57] is the only one that addresses 
node accountability in WSNs. However, our APDA is significantly different from [57] in 
the following aspects.  
First, the scheme proposed in [57] targets only nodes in WSNs with static topologies, 
while APDA can support privacy-preserving data aggregation in a MSS in a mobile 
topology. In addition, our extended APDA schemes support maximal value finding 
without scarifying the mobile users’ privacy. However, MAI did not consider any family 
of data aggregation to be performed on the aggregated data.  
Secondly, the scheme proposed in [57] has been designed to allow any malicious 
aggregator in WSNs to be detected by its child nodes. By using such a scheme, each node 
has to re-calculate the aggregation result using its own data with those received from its 
sibling. Then, each node has to compare with the aggregation result received from the 
grandparent nodes (sent by its parent node). The comparison of these two results is used 
to determine the behaviour of the node’s parent.  In contrast, APDA requires only the 
aggregators, which sense as well, aggregate the sensed data while others just need to sense 
and forward the data to the aggregators. Such a setting could reduce the energy 
consumption of leaf nodes for computing and transmitting data so as to prolong their 
battery lifetime.  Furthermore, APDA can surely detect any misbehaved nodes without 
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compromising the privacy of other well-behaved nodes during the data aggregation and 
misbehaviour tracking processes. 
For a direct comparison, we summarise all the above requirements that can be supported 
by the existing schemes as listed in Table 2. Based on this comparison, we can conclude 
that the work in [23] is the only one that almost fulfils the selected requirements except 
the accountability. Therefore, we select the work in [23] and further investigate on its 
efficiency. We conduct several experiments and compare the results with our proposed 
scheme to determine the best scheme to implement in MSSs. The simulation and 
evaluation of our work will be given in the subsequent sub-sections.  
Table 2: The Compared Scheme based on the selected Criteria 
The 
Comparing 
Schemes 
The comparing Criteria 
Applica
bility 
Users’ 
privacy 
Data 
Integrity 
Accountability 
(Misbehaviour 
Nodes 
Detection ) 
Additive 
Aggregation 
functions 
Non-additive 
Aggregation 
Functions 
PPDM [25] MSS Yes No No No No 
MAI [57] WSNs Yes Yes Yes No No 
PPSense 
[66] 
MSS Yes No No No No 
PDA [67] MSS Yes No No Yes Yes 
VPA [23] MSS Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
PLAM [70] MSS Yes Yes No No No 
RPDA [36] WSNs Yes No No Yes No 
VerDP [184] CC Yes Yes No No No 
APDA  MSS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5.4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
This section elaborates the performance evaluation of our proposed scheme by providing 
the experimental results and analysis. The experimental results are essential to validate 
our aim and objectives stated in Section 1.6. Prior to providing the experimental results, 
we will describe application or experimental settings that are required by two distinct 
software packages. These are the Matlab version 15a and OPNET version 14.5.A. The 
purpose of the former software is for data computation, while the latter is for simulating 
data transmission. Finally, our experimental results and their analysis will be presented, 
which provides meaningful evidence to support the conclusions that we will make at the 
end of this section. 
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5.4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUPS 
Our simulation for data transmission among nodes in a network is set up using the 
powerful simulation software OPNET version 14.5.A. There are a lot of commercial and 
freeware network simulators in the market like OPNET, NS, OMNeT++ and SIMULINK, 
which are popular and widely used. Among them, OPNET offers more user friendliness, 
flexibility and portability. OPNET stands for Optimised Network Engineering Tools and 
was created by OPNET Technologies, Inc., which was founded in 1986. OPNET is a 
powerful network simulation tool set and can create and test large network environments 
via software. 
For our experimental setups, we consider seven scenarios which consist of 103 nodes, 
154 nodes, 205 nodes, 256 nodes, 307 nodes, 358 nodes and 409 nodes respectively. They 
have been modelled to compare the efficiency of the verifiable privacy-preserving data 
aggregation between versions of our APDA and the chosen scheme VPA [23]. 
Furthermore, those settings have been implemented to investigate the performance of the 
whole process using the versions of our APDA. This whole process covers the 
commitment generation, aggregated data encryption, data recovery, integrity checking 
and misbehaviour nodes detection.  
Furthermore, we investigate the rate of increase in misbehaving nodes with respect to an 
increasing size of networks. For simulation purposes, each network is divided into the 
same size of cells. Each cell has 25 nodes consisting of one parent node and 24 children, 
i.e. each child is connected to its parent within the same cell. To construct a hierarchical 
structure, each parent node is linked to a node, named a grandparent node, at the upper 
layer of the structure, and each grandparent is then connected to the root node. Finally, 
this root node is linked to the AS for aggregated data submission. For example, a network 
of 100 nodes is divided into 4 cells with 25 nodes for each, in addition to the AS, root 
node and two grandparent nodes with each connected to two parent nodes. Such a network 
is illustrated in Figure 15. Moreover, each node has a dedicated destination address to 
avoid collusion and reduce any delay in data transmission.  
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Furthermore, Figure 16 shows the OPNET 14.5.A interface for setting up our parameters 
before running the simulation. As shown in the figure, there are several attributes that 
need to be inserted before running the simulation. The first two attributes are for node 
identification. Furthermore, the third attribute is for the start time of the simulation and 
the packet size that needs to be transmitted by each node in a network. Finally, the last 
attribute is the setting up of a wireless connection between nodes that includes the 
wireless LAN MAC address, BSS identifier, data rate etc. For the simulations using 
OPNET 14.5.A, we run each of the simulations for 50 runs to achieve accuracy and 
consistency [23]. An input of the simulations is taken from the results (the execution time) 
generated by Matlab. Those results are converted into bytes before simulating the data 
aggregation using OPNET.  
Figure 15: The simulation setting of a network that consists of 103 nodes 
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Figure 16: Simulation attributes settings 
For our experimental purposes, we have designed three different behaviour scenarios to 
investigate the efficiency of the proposed scheme on different sizes of networks. Those 
scenarios are described as below. 
Scenario 1: There is at least one misbehaved node distributed randomly in a single cell of 
the networks.  
Scenario 2: There is at least one misbehaved node distributed randomly in 50% of cells 
of the networks.  
Scenario 3: There is at least one misbehaved node distributed randomly in 25% of cells 
rounded up to the nearest number of cells. 
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5.4.2 PARAMETER SETTINGS 
We have implemented our algorithms using Matlab and OPNET 14.5.A and evaluated 
their execution time. Those algorithms consist of data randomisation, commitment 
generation, key generation, aggregated data encryption and data recovery. Furthermore, 
we have also implemented data verification and misbehaved node detection algorithms. 
The computations have been performed on a machine with a 3.60GHz Intel (R) Core 
(TM) i7 – 4790 CPU. Furthermore, the data transmission has been simulated on mobile 
devices with the data rate of 11Mbps and the buffer size of 256,000 bits. Table 3 provides 
the parameter settings of the implementations for both the two versions of APDA and 
VPA+. Furthermore, Table 4 provides other parameter settings to investigate the 
performance of APDAW, APDAS and APDAH for the whole data aggregation and 
misbehaved node tracking process.  Such parameters are required to produce a signature 
for each aggregated data encryption so that each data can be verified and the nodes’ 
behaviour can be determined based on the aggregated information received by the AS. 
Table 3: Parameter Settings for APDAW, APDAS and VPA+ for the process up to 
integrity checking 
No. Parameter Description Bit 
length 
Who should know  
1. 𝑝 Public parameter 1024 All  
2. 𝑔 Public parameter 160 All  
3. 𝑞 Public parameter 186 All  
4. 𝑑𝑖 Plaintext data item 10 𝑢𝑖 only 
5. 𝑒𝑖 Randomised plaintext 160 𝑢𝑖 only 
6. 𝑏𝑖 Random integer 140 𝑢𝑖 only 
7. 𝑐𝑖 Commitment/encryption key 1024 𝑢𝑖 and AS only 
8. 𝑛 Number of nodes 9 All 
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Table 4: Parameter Settings for APDAW, APDAS and APDAH for the whole 
process including misbehaved node detection 
No. Parameter Description Bit 
length 
Who should know  
1. 𝑝 Public parameter 1024 All  
2. 𝑔 Public parameter 160 All  
3. 𝑞 Public parameter 587 All  
4. 𝑑𝑖 Plaintext data item 10 𝑢𝑖 only 
5. 𝑒𝑖 Randomised plaintext 160 𝑢𝑖 only 
6. 𝑏𝑖 Random integer 140 𝑢𝑖 only 
7. 𝑐𝑖 Commitment/encryption key 1024 𝑢𝑖 and AS only 
8. 𝑛 Number of nodes 9 All 
9. 𝜂 A secret key 120 AS only 
10. 𝑟 A secret key 289 AS only 
11. ℎ(∙) Hash function 160 All 
12. 𝑤 A random number 120 AS only 
13. 𝑞 Public parameter 578 All 
14. 𝑘𝑖 A private key 578 𝑢𝑖 and AS only 
15. 𝜇𝑖 Public key 1024 Parent nodes 
5.4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this section, we provide our experimental results to evaluate the performance of the 
different versions of our APDA together with the performance of the VPA+ scheme. 
Several experiments have been conducted to investigate the performance of each scheme. 
We divide our experiment into several parts. In the first part, we investigate the efficiency 
of implementing APDAW, APDAS and VPA+ up to the integrity checking.  
In the second part of our experiment, we compare the total execution time for the whole 
data aggregation and misbehaved node detection process using only both APDAW and 
APDAS as VPA+ does not offer the capability of misbehaved node detection. In this 
experiment, we implement and evaluate the BU only approach for tracking misbahaved 
nodes within various sizes of networks. 
To accelerate the misbehaved node detection within such networks, we apply the mixed 
TD and BU approach discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. The result of such an 
improvement is illustrated in the third part of our experiment.  
In the next part of our experiment, we investigate the probability of getting a correct 
maximal value based on the number of strings.  
Finally, we compare the performance of our extended version of APDAM to determine 
the maximum value among those contributed by the 𝑛 nodes. 
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The results obtained from the above experiments using Matlab 15a and OPNET 14.5.A 
are shown in the figures below. Detailed discussions on the results are also provided for 
clarification and analysis purposes.  
In addition to the aforementioned experiments, we have also tested some of our results 
using a statistical test, which is called a t-Test. We have executed this test by using 
Microsoft Excel 2013. The main purpose of this test is to determine the significant 
difference of two samples tested. This significant difference is important to prove that 
both samples are likely or unlikely based on the significant level, which we have set at 
0.05. This value will be compared with the result of the P-value of the test. We say if the 
P-value is greater than the significant level value, then both samples are likely. In contrast, 
if the P-value is less or equal to the significant level value, then both samples are unlikely. 
Furthermore, if both samples are unlikely, the mean of both samples can be used to 
determine the best one.   
5.4.3.1 An efficiency comparison for the process only up to the integrity checking.  
In this experiment, the two versions of APDA, i.e. APDAW and APDAS, have been 
compared with the chosen scheme VPA+ by executing the process only up to the integrity 
checking. This process covers the commitment generation, aggregated data encryption 
and integrity checking. Prior to comparing the efficiency performance of these schemes, 
we have tested APDAW with VPA+ to determine the significant difference and the best 
method between both schemes by using t-Test. For experimental purposes, samples of the 
t-Test are listed in Table 5 and the results of the test are illustrated in Table 6.   
Table 5: Total execution time for the whole process up to integrity checking in one 
round data aggregation using APDAW and VPA+ 
Total 
Nodes 
Delay in seconds 
APDAW VPA+ 
103 2.84 5.50 
154 3.00 5.66 
205 3.16 5.83 
256 3.33 5.99 
307 3.49 6.16 
358 3.65 6.32 
409 3.82 6.49 
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Table 6: Results of t-Test for 2 samples of APDAW and VPA+ in Table 5 
 Statistical Functions APDAW VPA+ 
Mean 3.327143 5.992857143 
Variance 0.124324 0.127057143 
Observations 7 7 
Pooled Variance 0.12569 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 12 
t Stat -14.0668 
P(T<=t) one-tail 4.04E-09 
t Critical one-tail 1.782288 
P(T<=t) two-tail 8.08E-09 
t Critical two-tail 2.178813 
Table 6 shows the result of t-Test for the two samples listed in Table 5. Based on this test, 
there are two important results that provide a significant conclusion on both samples of 
the data, which are the P-value (our significant level at 0.05) and the mean of the two 
samples. From Table 6, the P-value of this test is 4 × 10−9 < 0.05 . This means that both 
samples are unlikely or have significant difference. In order to determine the best method, 
we compare the means of both samples. Based on the result, we can conclude that APDAW 
is better than VPA+ as its mean is lower than the mean of VPA+. In Table 7, we compare 
the efficiency performance of both versions of our APDA and the VPA+, and Figure 17 
illustrates the graph of their performance. 
Table 7: Total execution time for the whole process up to the integrity checking in 
one round data aggregation using APDAW, APDAS and VPA+ 
Total 
Nodes 
Delay in seconds 
APDAW APDAS VPA+ 
103 2.84 5.56 5.50 
154 3.00 5.74 5.66 
205 3.16 5.92 5.83 
256 3.33 6.10 5.99 
307 3.49 6.28 6.16 
358 3.65 6.45 6.32 
409 3.82 6.63 6.49 
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Figure 17: Total execution times for the process only up to integrity checking using 
APDAW, APDAS and VPA+.  
Figure 17 illustrates the total execution times for the process only up to integrity checking 
in one round of data aggregation shown in Table 7. We can see that the execution time of 
APDAW is much faster than those of APDAS and VPA+. The reason is that APDAW does 
not involve hash calculations in its privacy-preserving computation while APDAS and 
VPA+ do. In addition, as we can see from the graph, the delays of implementing APDAS 
are higher than VPA+. The reason is that APDAS requires more parameters to be 
computed in generating ciphertext data by each node. 
5.4.3.2 An efficiency comparison of the whole misbehaviour nodes detection process 
via the BU only approach. 
Table 8 compares the required total execution times of APDA for the whole process up 
to the misbehaviour nodes detection in an aggregation process. That is, the process covers 
the commitment generation, aggregated data encryption, data recovery, integrity checking 
and misbehaviour nodes detection. Both APDAW and APDAS have been implemented for 
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scenario 1 described in Sub-section 5.4.1 to compare their efficiencies. Furthermore, we 
have implemented the BU only approach to detect the misbehaved node in this 
experiment. As we can see in Table 8, the delays introduced by APDAS are higher than 
those of APDAW. Furthermore, when the number of nodes increases, the delay difference 
also increases. The reason for such differences will be explained in the discussion of 
Figure 18. 
Table 8: Total execution times for the whole process including misbehaved node 
detection using two versions of APDA in various sizes of networks 
Total 
Nodes 
Delay in Minutes Delay 
Difference One Round Data Aggregation 
APDAW APDAS 
103 0.97 3.93 1.09 
154 1.32 4.49 1.49 
205 1.66 5.04 1.88 
256 2.01 5.60 2.28 
307 2.36 6.16 2.66 
358 2.71 6.71 3.06 
409 3.06 7.27 3.44 
 
Figure 18: Total execution times for the whole process up to misbehaved node 
detection using the two versions of APDA in various sizes of networks. 
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Figure 18 displays the total execution times of the two APDA versions for the process up 
to misbehaved node detection. Such misbehaved nodes are randomly distributed in the 
networks as described in scenario 1. The graph shows that the execution time of APDAW 
is faster than that of APDAS within all the sizes of networks. The graph also shows that 
the percentage differences between the two lines of all the sizes of networks are greater 
than 50%. Furthermore, the delay difference between both lines increases as the network 
size increases. The main reason is that APDAW requires less computation on time-
consuming exponentiations while executing the whole process up to misbehaved node 
detection. In contrast, APDAS has consumed more time as it requires to compute more 
exponentiations for data generation in addition to data transmission. Furthermore, we 
embed hash computation in each ciphertext generation using APDAS to allow the 
verification of the received aggregated data by each parent node, which leads to further 
delays. 
5.4.3.3 An efficiency comparison of APDA via the combined approach for 
misbehaved node detection. 
In this case study, the combination of the TD and BU approaches discussed in Sections 
4.4 and 4.5 has been implemented to execute the whole process up to misbehaved node 
detection during an aggregation process. The main reason of this combination is to 
accelerate the detection of misbehaved nodes once the integrity check has failed. We have 
compared the delays of the whole process among the three versions of APDA in the three 
scenarios involving misbehaved nodes randomly distributed in one cell as well as 50% 
and 25% of the cells.  The experiment results are given in Figure 19. 
In the 25% (or 50%) scenario, the total numbers of suspicious cells are different from one 
network to another. For example, 25% of 6 and 8 cells are just 2 cells. Thus, in such cases, 
the time delays for determining misbehaved nodes are almost similar due to the same 
number of suspicious cells. In contrast, for a network of 10 or 12 cells, 25% of the cells 
provide more delays compared to a network of 8 cells due to the number of suspicious 
cells increased to 3. In addition, as each cell consists of 25 nodes, checking a cell with at 
least one misbehaved node requires all the nodes in the cell to be examined, which 
increases the delay.  
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Table 9 shows the total execution times for the whole process including the detection of 
various numbers of misbehaved nodes by the three versions of APDA. 
Table 9: Total execution times for the whole process using the combined TD and 
BU approach. 
Node 
Total  
Delay in Minutes 
APDAW APDAS APDAH 
One Round of Data Aggregation Two Rounds of Data 
Aggregation 
One  50%  25%  One  50%  25% One  50% 25%  
103 0.47 0.64 0.47 3.36 3.53 3.36 2.22 2.41 2.22 
154 0.49 0.82 0.65 3.55 3.89 3.72 2.23 2.62 2.43 
205 0.51 1.00 0.67 3.74 4.24 3.91 2.25 2.84 2.44 
256 0.52 1.18 0.85 3.93 4.60 4.27 2.27 3.05 2.66 
307 0.54 1.36 0.87 4.12 4.95 4.46 2.28 3.26 2.67 
358 0.56 1.55 1.05 4.32 5.31 4.81 2.30 3.48 2.88 
409 0.57 1.73 1.07 4.50 5.66 5.00 2.32 3.69 2.90 
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Figure 19: Total execution time for the whole process including misbehaved node 
detection in one cell, 50% and 25% of cells using APDAW, APDAS and APDAH. 
Based on Figure 19, APDAW is the most efficient method compared to APDAS and 
APDAH. This efficient performance is due to APDAW requiring the lowest number of 
time-consuming exponentiations during the misbehaved node detection. In contrast, 
APDAS is the least efficient method as it involves the highest number of exponentiations 
for data aggregation and verification as well as misbehaved node detection. By having 
more exponentiations in APDAS for data aggregation and data verification, the tracking 
of misbehaved nodes by the AS can be executed with certainty. Nevertheless, by using 
APDAW, the AS can only detect with certainty those misbehaved nodes which are leaf 
nodes, as discussed in Sub-section 4.4.3. On the other hand, APDAH provides a more 
balanced performance in terms of the efficiency and assurance of identifying misbehaved 
nodes. This result has been achieved because only the high-level parent nodes initially 
run APDAW to detect any suspicious cell, and once detected, only the nodes in the 
suspicious cell(s) need to run APDAS while the rest still run APDAW if needed. As a 
result, APDAH remains relatively stable in all cases.  
Furthermore, the results in Figure 19 show that the gap between the middle line for 
APDAH and the top line for APDAS is widening as the number of network nodes 
increases. The reason is that APDAS requires every parent node to verify the received 
data from its children and this verification process involves heavy computation on 
exponentiation. As a result, this verification increases the delay rapidly. In contrast, 
APDAH requires only the parent node within the suspicious cell, which is determined by 
APDAW, to verify the received data. Conversely, the gap between the middle line for 
APDAH and the bottom line for APDAW remains constant as the number of network nodes 
rises. The reason is that, by running APDAH for every scenario, the number of nodes in 
the suspicious cells, which are determined by APDAW to run APDAS, increases 
constantly as the network size increases. 
5.4.3.4 A probability comparison for getting a correct maximum using different 
numbers of strings. 
In this study, we have investigated the number of strings required for MaxB to determine 
the maximum value with a high probability. We have implemented two methods, a Matlab 
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based simulation of MaxB and the calculation of Equation 4.26, for a comparison. We 
have executed 1,000 rounds of the simulation for each number of strings up to 15. The 
experimental results together with the calculated ones are shown in Table 10 and Figure 
20.  
In addition, we have tested the results of both methods by using t-Test to determine 
whether both of them are significantly different, and the test results are provided in Table 
11. From Table 11, the P-value of both samples is 0.5, which is greater than the significant 
level at 0.05. Thus, we conclude that both samples are likely and there is no significant 
difference between the means. 
Table 10: Probabilities from our experimental result and Equation 4.26 for MaxB 
to get a correct maximum using different numbers of strings  
Number of 
strings 
The probability 
Experimental 
result 
Formula 
0 0.000 0.000 
1 0.508 0.500 
2 0.749 0.750 
3 0.876 0.875 
4 0.930 0.938 
5 0.965 0.969 
6 0.987 0.984 
7 0.990 0.992 
8 0.998 0.996 
9 0.998 0.998 
10 0.999 0.999 
11 0.999 0.999 
12 0.999 0.999 
13 0.999 0.999 
14 0.999 0.999 
15 0.999 0.999 
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Figure 20: Probabilities for MaxB to get a correct maximum using different 
numbers of strings. 
From Figure 20, we can see that the results from both methods are very close and the 
probability increases as the number of strings increases. Furthermore, in order to have a 
correct result of finding the maximum value, the probability must be close to one. From 
the graph, we can conclude that the total number of strings required for getting the correct 
result with a high probability of 0.999 is 10. If we further increase the number of strings, 
the probability will not significantly change as evidenced in Table 10.  
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Table 11: t-Test result for 2 samples in Table 10 
 Statistical Functions Experimental result Formula 
Mean 0.8746875 0.87475 
Variance 0.071706496 0.072151667 
Observations 16 16 
Pooled Variance 0.071929081 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 30 
t Stat -0.000659133 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.499739226 
t Critical one-tail 1.697260887 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.999478452 
t Critical two-tail 2.042272456 
5.4.3.5 An efficiency comparison between our solutions and VPA⊕ for maximal value 
finding.  
In this case study, we compare the efficiency between the extended versions of our APDA 
scheme (i.e. MaxC, MaxB and MaxH) and the chosen scheme VPA⊕ in [23] for finding a 
maximum value among those contributed by the 𝑛 nodes. The aim of comparing those 
methods is to determine the most efficient method for maximum value finding. We have 
set up the network with various sizes for the performance comparison. Furthermore, we 
have set up the parameter settings as illustrated in Table 12 to execute the different 
versions of our Max and VPA⊕. The efficiency on each scheme has been measured based 
on the total execution time taken in seconds for the completion of finding a correct 
maximum. The comparison results are shown in Table 13 and Figure 21. 
Table 12: The Parameter Setting for implementing MaxC, MaxB and VPA⊕ 
No Parameter Description MaxC MaxB VPA⊕ 
1. 𝜏 Bit length of 𝑑𝑖 10 10 10 
2. 𝜃 Index of base 2 in 𝛾 4 7 1 
3. 𝜖 Number of decimal digits 2 2 2 
4. 𝛾 Number of sub-ranges 16 128 2 
5. 𝑛  Number of rounds 3 2 10 
6. 𝜏′ Bit length of  𝑑𝑖́  112 128 14 
7. 𝜗 Number of strings 1 10 1 
8. log2 𝑛 Bit length of 𝑛 9 9 9 
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Table 13: Total execution times for the maximal value finding using MaxC and 
VPA⊕  for t-Test evaluation 
Node 
Total  
Delay in seconds 
MaxC VPA⊕ 
103 9.26 35.92 
154 9.37 36.31 
205 9.54 36.89 
256 9.82 37.80 
307 10.12 38.83 
358 10.46 39.96 
409 10.84 41.15 
Table 14: t-Test result for 2 samples in Table 13 
 Statistical Functions MaxC VPA⊕ 
Mean 9.82 37.80125 
Variance 0.369057143 4.084869643 
Observations 8 8 
Pooled Variance 2.226963393 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 14 
t Stat -37.50080309 
P(T<=t) one-tail 9.51026E-16 
t Critical one-tail 1.761310136 
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.90205E-15 
t Critical two-tail 2.144786688 
Table 14 illustrates the t-Test result of the two samples in Table 13. This test compares 
the significant difference between the two samples, which are generated via MaxC and 
VPA⊕. From the figures, the P-value of both samples is too small (i.e. 9.5 × 10−16), 
which is lower than the significant level value at 0.05. This indicates that both samples 
are very unlikely and there is a significant difference between both samples. Furthermore, 
by comparing the means of both methods, we conclude that MaxC is better as its mean is 
lower than the mean of VPA⊕.  
In Table 15, the three versions of our Max and VPA⊕ have been compared to investigate 
their efficiency performance in order to determine the maximal value based on a given 
data set.  
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Table 15: Total execution times for the maximal value finding using MaxC, MaxB, 
MaxH and VPA⊕  
Node 
Total  
Delay in seconds 
MaxC MaxB MaxH VPA⊕ 
103 9.26 1.48 4.56 35.92 
154 9.37 1.56 4.69 36.31 
205 9.54 1.66 4.84 36.89 
256 9.82 1.71 4.98 37.80 
307 10.12 1.84 5.22 38.83 
358 10.46 1.94 5.42 39.96 
409 10.84 2.03 5.51 41.15 
 
Figure 21: Total execution times for maximal value finding. 
Figure 21 shows that MaxC is more efficient than VPA⊕. This is because MaxC utilises 
more sub-ranges in every round of maximal value finding so as to reduce the total number 
of rounds required to find the maximum. In contrast, VPA⊕ uses only 2 sub-ranges in 
each round, resulting in much more rounds of aggregation for finding the maximum and 
hence much lower efficiency. This highlights that reducing the number of aggregation 
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rounds for maximal value finding can lead to significantly lower execution times due to 
the reduced amounts of data computation and transmission. This is further evidenced 
from the results of MaxB, showing its best efficiency in the figure, as it increases even 
more sub-ranges in every round of aggregation and hence reduces the total number of 
rounds needed.  
In addition, Figure 21 also shows the efficiency result of MaxH, which is between those 
of MaxC and MaxB. The reason is that MaxH implements MaxB in an efficient fashion to 
narrow down the range that contains the maximum, and then runs MaxC with a better 
accuracy in determining the maximum within the narrowed range. 
5.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we have detailed the security analysis and proved that our proposed 
schemes are secured against the threat model described in Chapter 4. We have also shown 
that our schemes satisfied all the requirements stated in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the 
experimental results of our proposed schemes have demonstrated that our work can 
provide better efficiency compared to the best existing solutions VPA+ and VPA⊕. Our 
APDA has shown that it is able to detect with certainty the misbehaved nodes in the 
aggregation process. Finally, our schemes’ performance and security analysis have shown 
that they are suitable to be implemented in MSSs. In the next chapter, our LHE scheme 
will be introduced to allow resource-limited devices like smartphones to leverage rich-
mobile applications provided by cloud providers in an efficient and secure manner.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A NEW LIGHTWEIGHT HOMOMORPHIC 
ENCRYPTION SCHEME 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Even though MCC and MSS use a similar concept of leveraging cloud computing for 
alleviating all the burdens of heavy computations and complex tasks to a cloud server, 
both of them differ significantly as stated in Chapter 2. MCC allows mobile users to 
leverage rich-mobile applications provided by the clouds, mainly applications related to 
complex computation. In such a case, APDA proposed for MSS needs to be enhanced so 
that it can support fully homomorphic properties, which allows the scheme to compute 
arbitrary functions on ciphertext data. Thus, in this chapter, we propose a new scheme to 
suit the implementation of MCC.  Prior to proposing the scheme, we will briefly describe 
the fundamental concept together with the implementation issues of MCC.   
With the emerging technology of cloud computing, rich mobile applications have been 
offered and delivered through the Internet. Cloud computing offers tremendous 
advantages by allowing users to use its infrastructures, platforms and software. Such 
services are provided by Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) like Google, Amazon, and 
Salesforce at low costs. With the increasing number of mobile applications and the 
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support of cloud computing for a variety of services for mobile users, Mobile Cloud 
Computing (MCC) is introduced as an integration of cloud computing into the mobile 
environment. As a result, MCC brings new types of services and facilities for mobile 
users to take full advantages of cloud computing [4], [8], [9], [14], [27], [53], [129]. 
 To leverage such a technology and service, mobile users need to outsource their data to 
the CSPs for storing and processing purposes. However, outsourcing such data, which is 
often private or sensitive, into the clouds with no physical and limited digital control by 
the users raises serious concerns on its security [60]. Furthermore, inappropriately 
handling such data could result in a disaster to the data owners due to data misuse, data 
leakage, or data theft by other parties that abuse the same services. Moreover, the CSPs 
do not offer proper security guarantees to the data owners [185]. Due to the scale, 
dynamicity, openness and resource-sharing nature of cloud computing, addressing 
security issues in such environments is a very challenging problem [186]. 
To ensure that the security and integrity of the data are preserved in clouds, encryption 
techniques should be implemented. Primitive encryption schemes such as RSA algorithm 
and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) are good for storing purposes [33] but they 
prevent the encrypted data from being processed by cloud-based applications [103]. Thus, 
a scheme that allows data to be processed in its ciphertext form, like a Fully 
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme, is extremely desirable for securing cloud-based 
data processing.  Although a number of existing FHE schemes have been proposed and 
improved upon, none of them is practically efficient enough to be deployed in an open 
cloud environment, as efficiency is still a big challenge for their implementation. For 
instance, existing FHE schemes based on Lattices are suffering from efficiency issues due 
to the amount of noise introduced during the data processing stage [159]. Additionally, a 
scheme based on a bilinear map allows arbitrary additions but only one multiplication on 
encrypted data [146]. Furthermore, existing FHE schemes are computationally expensive, 
which draw a lot of computing resources to implement. This computational process 
inhibits mobile devices from computing in an efficient manner.  
To address the above problem, in this chapter, we propose a new Lightweight 
Homomorphic Encryption (LHE) scheme that is constructed based on Gentry’s scheme. 
We follow the same application settings as in [74]. The main difference between the two 
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schemes is that our choice of plaintext for encryption is an integer form, whereas Gentry’s 
scheme is in the form of bits. This novel choice leads to our scheme being more efficient 
as the encryption on an integer is faster than encryption on every single bit of the integer 
[46]. Moreover, encryption over the integer increases input and output message spaces so 
as to consume less storage space and require less bandwidth for data transmission. 
Based on the above choice, we have designed a symmetric encryption scheme as in [35] 
and [76] with better efficiency. This is because our scheme’s input and output are in a 
single integer form, whereas both schemes in [35] and [76] represent their input and 
output in a matrix form. This argument is supported by our experimental results that show 
the total time to execute data summation and multiplication operations by using the 
proposed scheme is much less than the schemes in [35] and [76]. In fact, our scheme 
supports arbitrary functions on ciphertext data as long as the desired result satisfies some 
conditions to be detailed in Sub-section 6.4.1. To implement the new scheme, we have 
provided a process to securely communicate and handle the data in its ciphertext form. 
This process ensures that the privacy of the outsourced and processed data in the third 
party environment is preserved. Also the performance of our new LHE is thoroughly 
evaluated with detailed simulations, which demonstrates much better efficiency than 
related work.  
Prior to detailing the threat model in the next section, Figure 22 shows the MCC setting 
used to implement our proposed scheme. This setting consists of mobile devices or nodes 
as data contributors, a data client as a data user, and a server managed by a CSP for data 
storage and processing, where each node has a dedicated destination address to avoid 
collusion and reduce any delay in data transmission. Here, all the mobile devices are 
connected wirelessly to the CSP, which exploit public communication links through 
either a high-speed mobile network technology 3G/4G or Wi-Fi access. Furthermore, we 
assume that every two connected nodes have already authenticated each other and 
established a secure communication channel between them if necessary. 
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Figure 22: A MCC setting 
6.2 THREAT MODEL 
In our proposed MCC process, all parties in Figure 22 (i.e. the Data User, the Cloud 
Server and Data Contributors/mobile devices, which are denoted as DU, CS and DCs, 
respectively) communicate with one another to collect and process required information 
via a data offloading technique. This technique allows the collected data to be processed 
arbitrarily. By using this technique, DU sends a request to DCs via open wireless links to 
collect information from them, including personal data (e.g. health, monthly salary or 
home address information) or sensed data about the surrounding area (e.g. crowd in an 
event, road congestion or local weather information). Having received the request and got 
the requested information, DCs send the data to CS for necessary processing. However, 
as such information is closely related to DCs (e.g. their locations and health conditions), 
submitting the data in the aforementioned process could  lead to the exposure of the data 
to a curious CS, malicious DCs or any intermediary party like an adversary that observes 
the process. In order to give a better description about the threats, we divide them into 
internal and external threats, which are elaborated separately below.  
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6.2.1 INTERNAL THREATS 
In MCC, CS is normally assumed to be a trusted party. Nevertheless, it may have an 
intention to reveal the content of the transmitted or collected data for its curiosity or other 
purposes. Such an intention unavoidably invades the privacy of individual mobile users. 
In addition, as CS is an external party with diverse interests, it is difficult to ensure that 
CS is trustworthy in the MCC environment. Thus, it is essential that CS has no means to 
access any private data without authorisation. 
6.2.2 EXTERNAL THREATS 
In our proposed system, all the communications among DU, CS and DCs are executed 
via open wireless devices like Wi-Fi routers. Such devices are not secure and reliable as 
they are made public and thus vulnerable to external attacks like data interception and 
Denial of Service (DoS) [187], [188]. Those attacks can be orchestrated  by an adversary 
in the following scenarios considered in this chapter: 
(i) An adversary node that observes the transmission process and may want to 
eavesdrop on some communication devices between DU, CS and DCs. 
(ii) An adversary or malicious node, which intends to obtain another nodes’ secret key 
or leverage some cloud-based applications to retrieve relevant information about 
the key for decrypting the node’s encrypted data.   
6.3 DESIGN GOAL 
Based on the above threats, we design our scheme to fulfil the following requirements: 
(i) In the proposed process, DU uses a pair of master keys (𝑝, 𝑟) to generate a secret 
key 𝑘𝑖 for every DC node 𝑢𝑖. Then, it sends 𝑘𝑖 to 𝑢𝑖 securely (i.e. by encryption). 
The key generation may lead to a brute force attack on the master keys. Thus, we 
need to design the key generation algorithm in such a way that even if the attacker 
manages to hold a set of secret keys, it will not be able to retrieve any useful 
information about the master keys from the possessed keys.  
(ii) Any cryptosystem is targeted by attacks on secret keys. Thus, we need to design 
our scheme with the ability to prevent any information about a secret key from being 
disclosed to any unauthorised users.   
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(iii) Every user should be assigned with a single and unique key for data protection and 
ease key management. Encrypting data using the same key by the same user may 
reveal some information about the plaintext. Thus, we need to design a scheme that 
prevents data leakage by adding extra information during the data encryption.   
In the following section, we provide our proposed LHE solution in accordance with the 
above requirements. We describe all the processes executed by DU, CS and each DC, 
including key generation, data encryption, and data processing and recovery.  
6.4 THE PROPOSED LHE SCHEME 
Our LHE scheme consists of three algorithms, which are for key generation, data 
encryption, and data processing and recovery. To devise these algorithms for MCC, 
several parameters need to be set beforehand. Suppose that there are n mobile devices 
participating as DCs, each of which is denoted as 𝑢𝑖 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛). For each data item to 
be computed, we set the maximum length of 𝑙𝑑 bits. In this setting, CS is employed to 
process the data received from the n mobile devices. We define two functions for data 
processing, which will be detailed in Sub-section 6.4.3.  
The LHE scheme employs its key generation algorithm for DU to produce a unique 
symmetric secret key for each DC 𝑢𝑖. The data encryption algorithm of the scheme allows 
𝑢𝑖 to encrypt its contributed data with the key and outsources the encrypted data to CS 
for further processing. This enables all the DCs to contribute their values to CS in an 
encrypted form, which CS is unable to decrypt. The data processing and recovery 
algorithm of the scheme allows CS to process the received data without decryption based 
on the desired function requested by DU and transmit the result to DU. DU then decrypts 
the received result to recover its plaintext data without knowing any individual values 
contributed by different DCs. The details of these three algorithms are given in the sub-
section below.  
6.4.1 KEY GENERATION 
The proposed LHE scheme employs a secret key for data encryption by each DC 𝑢𝑖. The 
secret key is shared only between its associated DU and 𝑢𝑖, and used for symmetric data 
encryption.  
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To produce this key, we adopt the parameter delineations for the verifiable encryption of 
RSA signatures [176].  That is, DU defines 𝜑 as the product of two safe primes 𝑝 and 𝑤, 
i.e. 𝜑 = 𝑝𝑤 where 𝑝 = 2𝑝′ + 1 and 𝑤 = 2𝑤′ + 1 with 𝑝′ and 𝑤′ being primes. 𝜑 will 
be used as a public number, w needs to be discarded without disclosing it to anyone and 
p should be kept securely. Additionally, DU selects a prime r (< p) and stores both p and 
r as its secret master keys.  
To generate a key for each 𝑢𝑖, DU picks up random numbers 𝑠𝑖 < 𝑝 and 𝑞𝑖 > 𝑝 to produce 
the following symmetric secret key: 
𝑘𝑖 = (𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝑝𝑞𝑖) mod 𝜑                                             (6.1) 
𝑘𝑖 is only given to 𝑢𝑖 as its secret key. The n secret keys 𝑘𝑖 need to meet the following 
conditions: 
(a) For summation, 
2𝑙𝑑𝑛 < 𝑟 and 𝑟(1 + 2𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠𝑛) < 𝑝                                                                (6.2a) 
(b) For multiplication,  
2𝑛𝑙𝑑 < 𝑟 and (2𝑙𝑑 + 2𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠𝑟)𝑛 < 𝑝                                        (6.2b) 
Here, 𝑙𝑑, 𝑙𝑐̃ and 𝑙𝑠 are the maximal bit lengths of the data 𝑑𝑖, a random  ?̃?𝑖 chosen by DC 
𝑢𝑖 for its data encryption, and random number 𝑠𝑖 in key 𝑘𝑖 for any i, respectively. The 
detailed reasons for the above conditions will be discussed later when the proposed data 
encryption and decryption are presented. In brief, the first part of both conditions says 
that the sum or the product of encrypted data items is less than 𝑟 for the purposes of 
ensuring the recovery of the sum or product result. The second part of both conditions 
means that the calculation on the first part of each 𝑢𝑖’s secret key together with the other 
items results in a number less than 𝑝. This condition also allows the summation or product 
result to be recovered. 
For easy reference, the above key generation algorithm executed by DU is summarised 
below: 
(i) Choose two safe primes 𝑝 and 𝑤 to calculate 𝜑 = 𝑝𝑤, where 𝑝 = 2𝑝′ + 1 and 
𝑤 = 2𝑤′ + 1 with 𝑝′ and 𝑤′ being primes. 
(ii) Discard 𝑤. 
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(iii) Pick a prime number 𝑟 (< 𝑝). 
(iv) For i = 1 to n do 
(v)   Pick random numbers 𝑠𝑖 < 𝑝 and 𝑞𝑖 > 𝑝. 
(vi)   Compute 𝑘𝑖 = (𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝑝𝑞𝑖) mod 𝜑. 
(vii)   Send 〈𝜑, 𝑘𝑖〉 to DC 𝑢𝑖 securely. 
(viii) End for. 
6.4.2 DATA ENCRYPTION 
We now present how DC 𝑢𝑖 generates its encrypted data to be sent to CS. To do so, 𝑢𝑖 
first performs the following calculation: 
?̃?𝑖 = (𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑘𝑖) mod 𝜑                                               (6.3) 
Here, ?̃?𝑖 is the encrypted form of 𝑢𝑖 data item 𝑑𝑖, and ?̃?𝑖 is a random number picked up 
by 𝑢𝑖 and will be further explained in Section 6.5. Briefly, the reason to include ?̃?𝑖 in the 
encryption is to enhance the security of 𝑑𝑖. This is because the size of 𝑑𝑖 may be too small 
when compared with secret key 𝑘𝑖, so some information about the key could be retrieved 
from the encrypted data if only the key was used in the encryption. Thus, by including 
such a random number ?̃?𝑖 during the encryption, it will hide the information about the 
secret key, as the encrypted data will be different from the key used for the encryption.  
After the completion of the above calculation, 𝑢𝑖 sends ?̃?𝑖 to CS for storing and computing 
purposes. Upon the receipt of ?̃?𝑖 from every 𝑢𝑖, CS starts its computation on the 
ciphertexts received to generate a result based on a function requested by DU. 
The above data encryption algorithm performed by 𝑢𝑖 is summarised as the following 
steps: 
(i) Choose a random number ?̃?𝑖 (< 𝜑). 
(ii) Compute ?̃?𝑖 = (𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑘𝑖) mod 𝜑. 
(iii) Send ?̃?𝑖 to CS securely. 
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6.4.3 DATA PROCESSING AND RECOVERY 
In this sub-section, we first describe how CS computes the received data using addition 
and multiplication without the need for decryption. Once the computation on ciphertext 
is completed, the result will be sent to DU for decryption to recover the plaintext result. 
The following are the steps of addition and multiplication together with the reason for 
getting a correct result of ciphertext data computation. We will also show how the scheme 
supports homomorphism under both addition and multiplication. Homomorphism under 
those operations has been defined in the definition 3.9 in Sub-section 3.2.8. 
(i) Summation 
Let 𝑓(𝑑1, 𝑑2, … 𝑑𝑛) = ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , i.e. the summation of all the data items 𝑑𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
For summing 𝑛 ciphertext in MCC, CS computes the received ciphertext data from each 
𝑢𝑖 as follows: 
𝑓(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛) = (∑ ?̃?𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 mod 𝜑. 
Then, this result will be sent to DU for recovering the sum. To obtain the sum, DU applies 
its master keys 𝑝 and 𝑟 to calculate: 
∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = (𝑓(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛) mod 𝑝) mod 𝑟         (6.4) 
This is valid due to the following relationships: 
(𝑓(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛) mod 𝑝) mod 𝑟  
   = (((∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑) mod 𝑝)  mod 𝑟   
   = (((∑ (𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑘𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1 mod 𝜑) mod 𝑝)mod 𝑟  
   = (((∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑘𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑) mod 𝑝)mod 𝑟  
   = (((∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ?̃?𝑖(𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝑝𝑞𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑝𝑤) mod 𝑝)mod 𝑟  
   = ((∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝑝𝜔′
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑝) mod 𝑟  
   = (∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑟∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑟  
   = ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
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Here, we have (∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑝𝑞𝑖) mod 𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝𝜔′
𝑛
𝑖=1  with 𝜔′ < 𝑤. Also the above fact is based on 
the following connections derived from condition (6.2a) defined in Sub-section 6.4.1, i.e. 
2𝑙𝑑𝑛 < 𝑟 and 𝑟(1 + 2𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠𝑛) < 𝑝: 
∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 < 2
𝑙𝑑𝑛 < 𝑟, ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑟∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑖 < 𝑟 + 2
𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠𝑟𝑛 <𝑛𝑖=1 𝑝, and 
∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑟∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑝𝜔′ < 𝑝𝑤. 
(ii) Product 
Let ?̃?𝑖 and ?̃?𝑗 be the ciphertext of plaintext 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑑𝑗 respectively. The product of 𝑑𝑖 and 
𝑑𝑗 can be recovered from the product of 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼𝑗 as follows: 
𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑗 = (((?̃?𝑖?̃?𝑗) mod 𝜑)  mod 𝑝)  mod 𝑟        (6.5) 
This is valid due to the following relationship: 
(((?̃?𝑖?̃?𝑗) mod 𝜑)  mod 𝑝)  mod 𝑟 
= (((𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑘𝑖) (𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑗𝑘𝑗) mod 𝜑)  mod 𝑝)mod 𝑟  
Since 𝑘𝑖 = (𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝑝𝑞𝑖) mod 𝜑, then 
= (((𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖(𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝑝𝑞𝑖)) (𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑗(𝑟𝑠𝑗 + 𝑝𝑞𝑗))  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑)  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟   
= ((((𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖) + ?̃?𝑖𝑝𝑞𝑖)((𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑗𝑟𝑠𝑗) + ?̃?𝑗𝑝𝑞𝑗) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟  
= ((((𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖)(𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑗𝑟𝑠𝑗) + 𝑝 ((𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖)?̃?𝑗𝑞𝑗 + (𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑗𝑟𝑠𝑗)?̃?𝑖𝑞𝑖 +
 ?̃?𝑖𝑞𝑖?̃?𝑗𝑝𝑞𝑗)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑤)  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟  
= (((𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖)(𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑗𝑟𝑠𝑗) + 𝑝𝜔")𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟  
= (𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖)(𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑗𝑟𝑠𝑗) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟  
= (𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑗 + 𝑟(𝑑𝑖?̃?𝑗𝑠𝑗 + ?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑖?̃?𝑗𝑟𝑠𝑗)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟  
= 𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑗   
. 
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Here, we have 𝑝 ((𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖)?̃?𝑗𝑞𝑗 + (𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑗𝑟𝑠𝑗)?̃?𝑖𝑞𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑞𝑖 ?̃?𝑗𝑝𝑞𝑗)  mod 𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝𝜔" 
with 𝜔" < 𝑤. Also the above fact is based on the following connections derived from 
condition (6.2b) in Sub-section 6.4.1, i.e. 22𝑙𝑑 < 𝑟 and (2𝑙𝑑 + 2(𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠)𝑟)
2
< 𝑝 for 𝑛 = 2:  
(i) 𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑗 < 2
2𝑙𝑑 < 𝑟,  
(ii) (𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖)(𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑗𝑟𝑠𝑗) < (2
𝑙𝑑 + 2𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠𝑟)2 < 𝑝, and   
(iii) (𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖)(𝑑𝑗 + ?̃?𝑗𝑟𝑠𝑗) + 𝑝𝜔" < 𝑝𝑤. 
We can generalise Equation (6.5) to retrieve a general relationship on a product of 𝑛 
plaintexts from 𝑛 ciphertexts as follows. Let 𝑑1 ∙ 𝑑2 ∙ … ∙ 𝑑𝑛 =  𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , i.e. the product 
of all the plaintexts 𝑑𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. For multiplying their corresponding ciphertexts in 
MCC, CS computes the received ciphertext data from each 𝑢𝑖: 
(?̃?1 ∙ ?̃?2 ∙ … ∙ ?̃?𝑛) mod 𝜑 =  ?̃?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 mod 𝜑. 
Then, this ciphertext product is sent to DU that recovers the plaintext result by the 
following computation: 
 𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ((( ?̃?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )mod 𝜑) mod 𝑝)  mod 𝑟    (6.6) 
This is a valid operation due to the following relationships: 
((( ?̃?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝜑) mod 𝑝)mod 𝑟  
= ((( (𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑘𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1 mod 𝜑) mod 𝑝) mod 𝑟  
= ((( (𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖(𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝑝𝑞𝑖)))
𝑛
𝑖=1 mod 𝜑) mod 𝑝)  mod 𝑟  
=  𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
The above relationships are similar to those detailed for Equation (6.5) 
Based on the FHE concept given in Sub-section 3.2.8. it is clear that our LHE scheme is 
homomorphic under both addition and multiplication operations. For easy reference, the 
algorithms presented in this sub-section are summarised as below: 
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Ciphertext Addition by CS: 
(i) Compute ?̃? = (∑ ?̃?𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 mod 𝜑. 
(ii) Send ?̃? to DU securely. 
Ciphertext Multiplication by CS: 
(i) Compute ?̃?′ =  ?̃?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 mod 𝜑. 
(ii) Send ?̃?′ to DU securely. 
Sum Recovery by DU: 
(i) Get master keys r and p. 
(ii) Compute 𝑑 = (?̃? mod 𝑝) mod 𝑟.  
Product Recovery by DU: 
(i) Get master keys r and p. 
(ii) Compute 𝑑′ = (?̃?′ mod 𝑝) mod 𝑟. 
In the following section, we describe how the LHE scheme can prevent several attacks 
on the scheme even though it has less complexity.  
6.5 SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we analyse the security of the scheme proposed in the previous section by 
considering both external and internal attacks described in Section 6.2. Those threats can 
be categorised as a brute force attack on DU’s master keys, a brute force attack on DCs’ 
secret keys and a many time pad attack. 
6.5.1 BRUTE FORCE ATTACK ON THE MASTER KEYS 
By using our scheme to encrypt the data, this attack on the ciphertext can be formulated 
as follows. DU sends a request to the DC group. Suppose that several attackers are 
members of the group. The attackers pretend to have the data related to the request and 
will let DU know about it. As DU is not able to differentiate the attackers from other 
genuine contributors, DU will securely send a symmetric key to each DC, including those 
attackers, for data encryption. Having received the keys from DU, the attackers start the 
computation of deducing DU’s master keys 𝑝 and 𝑟. They subtract one key from another, 
hoping to remove 𝑟 (or 𝑝). If 𝑟 were removed, the attackers could compute the Greatest 
Common Divisor (GCD) of the remainder with the public value 𝜑. By doing this, master 
key 𝑝 would be discovered by the attackers, which could then be used to work out 𝑟 in a 
similar way. 
We now present the above attack in detail. Having received the keys from DU, the 
attackers start colluding for the computation of recovering the master keys. Suppose that 
𝐴1 and 𝐴2 are attackers with received keys 𝑘′1 and 𝑘′2 in the following form: 
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𝑘′1 = (𝑟 + 𝑝𝑞1) mod 𝜑, and 
𝑘′2 = (𝑟 + 𝑝𝑞2) mod 𝜑. 
𝐴1 and 𝐴2 then subtract both keys: 
?̃? = 𝑘′1 − 𝑘′2 = ((𝑟 + 𝑝𝑞1) − (𝑟 + 𝑝𝑞2)) mod 𝜑 
    = (𝑝(𝑞1 − 𝑞2)) mod 𝜑. 
Assume that 𝑝(𝑞1 − 𝑞2) < 𝜑. To determine master key 𝑝, they compute the GCD of the 
following values: 
GCD (?̃?, 𝜑) = 𝑝. 
This is valid due to the following relationships: 
GCD (?̃?, 𝜑) = GCD (𝑝(𝑞1 − 𝑞2), 𝑝𝑤) = 𝑝 
Furthermore, the attacker can retrieve the value of 𝑟 by computing 𝑘′1mod 𝑝 = 𝑟. 
After the completion of the above steps, the attackers obtain master keys (𝑝, 𝑟) generated 
by DU. If they can intercept the communication between another group member 𝑢𝑖 and 
CS, then they can gain the information from the encrypted data as they have the 
decryption keys. 
To prevent such an attack, we attach a random parameter 𝑠𝑖 to 𝑟 in the definition of our 
keys 𝑘𝑖 to avoid the above elimination of 𝑟 when the attackers subtract two distinct keys 
they received from DU. This can be seen by repeating the elimination process as follows: 
𝑘1 = (𝑟𝑠1 + 𝑝𝑞1) mod 𝜑, and 
𝑘2 = (𝑟𝑠2 + 𝑝𝑞2) mod 𝜑. 
If 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 subtract both keys: 
?̃?′ = 𝑘1 − 𝑘2 = ((𝑟𝑠1 + 𝑝𝑞1) − (𝑟𝑠2 + 𝑝𝑞2)) mod 𝜑 
     = (𝑟(𝑠1 − 𝑠2) + 𝑝(𝑞1 − 𝑞2)) mod 𝜑 
Now master key 𝑝 cannot be retrieved by computing GCD (?̃?′, 𝜑) due to ?̃?′ being no 
longer a multiple of 𝑝, i.e.  
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GCD (?̃?′, 𝜑) = GCD (𝑟(𝑠1 − 𝑠1) + 𝑝(𝑞1 − 𝑞2), 𝑝𝑤) ≠ 𝑝 
However, according to [147], such improvement allows known attacks like brute-forcing 
the remainders on the secret keys. Thus, we review such an attack for two keys 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 
and prove the resilience of our scheme against the attack by using a contradiction 
approach described below. 
A simple brute-force attack [147] tries to guess ?̌?1 = 𝑟𝑠1 and ?̌?2 = 𝑟𝑠2 and verify the guess 
with a GCD computation. Specifically, for two correctly guessed values ?̌?1
′ and ?̌?2
′ of ?̌?1 
and ?̌?2 (i.e. ?̌?1
′ = ?̌?1 and ?̌?2
′ = ?̌?2), the attacker compute:  
𝑘1
” = (𝑘1 − ?̌?1
′) mod 𝜑, and 
𝑘2
” = (𝑘2 − ?̌?2
′) mod 𝜑. 
By contradiction, if we assume 𝑝𝑞1 < 𝑝 and 𝑝𝑞2 < 𝑝,  then 𝑝 can be computed by: 
GCD (𝑘1
” , 𝑘2
”) = 𝑝. 
The above equation is true due to the following relationships: 
GCD (𝑘1
” , 𝑘2
”) 
= GCD ((𝑘1 − ?̌?1
′)mod 𝜑, (𝑘2 − ?̌?2
′)mod 𝜑) 
= GCD (((?̌?1 + 𝑝𝑞1) − ?̌?1
′)mod 𝜑, ((?̌?2 + 𝑝𝑞2) − ?̌?2
′)mod 𝜑) 
= GCD (𝑝𝑞1mod 𝜑, 𝑝𝑞2mod 𝜑) 
However, both 𝑝𝑞1 and 𝑝𝑞2 are in fact greater than 𝜑 as defined in Sub-section 6.4.1. 
Then, GCD (𝑝𝑞1mod 𝜑, 𝑝𝑞2mod 𝜑) ≠ 𝑝. Therefore, our selection of 𝑞𝑖 prevents the 
brute-forcing on the master keys. In addition, to avoid the brute-force attack on the 
remainder, the length of ?̌?1 and ?̌?2 should be large enough to make it much harder for the 
attacker to guess them correctly, but it must be smaller than 𝑝 to allow the recovery of 
the plaintext data during the decryption. 
6.5.2 BRUTE FORCE ATTACK ON THE SECRET KEYS 
To protect the proposed scheme from a brute force attack on a DC’s secret key, a random 
parameter ?̃?𝑖 is added in ciphertext ?̃?𝑖 as defined in Equation 6.3. Such a parameter can 
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improve the security of the encrypted data by avoiding any information about the 
encryption key being disclosed to unauthorised users. Having another random parameter 
?̃?𝑖 means that, given items ?̃?𝑖 and 𝜑, an attacker with some knowledge about the plaintext 
related to ?̃?𝑖, is unable to retrieve any useful information for successfully inferring the 
encryption key.  
We now argue the above claim in detail. Suppose that the encryption algorithm for 
plaintext 𝑑𝑖 with secret key 𝑘𝑖 is: 
?̃?′𝑖 = (𝑑𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖) mod 𝜑.                                          (6.7) 
Such an encryption algorithm is vulnerable against a brute-force attack on key 𝑘𝑖. The 
reason is that, when the size of 𝑑𝑖 is small compared to key 𝑘𝑖 used for the encryption, 
then the high-end part of the ciphertext generated is likely to be identical to that of the 
key. This means that for different encryptions with the same key, the differences among 
them are just the bits at the lower end of the ciphertext, while the rest (the higher end of 
the key) remains the same. In case the attacker is able to obtain several ciphertexts, he/she 
can compare them to spot their identical part so as to gain that part of the key. If the 
remaining part of the key is short, then the attacker can guess it by a brute force attack. 
Thus, to prevent such an attack, we add a unique random parameter ?̃?𝑖 in Equation 6.3 for 
our encryption. By adding this parameter, attempting to spot any identical part of the key 
will be intractable as it will be hidden by ?̃?𝑖, which is known only by 𝑢𝑖. 
6.5.3 A MANY TIME PAD ATTACK 
Our scheme could also face a so called many time pad attack [189]. This attack allows an 
adversary to obtain some information about plaintexts. Let ?̃?𝑖̇ = (𝑑𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖) mod 𝜑 and 
?̃?"̇𝑖 = (𝑑"𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖) mod 𝜑 be two distinct ciphertexts of plaintext 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑑"𝑖 respectively. 
DC 𝑢𝑖 using the same key to produce both ciphertexts. If the attacker gets hold of ?̃?𝑖̇  and 
?̃?"̇𝑖, it can compute the difference between them to gain some knowledge about 𝑑𝑖 and 
𝑑"𝑖. By using a crib dragging technique [190] on this result, the attacker would eventually 
discover all the information about the data. 
We now elaborate such an attack in detail. Suppose that the attacker has gained ?̃?𝑖̇  and 
?̃?"̇𝑖, it can compute: 
  
 
136 
 
𝑑′ = (?̃?𝑖̇ − ?̃?"̇𝑖) mod 𝜑 = ((𝑑𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖) mod 𝜑 − (𝑑"𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖) mod 𝜑) mod 𝜑 
   = (𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑"𝑖) mod 𝜑 
This is caused by 𝑢𝑖 using the same key 𝑘𝑖 for the different encryptions. Hence the 
difference between the two ciphertexts produces the above result, revealing some 
information about the plaintexts (i.e. the difference between 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑑"𝑖). This security 
flaw can be remedied by adding a random parameter ?̃?𝑖 to the encryption in Equation 6.3: 
?̃?𝑖 = (𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑘𝑖) mod 𝜑. 
In this case, the possession of ?̃?𝑖 = (𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑘𝑖) mod 𝜑 and ?̃?′′𝑖 = (𝑑′′𝑖 + ?̃?′′𝑖𝑘𝑖) mod 𝜑 
does not allow the attacker to retrieve the difference between the two plaintexts as ?̃?𝑖 and 
?̃?′′𝑖 are randomly picked up by 𝑢𝑖 and highly unlikely to be identical. This prevents any 
partial leakage to the attacker.  
6.6 A COMPARISON WITH EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
Although the efficiency of FHE schemes has received extensive attention and efforts have 
been made to improve it, there are still limitations on these methods as discussed in 
Section 3.3. In this section, we provide a comparison among selected existing solutions 
and highlight the improvements achieved by our scheme. Table 16 shows a brief summary 
of these selected schemes.  
Table 16: Selected Existing Schemes 
 Bits-based Mixed-based Integer-based 
Description Both input and output are 
in the form of bits. 
Input is in the form of integers 
and the output is in the form of 
bits. 
Both input and output 
are in the form of 
integers. 
Existing 
Schemes 
[128], [149], [153] [44], [48], [147] [35], [46], [76] 
Advantage/s Easier to achieve fully 
homomorphic properties. 
Support arbitrary addition. Support both addition 
and multiplication.  
Limitation/s More storage space 
required. 
Higher bandwidth for data 
transmission. 
Only support one multiplication. 
High computational complexity 
and communication costs to 
implement by mobile devices 
[146]. 
[46] requires a large 
public key. 
[35], [76] designed 
for a higher 
performance device.  
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More computing resources 
for encryption and 
decryption [46]. 
Require a large public key size 
for encryption [35], [76]. 
6.6.1 BITS-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 
Most of the existing FHE schemes are suffering from an efficiency issue as their choice 
of plaintext for encryption and the generated ciphertext is in the form of bits [128], [149], 
[153]. The advantage of such individual bit based encryption is easier to achieve fully 
homomorphic properties. Nevertheless, these encryption schemes significantly reduce the 
storage and communication efficiency that leads to an increase in the computational time. 
Furthermore, the schemes require applications to convert computation tasks into binary 
addition and multiplication operations, which makes the computation more complex [46]. 
In contrast, our proposed scheme shows simplicity that improves its efficiency. Our 
scheme is also designed based on integers to reduce storage consumption and increase 
communication efficiency so as to allow resource-constraint devices like smartphones 
and tablets to prolong battery lifetime.  
6.6.2 MIXED-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 
Several schemes have been proposed so that the plaintext for encryption is in the form of 
integers while the output remains in the form of bits [44], [48], [147].  Those schemes 
support arbitrary functions on an encrypted form with better efficiency as they are 
designed based on integers. Nevertheless, such schemes are also hardly to be 
implemented by resources-constraint devices due to still high computational complexity 
and communication costs [46]. In addition, those schemes require a large public key size 
for encryption [35], [76], which rapidly reduces the battery lifetime of mobile devices 
during data encryption. To remedy these weaknesses, our scheme is designed with its key 
size depending on the computation function required. For instance, our addition only 
function requires a shorter key for encryption so as to improve the scheme’s efficiency 
and reduce the battery consumption for the increase lifetime of mobile devices. This 
flexibility of the key size selection enables the scheme to incorporate any computation 
functions with better efficiency. As a result, our scheme allows mobile devices, which 
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have limited computing resources and storage spaces, to leverage rich-mobile 
applications provided by CSPs in an efficient and secure manner.   
6.6.3 INTEGER-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 
In the recent work by H. Zhou and G. Wornell [46], a new homomorphic encryption 
scheme has been developed. The scheme operates directly on integer vectors that support 
three operations, which are more specifically implemented in signal processing 
applications. The operations supported by this scheme are addition, linear transformation 
and weighted inner products. However, such a scheme has a limitation on the degree of a 
polynomial to be computed efficiently. Furthermore, this scheme suffers from an 
efficiency issue due to the large public key size adopted [46]. In contrast, our LHE scheme 
is able to compute both addition and multiplication on an encrypted form as long as the 
noise size (which is depending on the number of additions and multiplications) is less 
than the key for encryption. It can be implemented in various MCC related applications 
due to its lightweight property and strong security.  
In addition, the works in  [35] and [76] have proposed schemes with both plaintext and 
ciphertext in the form of integers. This approach improves the schemes’ efficiency as 
discussed earlier. In our view, those are the only schemes that consider the plaintext and 
the generated ciphertext in the integer form. Both schemes allow arbitrary functions to be 
executed on an encrypted data. Nevertheless, such schemes are designed for devices with 
higher performance due to the plaintext and ciphertext data being represented as matrices. 
Processing and transmitting data in a matrix form requires more computing resources and 
bandwidths as well as storages. In contrast, our LHE scheme has its output in a single 
integer form, which requires less time for computation, less bandwidth for data 
transmission and less space for data storage. These merits enable our scheme to be 
implemented more efficiently by resource-constraint devices like smartphones. To 
support this claim, we have tested the efficiency of both schemes under a MCC setting 
with the details provided in the following section.  
6.7 APPLICATION SETTINGS 
Our new LHE scheme enable mobile data to be outsourced and processed in cloud. 
However, data outsourcing itself is not sufficient to overcome the limitation of the mobile 
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devices as the security and privacy of the data are highly important and should be consider 
carefully [4], [9], [14], [129]. Also, excessive computation for securing the data on mobile 
devices before the outsourcing degrades their battery lifetime [168]. Thus, the security 
and computation complexity need to be balanced in order to provide a better scheme for 
outsourcing the data. In this section, we describe the application settings for implementing 
our scheme. 
 
Figure 23: A process of implementing LHE in MCC 
To process data in its ciphertext form, we propose a process of implementing the proposed 
LHE scheme in MCC as illustrated in Figure 23. We assume that there is a group of DCs, 
a DU and a CS managed by its CSP with their responsibilities described below: 
(i) DCs: 
They are a group of mobile users like smartphones and tablets. All the devices are 
connected to the Internet through wireless connections. The group members 
contribute their data to DU indirectly through CS after necessary processing.  
(ii) DU: 
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A third party organisation requires information from DCs in relation to specific 
tasks and purposes. It has low computing resources and storage spaces. It leverages 
the technology provided by the cloud to compute and store data purposely.  
(iii) CS: 
A cloud server managed by a CSP, which possesses a huge amount of computing 
power and storage space for computing and storing purposes. It is an untrusted party 
to provide Internet based applications and deliver services through Internet 
connections. DU takes advantage of such services to ask CS to collect and process 
the data from DCs for certain purposes.   
As an example, we consider a public health scenario where a group of individuals as DCs 
in the park share their personal health information like heart rates, blood pressures and 
weights with a local hospital as DU to get some statistical results based on the provided 
data. Here, the DCs are unwilling to disclose their personal data to CS and DU as there is 
no guarantee that their data privacy will not be violated. Thus, to allow such a scenario to 
be implemented securely, we propose a secure process as illustrated in Figure 23. The 
process involves four stages, which are described below: 
In stage 1, DU broadcasts a request to the group to ask for specific data to be processed 
by the CS. Upon receipt of the request, each group member 𝑢𝑖 in the possession of the 
requested data responds to DU to confirm its willingness for the data provision. After 
receiving the response from each of DC, DU utilies key generation algorithm in Sub-
section 6.4.1 to generate a set of secret keys for the responded group members and send 
a different key to each member.  
In stage 2, each participating DC 𝑢𝑖 applies the data encryption algorithm in Sub-section 
6.4.2 to encrypt its data with secret key 𝑘𝑖 received from DU in stage 1. 𝑢𝑖 then sends the 
encrypted data to CS for processing. 
In stage 3, after receiving the ciphertext data from every participating DC 𝑢𝑖, CS uses the 
algorithm in Sub-section 6.4.3 to process the received data based on the requirements set 
by DU and then transfers the result to DU.  
Finally, in stage 4, DU employs the algorithm in Sub-section 6.4.3 to decrypt the received 
result with its master keys to reveal the plaintext result.  
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For simulation purposes, we have set up various sizes of mobile networks using OPNET 
14.5.A. The simulations have been designed and implemented based on the mobile cloud 
computing setting in Figure 23 and attribute configurations in Table 17. The table 
includes the packet size for data transmissions in the network, the traffic type of service, 
and necessary wireless connection parameters. Based on these settings, we have run each 
simulation 50 times for accuracy and consistency [23]. Some computation times needed 
for the simulation are taken from the results measured by MATLAB.  
Table 17: Simulation attribute settings 
Node 
Type 
Packet 
Size 
(Bytes) 
Traffic Type 
of Service 
Wireless LAN Parameters 
BSS 
ID 
AP Physical 
Characteristic 
Data Rate 
(Mbps) 
Buffer Size 
(Bits) 
DC 128  Best Effort 0 Off Direct Sequence 11 256000 
DU 128  Best Effort 0 Off Direct Sequence 11 256000 
Server 128  Best Effort 0 On Direct Sequence 11 256000 
6.8 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we evaluate the total execution time of our LHE scheme and the chosen 
scheme for a comparison. The details of the chosen scheme can be found in [35]. The 
comparison results demonstrate the merit of our lightweight scheme in terms of its 
efficiency. 
6.8.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
In our total execution time tests, we have evaluated the total execution times of the two 
schemes for one round data processing in an encrypted form. We have simulated 50 runs 
for each round of data processing to get consistent results. This processing includes 
summation and multiplication on ciphertext data. We have implemented the two schemes 
with various numbers of DCs. The parameter settings of the schemes are given in the sub-
section, while the results and discussions of the conducted experiments are given in 6.8.3.  
6.8.2 PARAMETERS SETTINGS 
In our experiments, we use the parameter settings shown in Table 18. These parameter 
settings satisfy the conditions stated in Sub-section 6.4.1 in order to execute the two 
functions defined in Sub-section 6.4.3. 
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Table 18 : The parameter settings 
No. Parameters Bit length 
LHE Scheme The Chosen 
Scheme 
1. 𝑝 664 1024 
2. 𝑤 360 N/A 
3. 𝑟 80 16 
4. 𝑙𝑑 10 10 
5. 𝑙𝑐̃ 80 N/A 
6. 𝑙𝑠 80 N/A 
7. 𝑞𝑖 1024 N/A 
8. 𝜑 1024 N/A 
6.8.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The main purpose for evaluating the total execution times is to compare the efficiency of 
the two schemes. In our experiments, we have measured the execution times for 
completing one round of data processing using the following functions: 
(i) Addition-only operation: 
𝑓(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛) = ∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 mod 𝜑. 
(ii) Mixed addition and multiplication operation: 
𝑔(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛) = (∑?̃?𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
)  mod 𝜑. 
The condition (i) defined in Sub-section 6.4.1 needs to be satisfied by the secret keys used 
in 𝑓(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛). However, a new condition should be defined for 𝑔(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛) as 
it involves a mixture of both additions and multiplications. By applying similar 
relationships discussed in Sub-section 6.4.3, we can set the condition as 22𝑙𝑑𝑛 < 𝑟 
and 𝑟(1 + (2𝑙𝑑+𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠+1 + 22𝑙?̃?+2𝑙𝑠+log2𝑟)𝑛) < 𝑝 in order to enable DU to compute 𝑑" =
(𝑔(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛) mod 𝑝) mod 𝑟 (i.e. 𝑑" = ∑ 𝑑𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 ) for the plaintext result. This claim 
is supported by the following fact: 
(𝑔(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛) mod 𝑝) mod 𝑟 
= (((∑ ?̃?𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 ) mod 𝜑)mod 𝑝)mod 𝑟  
= (((∑ ((𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖) + ?̃?𝑖𝑝𝑞𝑖)
2𝑛
𝑖=1 )mod 𝜑)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟  
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= ((∑ ((𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖)
2 + 𝑝(2(𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖)?̃?𝑖𝑞𝑖 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
?̃?𝑖
2𝑞𝑖
2𝑝))mod 𝑝𝑤) mod 𝑝)mod 𝑟  
= ((∑ 𝑑𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑟∑ (2𝑑𝑖 ?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖
2𝑠𝑖
2𝑟)𝑛𝑖=1 + 𝑝𝑤") mod 𝑝)mod 𝑟  
= (∑ 𝑑𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑟∑ (2𝑑𝑖 ?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖
2𝑠𝑖
2𝑟)𝑛𝑖=1 ) mod 𝑟  
= ∑ 𝑑𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1   
The above result is based on the condition 22𝑙𝑑𝑛 < 𝑟 and 𝑟(1 + (2𝑙𝑑+𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠+1 +
22𝑙?̃?+2𝑙𝑠+log2𝑟)𝑛) < 𝑝, which leads to ∑ 𝑑𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 < 2
2𝑙𝑑𝑛 < 𝑟 and ∑ 𝑑𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 +
𝑟∑ (2𝑑𝑖 ?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖
2𝑠𝑖
2𝑟)𝑛𝑖=1 < 𝑟 + (2
𝑙𝑑+𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠+1 + 22𝑙?̃?+2𝑙𝑠+log2𝑟)𝑟𝑛 < 𝑝. Also, we use 
𝑝𝑤" to represent the result of 𝑝(2(𝑑𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖)?̃?𝑖𝑞𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖
2𝑞𝑖
2𝑝) mod 𝑝𝑤 with 𝑤" < 𝑤. 
Based on the parameter settings in Table 18, we now show that the 𝑛 secret keys can meet 
the necessary conditions. 
Claim 1: The addition only operation can satisfy the condition 2𝑙𝑑𝑛 < 𝑟 and 
𝑟(1 + 2𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠𝑛) < 𝑝. 
Proof: Let log2𝑛 = 9. Based on the settings in Table 18, we have: 
2𝑙𝑑𝑛 ≤ 2𝑙𝑑+log2𝑛 = 210+9 = 219 < 280 = 2log2𝑟 = 𝑟. 
Thus, 2𝑙𝑑𝑛 < 𝑟 is satisfied. 
Similarly, we can do the following calculation: 
𝑟(1 + 2𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠𝑛) ≤ 2log2𝑟 + 2𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠+log2𝑛+log2𝑟 = 280 + 280+80+9+80 = 280 + 2249
< 2664 = 2log2𝑝 = 𝑝. 
Hence, 𝑟(1 + 2𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠𝑛) < 𝑝 is also satisfied.  
 
Claim 2: The mixed addition and multiplication operation meets the condition 22𝑙𝑑𝑛 <
𝑟 and 𝑟(1 + (2𝑙𝑑+𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠+1 + 22𝑙?̃?+2𝑙𝑠+log2𝑟)𝑛) < 𝑝.  
Proof: In this case, we set the same value for n, i.e. log2𝑛 = 9. It is clear that 2
2𝑙𝑑𝑛 <
𝑟 is satisfied due to 22𝑙𝑑𝑛 ≤ 22𝑙𝑑+log2𝑛 = 229 < 280 = 𝑟. 
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Similar to the proof of Claim 1, 𝑟(1 + (2𝑙𝑑+𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠+1 + 22𝑙?̃?+2𝑙𝑠+log2𝑟)𝑛) < 𝑝 is also met 
because of: 
𝑟(1 + (2𝑙𝑑+𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠+1 + 22𝑙?̃?+2𝑙𝑠+log2𝑟)𝑛) ≤ 2log2𝑟 + 2log2𝑟+log2𝑛+𝑙𝑑+𝑙?̃?+𝑙𝑠+1 +
22log2𝑟+log2𝑛+2𝑙?̃?+2𝑙𝑠 = 280 + 280+9+10+80+80+1 + 2160+9+160+160 = 280 + 2260 +
2489 < 2664 = 𝑝. 
Therefore, we conclude that those parameter settings have met all the conditions as stated 
in Section 6.4.1.  
Through several experiments conducted based on those parameter settings in Table 18, 
our LHE scheme is faster than the chosen scheme as the computation complexity of the 
chosen scheme is higher than that of our scheme. Furthermore, by using our proposed 
scheme, the overall size of ciphertext data transmitted from each DC to CS is shorter than 
that of the chosen scheme. The reason is that the chosen scheme represents data as a 4 by 
4 matrix. Thus, submitting a single ciphertext requires 16 elements of the matrix to be 
transmitted [35]. Such a data transmission introduces more delays and requires more 
bandwidth and storage space. The experimental results based on the delay of both 
schemes are compared to evaluate their efficiency for data summation (i.e 
𝑓(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛)) and mixed operation (i.e. 𝑔(?̃?1, ?̃?2, … , ?̃?𝑛)) within one round of data 
processing. All the results are illustrated in Figure 24 for data summation and Figure 25 
for the mixed operation. We have measured the delays based on the designed process 
depicted in Figure 23, where three parties communicate with one another to process data 
collection, through ciphertext processing, to plaintext recovery.  
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Figure 24: Total execution times for one round of data processing (summing) in the 
ciphertext form 
Figure 24 illustrates the delay of one round of data summation on ciphertexts by the two 
schemes. The difference from the two lines shows that the delay introduced by our LHE 
scheme gradually increases as the number of contributors increases. However, for the 
chosen scheme, its delay is over 2 times higher than our scheme and goes higher as the 
number of data contributors gets larger. For example, when the number of contributors is 
50, the delay caused by LHE is below 0.1 second, whereas the delay caused by the chosen 
scheme is nearly 0.6 second. Furthermore, when the number of contributors increases to 
400, the delay caused by LHE is still lower, which is below 0.4 second, whereas the 
chosen scheme takes longer than 1 second. The main reason for the above differences is 
that the chosen scheme involves the matrix multiplication of keys and data [35]. Such 
computation incurs cubic complexity on each mobile node prior to data processing and 
hence extra delays. Furthermore, transmitting a ciphertext in a matrix form by a resource-
constraint device with lower data rate and buffer size requires capacities require more 
bandwidth, leading to a further delay to the data processing. In contrast, transmitting a 
ciphertext via a single integer by the same device using our scheme requires less 
bandwidth and thus consumes shorter time for completing the transmission process.  
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Number of Data Contributors
D
el
a
y
 i
n
 S
ec
o
n
d
s 
 
 
LHE Add
FHE(Matrix) Add
  
 
146 
 
 
Figure 25: Total execution times for one round of data processing (mixed 
operation) 
Figure 25 shows the delays of the two schemes on one round of data processing involving 
the mixed operation over ciphertext data. The two lines obviously demonstrate a 
significant difference in the delays between the two schemes. For our LHE scheme, the 
line gradually rises according to the rise in the number of contributors, but it is still 
acceptable and significantly smaller compared to the delays produced by the chosen 
scheme. In contrast, for the chosen scheme, the line increases rapidly in relation to the 
rise of the number of contributors. For instance, when the number of data contributors is 
50, the delay caused by our scheme is nearly 0.1 second, but the delay by the chosen 
scheme is more than 0.7 seconds. Furthermore, when the number of data contributors is 
400, the delay introduced by the chosen scheme drastically increases to more than 3.5 
seconds to complete the process, while our scheme only takes less than 0.5 second. 
Similar to the previous case, the main reason for the above differences is due to 
multiplications on 4 by 4 matrices used by the chosen scheme, which contain a big integer 
at each entry. Moreover, as the number of contributors gets higher, more time is required 
to complete the operation. Thus, the result in Figure 25 shows that our scheme is much 
more efficient. 
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6.9 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we have proposed our new LHE scheme that enables arbitrary data to be 
processed by homomorphic addition and multiplication in an encrypted form. The scheme 
has achieved simplicity and improved on its efficiency as the scheme is designed based 
on single integer rather than a matrix of integers. The related experiments have been 
conducted to compare the total execution times of our scheme with the most relevant 
existing scheme. The results have shown that our scheme can operate faster than the 
chosen scheme as it has less complexity in terms of its computation. Such a result is 
essential to enable the scheme to be executed by resource-constraint devices in an 
efficient manner. Furthermore, we have also provided the security analyses of our scheme 
to show that although it has less complexity, it can achieve stronger security on the 
outsourced data. The next chapter will provide a summary of the whole thesis together 
with further developments that can be done to improve our schemes in the future.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has presented two novel schemes APDA and LHE to allow mobile data to be 
collected, processed and stored in MSS and MCC environments, respectively. With the 
enhancement of cloud-based applications like Google-apps, the need for processing data 
in its ciphertext form is very much demanded in order to protect the data from disclosure 
to CSPs. Such a level of security promises tremendous advantages to the mobile users to 
enjoy a variety of applications without having to be concerned about their privacy and 
mobile devices’ limitations.  
In this thesis, APDA has been proposed to allow data to be aggregated in a privacy-
preserving manner. Data aggregation techniques that have widely been implemented in 
WSNs could be leveraged to extend the battery lifetime of mobile devices in a MSS. This 
is due to the emerging technology on mobile devices allowing more sensors to be 
embedded in such devices to sense and aggregate surrounding data to be further processed 
by the CSPs. For instance, an organisation like a hospital is interested in collecting and 
processing urban related information like personal health data instantly. Thus, users of 
such an application are requested to constantly upload their data so as to allow the 
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organisation to process the data and provide useful feedback to the users’ immediate need. 
Such personal medical data is directly related to the privacy of the users and there is no 
guarantee that their data is protected properly. Consequently, the users may refuse to share 
the information and cooperate with the organisation.  
In another scenario, the participating users may consist of both well-behaved and 
misbehaved users. For an example, misbehaved users such as a selfish driver may modify 
the information about his car speed to prevent other road users from choosing his road. 
Identifying such users in a privacy-preserving data aggregation is a very challenging task.  
Thus, the novel APDA scheme is proposed to hold the users’ accountable for their 
misbehaviour while minimising device performance degradation. Also our APDA has 
been extended to support maximal value finding in a privacy-preserving manner. Our 
experimental results on both APDA and its extended versions have demonstrated that 
they can achieve better efficiency compared to the existing schemes.  
Furthermore, being able to do addition and multiplication operations on encrypted data, 
the new LHE scheme is proposed. Our scheme works well as long as the noise size is less 
than the encryption key size. In our scheme, noise is embedded in each ciphertext for 
security reasons. The LHE scheme is really needed to allow resource-constrained devices 
like smartphones to efficiently leverage rich mobile applications provided by powerful 
computing resources and massive servers offered by CSPs. Our experimental results on 
the scheme have shown that its operability incurs a reasonable cost in terms of efficiency. 
Furthermore, the results have also shown that the scheme can achieve stronger security 
under the assumption that there is no collusion between mobile users and a CSP involved.  
To summarise the above results, this chapter provides a summary and conclusion on our 
research findings together with future work in the subject area. It is organised as follows. 
We first present a summary of the thesis in Section 7.2. The future work is then 
investigated and proposed in Section 7.3. Finally, our concluding remarks are provided 
in Section 7.4. 
7.2 THESIS SUMMARY 
This sub-section provides a summary of the whole thesis and describes how our objectives 
have been achieved through the contributions of this project. 
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7.2.1 OVERVIEWS ON THE PREVIOUS CHAPTERS 
Here, we give an overview on previous five chapters. In Chapter 1 of this thesis, we have 
introduced the research area and presented the motivation behind the work carried out. 
The aim and objectives of the research have been discussed along with an overview of 
the solutions and the novelties of the work.  
In Chapter 2, we have provided an overview of MSS and MCC in terms of its definition, 
benefits, limitations and existing solutions to the challenges. We have further discussed 
about the security challenges mainly on data security and integrity as well as users’ 
privacy. We have described the potential solutions to overcome such challenges using the 
existing works. However, such solutions still have limitations and need to be enhanced. 
Therefore, we have provided our solutions to remedy such limitations and described in 
chapters 4 and 6.  
In Chapter 3, the background on mathematical foundations has been presented. This 
chapter has defined some algebraic and number theory elements used throughout this 
thesis. Furthermore, the concepts of homomorphism and some related existing schemes 
have been introduced and discussed in this chapter. At the end of this chapter, we have 
detailed the research methodology taken for this research work.  
In Chapter 4, our first solution to the problem by allowing privacy-preserving data 
aggregation to be executed securely and efficiently has been presented. Furthermore, we 
have shown that our proposed solution provides a salient feature, which is able to detect 
with certainty any misbehaving nodes in a privacy-preserving manner. Moreover, we 
have shown that our extended APDA features maximal value finding to be executed on 
ciphertext data without compromising a user’s privacy. In addition, our extended APDA 
could be developed to compute other comparative operations in a privacy-preserving 
manner.  
In Chapter 5, we have provided security analyses, comparison with existing solutions, 
results and discussions to demonstrate the merits of our proposed solutions. Based on 
those analyses have led us to claim that our proposed schemes are suitable for 
implementing in MSS. 
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In Chapter 6, our second solution to overcome the efficiency problems with MCC has 
been provided with some justifications on why our scheme is highly required in such an 
environment. Furthermore, we have described the design and implementation settings of 
our proposed scheme. At the end of this chapter, we have shown some results obtained 
from the conducted experiments and provided some discussions on the results. 
7.2.2 A COMPARISON WITH EXISTING RESEARCHES 
A verifiable privacy-preserving data aggregation has received a great attention as mobile 
data is shared and processed by an AS like a CSP for various purposes. Several existing 
schemes have allowed mobile data to be protected and verifiable in a privacy-preserving 
manner [23], [57], [70], [72], [191]. Nevertheless, all of them do not provide further steps 
for node detection. Thus, our main objective of proposing APDA is to provide a verifiable 
privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme that can support an accountability of mobile 
users for their behaviour in the aggregation process. Our APDA offers a salient feature, 
which is capable of detecting misbehaved nodes with certainty and efficiency. Although 
our scheme has an extra functionality, our scheme still can provide better efficiency 
compared to the existing schemes.  
Furthermore, the main objective of having an aggregated result is to allow additive and 
non-additive functions like Count, Average, Min/Max and Percentile to be retrieved from 
such a result. Existing schemes that exploit homomorphism have allowed those functions 
to be computed in an encrypted form without any need for decryption [23], [42], [57], 
[67], [72]. However, such schemes still have limitations mainly in terms of their 
functionality and efficiency. Therefore, to overcome these limitations, we have extended 
our APDA to support maximal value finding in a privacy-preserving manner. Our 
simulation results show that the extended APDA provides better efficiency compared to 
the existing solutions.  
Finally, homomorphic encryption schemes based on integers are getting more attention 
due to their simplicity and efficiency. These schemes reduce computing resources while 
encrypting and decrypting, and require less bandwidth for data transmission, so as to 
reduce battery and storage consumptions [35], [46], [74], [76]. However, allowing 
ciphertext data to be executed by arbitrary functions in an encrypted form is very 
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challenging tasks in order to achieve a balanced performance between efficiency and 
functionality. Existing schemes that support fully homomorphic properties suffers from 
efficiency issues. Thus, going for this challenge as one of the objectives has brought to 
the introduction of a new LHE scheme that supports homomorphic addition and 
multiplication on ciphertext data. From the experimental result, we have shown that our 
LHE provides better efficiency compared to the chosen counter scheme.   
In summary, Table 19 provides an indication on whether each listed scheme delivers the 
objectives stated in Section 1.6 and listed in Table 20 for easy referencing.  
Table 19: Research Objectives achieved by the Proposed and Existing Schemes  
The Compared 
Schemes 
Objectives of our Proposed Schemes 
Objective 1 Objective 2 Objective 3 Objective 4 Objective 5 
LHE 
 
  √ √ 
APDA √ √ √ √ √ 
MAI [57] 
 
√ 
 
  
PPDM [25] √     
VPA [23] √ √  √  
PPSense [66] √     
PLAM [70] √ √    
PDA [67] √ 
 
 √  
Table 20: List of Research Objectives 
Objective  Description 
1 To develop a novel scheme, which can verify the integrity of 
aggregated data in MSS while preserving mobile users’ privacy. This 
objective has been achieved by using an extensive literature survey on 
privacy-preserving data aggregation techniques to provide the 
proposed novel APDA, which is able to verify the integrity of 
aggregated data without disclosing any information related to mobile 
users to the CSPs as described in Chapters 2 and 4.  
2 To propose an innovative scheme that can detect any misbehaved 
nodes in a data aggregation process in MSS without compromising 
individual nodes’ data privacy. Such an objective has been achieved 
  
 
153 
 
by using the proposed APDA with various versions to detect any 
misbehaved nodes in the aggregation process certainly and efficiently. 
We have evaluated those versions to confirm the fulfilment of this 
objective as described in Chapter 4.   
3 To extend the functionality of the above proposed scheme to support 
additive and non-additive statistical functions over encrypted data 
certainly and efficiently. We have developed an extended APDA by 
introducing three versions of a maximal value function in Chapter 4 
and evaluated those versions in Chapter 5 to fulfil this objective. 
4 To design a new FHE scheme, which has a lightweight property 
applicable to resource-constrained devices in MCC. This objective has 
been achieved by the proposed new LHE scheme that supports both 
addition and multiplication in an encrypted form as described in 
Chapter 6. Furthermore, we have evaluated this scheme for its 
fulfilment of this objective and described it at the end of Chapter 6. 
5 To design secure schemes without scarifying the privacy of mobile 
users during data outsourcing. This objective has been fulfilled by the 
extensive security analyses provided on the proposed schemes against 
several attacks launched by a curious AS or malicious devices as well 
as attacks on the schemes themselves such as key recovery attacks and 
a many time pad attack. We have shown in Chapter 5 and 6 that our 
schemes are secure against those attacks. 
7.2.3 NOVEL CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
The research findings presented in this thesis offer significant contributions to the 
advance of HE, particularly in terms of its applicability to the privacy-preserving data 
aggregation in MSSs and its efficient operation in MCC. More specifically, the main 
novel contributions of our research work can be described as follows: 
 In MSSs, data is sensed and aggregated by networked mobile devices, which 
could consist of both well-behaved and misbehaved nodes [58], [59]. Holding a 
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device accountable for its behaviour in such an environment is a very challenging 
task as data is encrypted to preserve the privacy of the users. Thus, the novel 
privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme APDA is proposed. This scheme 
allows the data to be aggregated in a privacy-preserving manner with an improved 
functionality that enables misbehaved nodes to be detected by an AS with 
certainty. APDA includes three sub-schemes with different benefits. APDAW is 
proposed to efficiently determine misbehaved nodes with less certainty. It offers 
lower computation and less communication as there is no digital signature 
included in ciphertext data. Conversely, APDAS is devised to pinpoint with 
certainty which nodes have misbehaved, but it has higher complexity and thus 
lower efficiency as the use of digital signatures is essential for holding 
misbehaved nodes accountable for their misbehaviour. To take advantage of the 
strengths of APDAW and APDAS as well as rectify their weaknesses, APDAH is 
introduced by mixing both versions to certainly spot misbehaved nodes with more 
balanced efficiency. 
 In data aggregation, the purpose of having aggregated data is to generate additive 
and non-additive statistical results like Sum, Average, Count, Min/Max and 
Percentile. Thus, a number of researchers have proposed schemes to allow such 
functions to be executed on ciphertext data so as to preserve the users’ privacy. 
Nevertheless, their limitations on efficiency and functionality are still the major 
challenges for their implementation [66], [67]. Therefore, the innovative 
extension of APDA is proposed to allow the AS to find the maximal value among 
those contributed by the 𝑛 nodes certainly and efficiently. Such an extension could 
be developed further for other comparative operations, which is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. The extension includes three sub-schemes, MaxC, MaxB and MaxH, 
for finding a maximum value. MaxC is designed to accurately determine a 
maximum value without compromising any privacy and security of the data 
involved, but its efficiency is lower. On the other hand, MaxB is produced to 
efficiently determine a maximum value but have less certainty in terms of whether 
the maximum determined is the right one. To take advantage of both methods, 
MaxH is introduced to accurately identify a maximum value with more balanced 
efficiency.  
  
 
155 
 
 The existing FHE schemes cannot be directly implemented by resource-
constrained devices as complexity and efficiency are the big obstacles for their 
implementation [37], [44]. Implementing such schemes requires extra computing 
resources to encrypt and decrypt the data, more bandwidth for transmitting the 
data and more storage spaces for storing the data [1], [11], [38], [46], [59]. Thus, 
the new LHE scheme with less complexity but strong security is proposed for 
MCC, so as to prolong the battery lifetime of mobile devices. This scheme allows 
mobile devices with limited computing resources and storage spaces to leverage 
rich mobile applications provided by CSPs in an efficient and secure manner.  
 During the design of our APDA methods, we have proposed a BU only approach 
for misbehaviour node detection. However, by using such an approach, the AS 
needs to check all the nodes when the integrity checking has failed even though 
some of them behaved well. Therefore, such a procedure still demands high 
communication and computation costs. To remedy such a problem, we have 
proposed a new method, which mixes the BU and TD approaches to accelerate the 
process of misbehaved node detection with better efficiency. The reason is that 
fewer exponentiations are computed in the verification process as the well-
behaved nodes are skipped from this check. Thus, the whole process requires less 
communication and computation. 
7.3 THE PROPOSED SCHEMES APPLICABILITY 
As described in the previous sub-section, we strongly believe that both MSS and MCC 
can be highly benefited by implementing our proposed schemes. This is due to our 
schemes offering effective and efficient solutions to remedy security issues inherent in 
both computing paradigms. Our schemes preserve user privacy as well as support user 
accountability without much resources degradation of mobile devices. In addition, our 
schemes guarantee confidentiality and integrity of the data generated by mobile devices 
against the external parties, which are responsible for processing the data.  
In MSS, the widespread implementation of smart city demands that data generated by 
mobile devices like smartphones is shared and processed by external parties to produce 
some useful information that could benefit other mobile users. Air quality [10], [192], 
[193] and transportation [194] are two relevant examples of main applications in smart 
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cities that require instant accurate information from the crowd to generate some useful 
real-time results. Our scheme suits both applications embedded with security solutions to 
the data generated by mobile users.  
In MCC, mobile users can access massive elastic resources and leverage rich-mobile 
applications provided by the cloud server in a very convenient way. For instance, file 
transfer via electronic mail using MCC proposed in [195] is a good implementation of 
MCC applications. Nevertheless, such files need to be filtered as they may contain 
malicious activity. Thus, our LHE is good to be implemented as it can filter all the files 
without disclosing the content of the files. Furthermore, our scheme can offer better 
efficiency compared to other methods such as a scheme proposed in [35] as transferring 
files online is resource consuming.         
7.4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Although a number of novel contributions have been presented in this thesis, it is possible 
to incorporate other features, which will enhance our schemes’ capabilities. In the 
following sub-sections, several possible future research directions stemming from this 
thesis are discussed. 
7.4.1 SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION 
Our APDA scheme allows the maximal value to be retrieved by the AS in a privacy-
preserving manner. Thus, similar methods could be developed for other comparative 
operations like finding a percentile, histogram and average on a given dataset. 
Furthermore, our LHE scheme allows homomorphic addition and multiplication to be 
executed in an encrypted form. In searchable encryption, more functions and operations 
are needed on data processing and retrieving such as data filtering based on keyword 
search, data sorting (e.g. ascending and descending order) and data grouping (e.g. sex, 
age and location). Thus, our schemes could be enhanced by adding more functionalities 
to allow those processes to be executed in a privacy-preserving manner.   
7.4.2 PARENT NODES SELECTION 
In MSSs, mobile nodes are embedded with sensors to sense surrounding data and 
aggregate such data to be processed by an AS. In the aggregation process, available parent 
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nodes need to be assigned prior to aggregate the data. However, as mobile nodes are 
mobile dynamically in and out of the coverage area of its children, the selection of parent 
nodes is crucial to ensure the suitable parent nodes to be selected at the first place of the 
aggregation process. As a result, the node mobility makes the selection of a parent node 
from the available ones hard. Thus, a suitable technique for determining a parent node 
from the available nodes in a MSS, e.g. the work in [196], can be used to allow the best 
available parent nodes to be chosen prior to aggregate the data. 
7.4.3 PUBLIC KEY DISTRIBUTION   
In APDAS, the public keys need to be shared among the relevant nodes for signature 
verifications. Existing approaches have provided solutions to share the key securely 
[197]. For example, in a certificate-based public key Infrastructure (PKI), where the 
certificate authority, i.e. the AS in our study, can issue a certificate to each node for its 
public key. This certificate is then passed to other nodes for signature verification. 
Alternatively, an approach like Identity Based Encryption (IBE) can also be used to 
distribute the key by allowing the AS to create a pair of private and public keys for each 
node. In such a scheme, a user can encrypt using users’ identities such as email addresses. 
Such an approach avoids the use of public key certification. Based on these two examples, 
it is essential to select a suitable technique to distribute the public key securely without 
degrading the performance of mobile nodes. 
7.4.4 PHYSICAL THREATS 
In MSS and MCC, a cloud server and mobile devices communicate via open 
communication devices such as Wi-Fi routers. Those devices may vulnerable to physical 
threats such as Denial of Service (DoS) and passive capturing [198] as they belong to the 
public and are beyond the control of mobile users. Nonetheless, as described in the threat 
model of MSS and MCC, we are not considering physical attacks as such attacks need 
different approaches for their solution and some of them can be found in  [199]–[203]. 
7.4.5 FHE BASED ON INTEGERS 
In our proposed scheme, we have improved the scheme efficiency by reducing the scheme 
complexity while achieving the strong security of the scheme. The proposed schemes 
  
 
158 
 
allow data to be processed in its ciphertext form. However, our schemes can only retrieve 
a correct result if and only if the noise generated from the process is less than the secret 
key. Thus, to allow such schemes to be implemented, the expected noise size needs to be 
estimated to ensure that a suitable secret key size is selected. Therefore, our schemes can 
be further improved so that it can handle arbitrary functions without the need to know the 
function to be executed in order to set the noise size. Our scheme can achieve fully 
homomorphic properties if it can handle the added noise in the decryption without any 
limitation and also improve its efficiency.  
7.4.6 FUNCTIONAL FHE 
A scheme, which enables some specific functions to be executed on ciphertext data 
without disclosing other information about the data, is really interesting. Such a scheme 
is known as Functional Encryption (FE) [204]. A FE scheme can be described as a scheme 
where the decryption key allows a user to learn a specific function of the encrypted data 
and nothing else [204]. Furthermore, [204] has also described that in a functional 
encryption system, a trusted authority holds a master key (𝑚) known only to the authority. 
When the authority is given the description of some function 𝑓 as input, it uses its master 
key to generate a derived secret key 𝑠𝑘[𝑓] associated with 𝑓. Now anyone holding 𝑠𝑘[𝑓] 
can compute 𝑓(𝑥) from an encryption of any 𝑥.  
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Figure 26: The proposed protocol with added Data Authority (DA) 
An FHE scheme holds a promise to allow data to be processed in its ciphertext while the 
FE scheme allows only a specific ciphertext to be revealed to the users and keeps the rest 
as a secret. In cloud settings, the combination of FHE and FE schemes will provide more 
flexibility to the output of the processed data by CSPs. Furthermore, it also provides an 
improved security feature to the user’s data. In such a combination, an additional party, 
i.e. a trusted authority (Data Authority (DA)), needs to be introduced as illustrated in 
Figure 26. In the figure, the DA generates a master key (𝑚) and a secret key 𝑠𝑘[𝑓] based 
on the requested function 𝑓 by a Data User (DU). Then, the DA sends the 𝑠𝑘[𝑓] to the 
DU so that the DU could decrypt the specific result based on the requested function 𝑓. 
The Fully Functional Homomorphic Encryption (FFHE) scheme provides an improved 
version of FHE and FE to our setting as in such a scheme, the inherent security flaw in 
our proposed scheme can be dissolved. That is, the problem of possible collusion between 
a DU and a CSP could be solved by introducing functional encryption mixed with the 
Data Contributors (DC) 
Data Users (DU) 
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FHE scheme. Such a combination allows the DU only to receive specific information 
about the users’ data based on the function requested.     
7.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Recent technologies in mobile devices and cloud computing have brought a new and 
efficient way for data to be collected, processed and stored. Mobile devices like 
smartphones have evolved on their capabilities to leverage rich mobile applications 
provided by CSPs. Furthermore, such devices are not only being used as communication 
tools, but also their role has been extended to act as sensors to collect surrounding data 
mainly in urban areas. Local weather, crowd monitoring and road traffic are part of the 
surrounding data that can be collected by the devices to share with other users. On the 
one hand, such sharing can benefit local people so that they are able to better plan and 
manage their daily life efficiently and productively. On the other hand, the privacy of the 
data collected has to be protected and preserved. By introducing a technique that can 
protect and preserve mobile users’ data, they can enjoy tremendous benefits provided by 
cloud computing and take full advantage of data aggregation techniques while improving 
data security and maintaining the battery lifetime of mobile devices.  
Privacy-preserving data aggregation is an approach that allows users’ privacy to be 
preserved against any curious CSPs in MSSs. Nevertheless, holding the users accountable 
for their behaviour using such a technique is a very challenging task as their data is 
encrypted. Thus, in this thesis, we have proposed a novel APDA to support the 
accountability of mobile users without compromising the users’ privacy. To efficiently 
detect any misbehaved nodes in the aggregation process, APDAW is composed of a weak 
version of accountability but high efficiency. Conversely, to certainly pinpoint the 
misbehaved nodes, APDAS is devised with lower efficiency due to its higher algorithmic 
complexity. To take advantage of both versions, APDAH is proposed to provide strong 
accountability with balanced efficiency, which is supported by our security analysis and 
experimental results.  
The successfully aggregated data also needs to be accompanied by some summary 
information based on necessary additive and non-additive functions. Thus, our APDA has 
been extended to allow maximal value finding to be computed on the ciphertext data so 
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as to preserve user privacy with good efficiency. The extension includes three versions 
for maximal value finding with different levels of accuracy and efficiency. To confidently 
determine a maximal value, MaxC is proposed but its efficiency is lower. In contrast, to 
efficiently determine the maximum value, MaxB is designed but its accuracy is lower. 
Thus, MaxH is produced to combine both versions to balance their strengths and 
weaknesses for high accuracy and balanced efficiency. The efficiency measurements on 
each version have been conducted through our experiments. The results have shown that 
MaxH is the most balanced method to implement in a MSS. 
To further leverage the tremendous benefits provided by CSPs, MCC is introduced. MCC 
is receiving great popularity due to the emerging technology of mobile devices together 
with the widespread 3G/4G networks and Wi-Fi access. MCC has brought rich mobile 
application experiences from CSPs to mobile users. In addition, FHE schemes have 
allowed mobile users to enjoy such experience from their mobile devices securely. 
Nevertheless, efficiency is still a big obstacle in their practical implementation mainly in 
mobile nodes, which have limitations on computing resources and storage spaces. These 
limitations are due to several reasons, which are mainly related to a large key size for 
encryption and the size of ciphertext data, which consumes a large amount of bandwidth 
for data transmission and requires huge storage spaces for data storing. 
The aforementioned reasons have led us to propose a new LHE scheme for data to be 
outsourced and processed in its ciphertext form without decryption, so as to preserve the 
privacy of mobile users. We have simulated the related processes to measure the 
efficiency of our proposed scheme. Based on our comparison with the related work, we 
claim that our scheme provides better efficiency and can achieve stronger security at a 
reasonable cost. 
As described in the thesis, our APDA method has its own novelties, mainly the scheme’s 
efficiency while guaranteeing data integrity, user privacy and accountability as well as 
data security. On the one hand, our APDA is plausible to incorporate other comparative 
functions on encrypted data like finding Average, Percentile and Histogram. Furthermore, 
by using this method, it is good to have a suitable technique like the one in [196] to 
determine the best node to be a parent node for aggregating the data via a hierarchical 
structure in a network. This is due to the nature of a mobile node, which is dynamically 
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in and out of the coverage area of its children. Moreover, as the existing key management 
schemes are computational expensive, it is good to have an efficient algorithm for public 
key distribution to run on resource-constraint devices without degrading their 
performance.  
On the other hand, our LHE scheme requires that the expected noise size be estimated to 
ensure the selection of a suitable secret key size. Therefore, it is good to have a scheme 
that can handle arbitrary functions without the need to know the function to be executed 
in order to set the noise size. In addition, the implementation of Functional Encryption 
(FE), which supports fully homomorphic properties, is desirable as such an encryption 
scheme could improve data privacy and processing efficiency. This is because 
implementing existing schemes leads to the decryption of all data or nothing. In contrast, 
the Fully Functional Homomorphic Encryption (FFHE) scheme allows arbitrary 
operations on a targeted result to be obtained by using a restricted secret key on the whole 
encrypted data. This reveals nothing about the rest of the encrypted data as the data 
remains in its ciphertext form.    
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